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Thesis Summary 
In this thesis, a novel protocol stack architecture is presented. The Future Core 
Networks System (FCNS) forms a secure reference model for use in packet- 
switched structures, with its applicability ranging from computer to 
telecommunication networks. An insight on currently used network protocol 
systems is given, analysing standardised sets of communication rules with respect 
to the security they afford to the messages exchanged. The lack of protection 
schemes for the internal protocol stack messages and the implementation pitfalls of 
their security architectures are described, in relation to the effects they have on the 
communication process. The OSI security model is also considered, with 
disadvantages identified in the placement of security functionality and its 
management. The drawbacks depicted for currently used systems form the 
motivation behind this work. The analysis of the FCNS follows, which is composed 
of three parts. In the first part, the FCNS communication layers are examined, with 
respect to the mechanisms used to establish, maintain and tear down a connection 
between peer entities. In the second part, the security mechanisms of the 
proposed reference architecture are given, including details on the FCNS keystream 
generator used for the security of the internal FCNS messages. Finally, the FCNS 
Error Protocol is depicted, illustrating the modes of operation and advantages it 
exhibits over currently used systems. The work then moves into presenting details 
of the software FCNS implementation, followed by the presentation of the results 
and measurements obtained by the case studies created. Comparisons are given in 
relation to the TCP/IP suite, to provide the means of identifying the 
FCNS 
applicability in various network environments. The work is concluded by presenting 
the FCNS functionality in delivering information for the UMTS, together with further 
work that may enhance the flexibility and use of the proposed architecture. 
2-- 
- 
---)rd --. 
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Chapter 1: Thesis Review 
Chapter 1. Thesis Review 
1.1 Overview 
1.2 Methodology 
1.3 Original Contributions 
1.4 Terminology 
1.5 Thesis Organisation 
A general review of the thesis and its structure with respect to the chapters 
presented and the applicability of the subject developed is provided. An overview 
of the system designed is given, together with the methodology used to materialise 
its software implementation. The objectives and contributions of the thesis are 
consequently presented, together with the various terms used throughout the 
document and, finally, a brief description of the chapters' contents. 
Chapter I-2 Protocol Security for 3 Generation Telecommunication Systems 
1.1 Overview 
Telecommunication systems management is a concept intended to decompose the 
management of a system into functions, enabling operators to better handle and 
identify potential network problems [1]. These functions include the performance 
management of a system, fault management, configuration management, 
accounting management and security management. The last of these has become 
a critical issue for the scientific community, due to the increased amount of vital 
information exchanged over the existing platforms between users and the number 
of subscribers requesting connections. The introduction of the Third Generation 
(3G) systems [2] will provide customers with advanced services and mobile 
commerce capabilities, further complicating the degree of effort and technology 
required to efficiently handle security management issues. 
This thesis considers the security organization of packet-switched (PS) networks 
and the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) Core Network (CN) 
architecture, as described in Release 99 (R99) specification by the 3G Partnership 
Program (3GPP) [3]. Its architectural view is depicted in Figure A. 1 of Appendix A. 
The reason for choosing the R99 as the representative packet-switched architecture 
of the UMTS CN lays on the deployment of the 3rd generation telecommunication 
network, whereby a migration from the currently used Global System for Mobile 
(GSM) communications [4], [5] should be supported. 
In particular, the work entails the specification and implementation details of a 
protocol stack architecture. This has been named the Future Core Network System 
(FCNS) and has been developed to accommodate the necessary network and 
protocol security functions that should be used to protect the system from possible 
attacks. The structure designed represents a model framework that could 
be used 
under any packet-switched environment, serving as the means of primarily 
protecting the stack architecture against attacks aiming at the operation of the set 
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of communication rules and consequently providing the appropriate functions to 
secure the user and/or signalling data exchanged. 
The motivation of this work is the disadvantages of currently used protocol 
architectures supporting communication networks and these are discussed in 
Chapter 3. FCNS provides the capability to secure all layers of the communication 
process, throughout the connection phases that protocols might be involved with at 
that time. The necessity of the application of the security functions is at the 
discretion of the network operator, although it is recommended that the FCNS 
functions be enforced and employed thoroughly, according to the protocol 
specification given in Chapters 4,5 and 6. 
Finally it should be noted that FCNS has been designed as a framework for use in 
network environments, with existing protocol architectures serving as one of its 
layers, if that is requested by the network operator. It has been realised in 
software to provide a measure of its functionality and compare its performance 
against stanclardised models. 
1.2 Methodology 
Protocol design constitutes a challenging task due to the diversity of the systems 
that have to be supported and the identification of the appropriate parameters for 
its implementation. Reduced complexity, clear definition of the protocol functions, 
flexibility, portability and interoperability with other systems are just a few of the 
parameters that need to be taken into account to provide a system that is efficient, 
easy to comprehend and easy to use [6]. 
The approach taken for the realisation of the FCNS architecture follows the principle 
of specifying the functions of the protocol and its verification against the standards 
addressed in its design, prior to transforming it into a software or hardware entity. 
Chapter 1-4 Protocol Security for 3r" Generation Telecommunication Systems 
The proposal has to be clearly defined and detailed in its specification, which should 
then be checked for logical consistency and conformance to the parameters and 
issues surrounding the environment for which applicability is addressed. Figure 1-1 
illustrates the steps taken to complete the development of the FCNS stack 
architecture, following the approach of a software - based implementation for 
simulation purposes. 
Specification 
Informal I 
Presentation 
Description 
Software (C/C++)l I Hardware (VHDL) 
Simulation 
Figure 1.1: Protocol design and development steps 
The specification of FCNS has been created to provide the basis upon which the 
rules of the protocol stack are supported, presenting the capabilities and functions 
of the protocols that can be used in a network architecture. It thus contains details 
of the messages used for realising the services provided to the system nodes, 
together with recommendations for the use of the FCNS functions for achieving the 
maximum possible performance and network resource utilisation. 
To abstract the requirements addressed into a functional prototype for testing and 
verification purposes, the FCNS has been presented in flow chart diagrams, with 
respect to its layered protocols and the services offered to their users. Prototype 
building forms an important step in validating the conformance of the protocol to its 
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specification, enabling the identification of pitfalls, such as deadlocks and livelocks, 
where the system could enter a state halting its operation or lock into a particular 
state that cannot recover from. The design requirements of the protocol stack are 
given in Chapter 7 of the thesis, including any assumptions taken as to the network 
environment for which the architecture has been designed. 
Usually, in high-level designs, the prototype building is followed by its 
interpretation using a description language, such as the Specification and 
Description Language (SDL) [7] or the Unified Modelling Language (UML) [8). The 
approach has the advantage of providing additional means to validate the system 
prototype using standardised methods and techniques. Currently available tools 
[9], [10] support the translation of the SDL code into a higher-level language such 
as C++, substantially reducing the work involved in a source code implementation 
of the stack model. 
As a final step in completing the design of the proposed architecture, the protocol 
functions and states have been translated into C++ source code for use within a 
network simulator environment. The OMNET++ simulator [11] has been chosen for 
obtaining performance measurements for the FCNS structure, as described in 
Chapter 8, identifying the conformance of the complete stack to its specification, as 
well as evaluating its efficiency against numerous operational conditions. 
Different approaches can be followed to obtain validation prototypes and then move 
into realising the model into a functional software or hardware unit. No matter the 
tools available though, the steps depicted in Figure 1.1 constitute the foundations 
for the methodological design, testing and development not only of protocol but 
general system architectures intended for use within real operating environments. 
Chapter 1-6 Protocol Security for 3' Generation Telecommunication Systems 
1.3 Original Contributions 
The completion of this thesis has led to a number of contributions in the field of 
study, including: 
e The design and development of a novel secure protocol stack architectural 
framework, realising security services to all levels of protocol communication 
in a network environment running the FCNS stack. 
0A secure structure addressing the problem of protocol security for the set of 
communication rules itself, against possible active attacks. 
0 The provision of a secure error signalling protocol supporting error 
notification services used between internal to the stack and peer network 
element entities. 
9 The design of a keystrearn generator architecture utilising existing 
pseudorandom number generation technology and one-way hash functions. 
The secret keys produced constitute the parameters of the security contexts 
exchanged between the FCNS security and communication layers. 
0 The functional realisation of the proposed architecture, yielding greater 
performance to existing network protocol structures, such as the TCP/IP 
suite, validated through simulation. Each of the FCNS layers has been 
implemented as a separate set of communication rules affording numerous 
services to its user, irrespective of currently used protocol architectures. 
o The investigation, simulation and analysis of the FCNS use in a generic 
packet-switched architecture and the UMTS core network, deducing 
comparisons with standardised network protocols. 
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1.4 Terminology 
Throughout the thesis there are several terms used to facilitate the composition of 
the material and its presentation. Unless explicitly defined in the document, the 
following assumptions and expressions should stand for: 
* "Application": The term is used to indicate either the FCNS stack user 
residing on top of the User-Defined Presentation (UDPRES) layer or a 
network element active in a network connection using the FCNS stack 
protocol instances. 
""Threat" or security threat will denote an entity possessing some danger to 
an information element (asset). 
* ""Attack" is the active attempt of an adversary in manipulating the network, 
either to disclose information or ultimately cause the termination of a 
connection. In a sense, an attack is the realisation of a threat. 
* "Network element"' denotes any node of the network used for the realisation 
of its services to the users connected to it. Those users will also be referred 
to as network elements. 
0 ""Protocol" is the set of communication rules used to provide a specific set of 
services throughout the communication phases. 
9 ""Protocol usee is the process residing on top of the protocol making use of 
its services, to provide access to these, either to the layer above, or to the 
application running the instance of the protocol. 
9 ""Information" and "Data" are terms closely related and therefore may 
appear in the thesis as signifying the same notion. It should be noted 
though that they differ in the sense that information is what a user really 
wants to transmit, whereas data is the format used to enable the 
transmission of the information. 
* ""3G" will be used to denote an integrated system whereby a subscriber is 
given connection capabilities with users belonging to diverse networks and 
environments. 
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The exact details of the mapping of a protocol's Service Data Unit (SDU) into a 
Protocol Data Unit (PDU) are not given, since their realisation is based on the 
functions of the simulation program(s) available. 
1.5 Thesis Organisation 
The thesis has been written in nine chapters including this one. An overview of the 
work presented subsequently is given below: 
0 Chapter 2 constitutes an introduction to packet-switched architectures 
including comPuter and telecommunications systems technology and 
protocols used to support their operation. 
* Chapter 3 provides the network and protocol security issues currently 
addressed in deployed systems. The disadvantages of the mechanisms used 
are presented, since they comprise the motivation of the work presented 
thereafter. 
0 Chapter 4 introduces the FCNS architecture and more specifically its 
communication layers structure, entailing details of the protocols' functions 
and services offered. 
o Chapter 5 moves into analysing the FCNS security layer responsible for the 
provision of the security functions and services afforded to the FCNS stack. 
A detailed description of the FCNS keystrearn generator is also provided. 
0 Chapter 6 analyses the FCNS error protocol, outlining its architecture and 
functionality with respect to the FCNS layers and the peers involved in a 
communication process. 
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Chapter 7 introduces the details of the FCNS implementation as a valid 
prototype, as well as a functional software instance for use within a 
simulation environment. 
Chapter 8 considers the simulation environments created for the provision 
of the FCNS efficiency and security implication measurements. Observations 
and results are therefore analysed in this chapter. 
Chapter 9 provides the conclusions of this work, given the implementation 
suggestions and future work that could be undertaken to improve the 
applicability Of the stack architecture. 
Appendix A includes the specification diagrams of the FCNS protocols, in 
the form of flow charts. 
Appendix B represents the results obtained for the statistical 
measurements of the FCNS keystream generator. 
Appendix C presents the list of publications to date resulting from this 
work. 
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Chapter 2: Communication Systems 
Chapter 2. Communication Systems 
2.1 Overview 
2.1.1 Circuit-Switched Systems 
2.1.2 Packet-Switched Systems 
2.2 Wireless Telecommunication Network Systems 
2.2.1 Overview 
2.2.2 Supporting Protocols 
2.2.2.1 Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) 
2.2.2.2 Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) 
2.2.2.3 Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) 
2.2.2.4 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
This chapter provides an introduction to data transmission based on packet 
message structures and packet-switched (PS) technology. An overview of the 
history and current network status is given, followed by discussion of 
telecommunication environments. More specifically, the Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) is presented, forming the integration of the 
fixed and mobile network systems often referred to as the Third Generation (3G) 
communications network. Finally, an insight into currently used protocol 
architectures is given, entailing details of the communication rules supporting 
information exchange in the UMTS Core Network (CN). 
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2.1 Overview 
Transmission systems techno(ogy has addressed communication needs between 
individuals, across distances greater than would normally be possible without the 
use of additional mechanisms [12]. Architectures such as the Public Switched 
Telephone Network (PSTN) [13] and computer networks [14] have enabled 
information exchange between users worldwide on a voice and/or data packet 
transfer basis. These networks may conveniently be categorised into Circuit- 
Switched (CS) and Packet-Switched (PS) architectures [13]. 
2.1.1 Circuit-Switched Systems 
CS systems base their operation in initiating and maintaining a connection 
throughout the call duration. In a sense, CS networks conform to a connection- 
oriented transmission, allocating the appropriate network resources to the users 
and offering a fixed data rate. PSTN and the Integrated Services Digital Network 
(ISDN) [15] are the most common examples of such environments used for voice 
transmission connections. 
Details of the switching principles supporting CS connections fall outside the scope 
of the thesis and will consequently not be analysed in this document. The signalling 
procedures of the CS environments [16], such as the common-channel technique 
form the very essence of a network environment where voice data is to be 
exchanged. The current status of such procedures is based on the application of 
the Signalling System 7 (SS7) protocol architecture [17], which is used in various 
applications ranging from the PSTN, to the UMTS core network CS domain [18]. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the architectural view of the SS7 protocol stack and its relation 
to the OSI model [19]. 
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Figure 2.1: SS7 architecture and its relation to OSI 
The Message Transfer Part (MTP) is divided into three levels, each of which 
represents a different set of actions, defining a separate layer of the SS7 stack. 
MTP level 1 encompasses the details of a physical layer protocol, including electrical 
and functional characteristics of the digital signalling link [20]. Data rates for the 
system vary from 56Kbps to 2048 Kbps depending on the physical interface used. 
Additionally, MTP level 2 acts as the data link layer of the structure, being 
responsible for the reliable and in-sequence delivery of the SS7 messages across 
the signalling link. The MTP level 3 protocol provides for the routing of the 
respective messages across the signalling network nodes present in the topology, 
and also contains functions regulating the information flow for congestion 
avoidance. 
The Telephone User Part (TUP) layer has been used in some countries to serve as 
the means of supporting the call setup and tearing down bearer functions, though it 
is the ISDN User Part (ISUP) protocol that has replaced the TUP functions on a 
global scale [21]. Generally, ISLIP is responsible for the maintenance and control of 
ISDN and non-ISDN based calls. The Transaction Capabilities (TCAP) layer [22] 
addresses issues such as the transmission of non circuit-related data using the 
connection provided by the Signalling Connection Control Part (SCCP) [23]. Both 
connection -oriented and connectionless services can be supported by the 
SCCP, 
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whereby an identifier is used to distinguish between the various signalling points 
the application instance is attached to. 
SS7 has been successfully implemented in digital telephone exchanges, enabling 
the realisation of the ISDN services to the subscribers., offering on-demand 64Kbps 
rates for voice and data transmission [24]. Moreover, the reliability of the protocol 
suite has enabled its employment in the UMTS architecture, supporting the CS 
domain of the fixed network part for the voice calls made between the users [3]. 
2.1.2 Packet-Switched Systems 
Packet-switched (PS) architectures were designed and presented in the 1960s as 
attempts made by research institutes to progress from CS structures to network 
communications using packets [25], [26]. Following the publication of these works, 
the first ever packet network, the ARPANET, was realised in 1969 encompassing 
only four nodes. By the middle 1980s, the specification of the TCP/IP protocol suite 
[27] enabled the growth of the primitive network, essentially renaming it to 
Internet and providing connectivity for various nodes independent of the ARPANET. 
PS topologies encompass environments such as Local Area networks (LANs), Wide 
Area Networks (WANs) and other private or proprietary environments, as well as 
the Internet, interconnecting all networks under a single technological umbrella. 
The difference between these systems does not lay in the signalling technology 
governing their operation. Instead, architectures supporting the communication in 
a LAN are the same as that on another PS network and/or the Internet. Their 
distinction is based in the hierarchical view of the network, whereby smaller, 
controllable and trusted systems are connected via an untrusted and unknown 
environment. 
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Numerous differences exist between the two switching mechanisms influencing 
everyday communication. Figure 2.2 illustrates a sample connection timeline for 
the CS and PS techniques between two peer users [28]. 
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Figure 2.2: Circuit Switching vs. Packet Switching 
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Table 2.1 addresses the main differences between CS and PS techniques. Virtual 
circuit packet switching emulates the CS architecture in that a virtual circuit is 
setup whenever data is to be transferred. Data message transmission then follows 
the principles of the packet switched topologies, which are often denoted as 
datagram packet-switched ones. 
Until the design and development of the 3G communication systems, PS and CS 
systems have been independent of each other [29], with only ISDN achieving a 
partial degree of integration. Services were offered to users via the telephone line 
with separate channels being used for the voice and the data messages on a CS 
based connection, representing a virtual circuit packet-switched mechanism. 
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Circuit Switching Virtual circuit packet switching Packet switching 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of the CS and PS 
Characteristic Circuit Switching Virtual Circuit Packet Switching 
Switching 
Call setup Req u1 red Required Not needed 
Physical path Dedicated Not dedicated Not dedicated 
Packet delivery In-sequence May arrived May arrive 
unordered unordered 
Packet routing Follow same May follow May follow 
route different routes different routes 
Bandwidth allocation Fixed Dynamic Dynamic 
Congestion built up At setup time At setup time and On every packet 
on every packet 
Transparency Yes No No 
(constant data rate) 
Store and forward No Yes Yes 
technique 
Overhead in No overhead Overhead in each Overhead in each 
messages after call setup packet packet 
Delay Call setup Call setup and Packet 
packet transmission 
transmission 
The provision of virtual circuit packet-switched connections though cannot always 
be achievable and there may be cases where the setup of a dedicated connection is 
not wanted. The identification of the appropriate switching mechanism depends on 
numerous factors including the size of the network, the load pattern, the host 
characteristics and the network topology. It is therefore up to the network operator 
to decide on the connection technique used and to share the system resources 
among multiple users and transmissions. 
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Connections are supported by the transmission of the information into the 
communication medium, either in an analogue or digital format. The technique 
used is strongly dependent on the technology of the underlying channel, which may 
vary from twisted copper cables, to optical fibres and microwave or Radio 
Frequency (RF) links. Digital transmission has been assumed for the FCNS 
implementation, with a typical system being depicted in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: Digital communications system 
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Principles defining the operation of digital systems involve the representation of the 
required data into discrete levels and their transmission via the communication link 
[30]. Usually, encryption/decryption functions are implemented on a demand-only 
basis, since their use may not be required for all connections. 
Digital communication systems have developed to provide transmission that is 
clearer and with less interference than the analogue based ones. Currently used 
architectures base their operation in faster and cheaper connections, enabling the 
exchange of the user information at the highest possible quality [31], [32]. 
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Consequently, telecommunication networks, and more specifically 3G systems, 
have been designed to function on top of structures providing such capabilities and 
resources [33]. 
2.2 Wireless Telecommunication Network Systems 
Wireless networks have been developed to support long-distance communication 
between users. They evolved from the initial designs of the analogue systems 
supporting the basic speech service, such as the Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) in 
Scandinavia, Total Access Communication System (TACS) in the United Kingdom 
and Advanced Mobile Phone Service (AMPS) in the USA [34]. In the 1990s the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) adopted the new 
generation of mobile communications, the GSM, supplying the necessary resources 
for the introduction of data services to the subscribers. 
2.2.1 Overview 
Since the implementation of the GSM, mobile communication has become a mass 
market [35]. Requirements for higher bit rates and more sophisticated services 
leveraged research on mobile networks, leading to the design of UMTS. The need 
for standardisation for open interconnection systems providing full roaming services 
[36], have enabled the migration from the second-generation (2G) systems to an 
advanced network, integrating fixed and mobile technologies to supply the 
maximum possible Quality of Service (QoS) [37], [38]. Simultaneously, the 
integrated system has addressed the need of a globally accepted relocation to allow 
interoperability with existing network technologies [39]. 
The principles behind UMTS dictate that a user should be able to access the 
services provided no matter his/her geographical position with respect 
to the peer 
entity and the network provider. However, global connectivity issues remain on a 
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theoretical level, with their implementation being dependent on the interoperability 
between providers and the data rates that could be available to the subscribers. 
Figure 2.4 depicts the basic concept of communication for 3G mobile systems. 
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Figure 2.4: Bask UMTS connectivity concept 
UMTS consists of three different network environments. Its main components are 
the access network [40], [41], often referred to as the UMTS Radio Access Network 
(UTRAN), and the fixed network part, denoted as the Core Network (CN). The 
satellite component of the UMTS (S-UMTS) has been designed to compensate for 
global connectivity issues between users belonging to different physical locations. 
This system integration aims at optimally using the common networks that may be 
present and avoiding any unnecessary functional duplication. Table 2.2 identifies 
the main areas migration towards UMTS targets [42]. 
Table 2.2: UMTS integration domains 
I Aim 
Service integration -------rServices offered to the user are the 
same for both fixed and mobile 
communications 
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Infrastructure integration Transport and switching infrastructure 
between UMTS and B-ISDN 
communication should be shared 
Functional integration Functional entities in the fixed network 
should be shared with UMTS to a 
maximal extend 
Protocol integration Fixed protocols should be selected to 
support UMTS information transfer and 
signalling at the interfaces 
The UTRAN is a collection of subsystems aimed at switching the voice data 
information between the subscribers, identifying the necessary parameters for the 
setup of the call connection [43]. It is the cellular environment of UMTS adopting a 
mixed cell architecture basing its operation in architectures such as the Wideband 
Code Division Multiple Access (W-CDMA) [44 - 47] and Spread Spectrum 
techniques [48 - 51]. 
S-UMTS is a system still under development, with its implementation awaiting the 
commercial deployment of the UMTS and the interoperability between the various 
service providers worldwide [52]. 
Finally, the UMTS CN is a collection of network elements serving as the main 
switching centre of the integrated network, for both voice and non-voice based 
data. Its architecture has undergone several modifications varying from the 
Release 99 (R99), to the Release 6 (R6) specifications [53], with emphasis being 
given to the underlying protocols supporting its operation [54], [55]. The CN 
consists of two domains, namely the circuit switched and the packet switched ones. 
The former is responsible for the transmission of the voice data between the peers 
[56 - 59], whilst the latter addresses issues regarding packet 
data transmission and 
interconnectivitY with networks such as the Internet and/or LANs. 
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2.2.2 Supporting Protocols 
The identification of advanced radio and packet services [60 - 621 led to the design 
of the R6 specification,, which adopted an all-IP infrastructure [63], [64] to enable 
compatibility with currently used computer network protocol systems. 
For the R99 specification there exist three different network protocol system layers, 
defining sets of communication rules for the exchange of user and control data 
[65]. The Transport Network architecture encompasses the protocols responsible 
for the reliable transmission of the user and control data across peers and the CN 
elements. The Radio Network layer is responsible for maintaining the transmission 
of the radio access parameters between the user equipment and the CN. Finally, 
the System Network layer has the task of monitoring and preserving the 
communication path set by the radio network layer entities. 
All three layered architectures address functionality issues for both the UTRAN and 
the CN, as well as for the CS and PS domains of the core network. Their 
implementation facilitates the management of the mobility and session services 
offered to the UMTS users. The communication rules forming the stack structures 
are based on protocols used in computer network systems, to enable 
interoperability with existing system entities as well as to remove the proprietary 
nature of SS7 based networks. These protocols vary from the Asynchronous 
Transfer Mode (ATM) [15] to the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) 
[66], the Internet Protocol (IP) [67], Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [68] and 
the Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) [69]. 
2.2.2.1 Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) 
The ATM is a protocol designed to compensate for variable bit rate connections and 
enable user data transfer at very high speeds. It has initially 
been intended as a 
technique for use within the Broadband - ISDN environment to support 
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transmission rates of up to 155.5MBps and 622.08Mbps [70]. Currently, ATM is 
widely used in large corporate networks supporting their backbone operation, such 
as university intranets and other proprietary environments. Its functionality is 
based on the reference model depicted in Figure 2.5. 
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User plane 
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AALlayer I AALlayer 
ATM layer 
Physical layer 
Figure 2. S., ATM reference model 
In the ATM model, data exchange has been classified into two categories. 
Signalling information exchanged between network elements handled by the 
Control Plane and user data managed by the User Plane. The Management Plane of 
the reference model maintains network operability and is responsible for regulating 
network resource issues via the Operation and Maintenance (OAM) cells. The ATM 
Adaptation Layer (AAL) receives the data from the application (Upper Layer) and 
segments them into the 48-byte blocks forming the ATM cell payload area. Upon 
reception of the data to be exchanged, the ATM layer adds the 5-byte header to 
compose the ATM cell structure, prior to forwarding it into the Physical Layer for 
transmission in the communications medium. The physical layer is also responsible 
for the calculation of a checksum on the ATM header for error detection purposes. 
ATM provides a connection-oriented service on two main levels, namely the User- 
to-Network Interface (UNI) and the Network-to-Network one (NNI). Their 
differences are reflected in the ATM cell structure, with usually the cell carrying 
signalling and/or control information. Parameters concerning services offered to 
the communicating parties are included in the data payload area, addressing 
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functionality issues of the B-ISDN reference model and the ATM architectural 
layers. 
Security issues of the ATM are discussed in Chapter 3, outlining details on the 
implementation Of the relevant framework in network topologies and the UMTS CN. 
2.2.2.2 Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) 
SUP has been developed to replace the TCP stack, in cases where the use of the 
latter protocol is inadequate, such as the transfer of network signalling information. 
The reasons for this approach include the fact that some applications may not 
require the sequence maintenance provided by TCP, whilst others might find that 
the stream orientation is inefficient for their messages. SUP has been designed in 
such a way that these problems would be eliminated and offer the applications 
more control over the packets sent throughout the network. 
The particularities of the nature of the signalling data also render TCP use 
inadequate for numerous reasons. TCP has been designed to support the 
transmission of large data amounts between two end-points, implementing flow 
control based on the behaviour of the end-to-end traffic [71]. Signalling data sizes 
are comparatively smaller than those of the user data, with their traffic pattern 
consisting of message bursts rather than forming a sequenced stream. Typical 
values range from 200 bytes to 500 bytes of data, in contrast to the 1500 - byte 
Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU) set for the user information [14]. Moreover, security 
pitfalls identified for the TCP protocol (Chapter 3) affected the need for a more 
secured solution, offering protection against replay and sequence number attacks. 
SUP bases its operation on the messages depicted in Figure 2.6. The source and 
destination port numbers identify the respective ports for which the application data 
refers to. The verification tag field is used to validate the sender of the SUP 
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datagram in an attempt to overcome fabrication attacks and ensure messages' 
confidentiality. 
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Figure 2.6: SCTP message format 
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During transmission, the value of this tag must be set to the value of the Initiate 
Tag received from the peer endpoint during the connection initialisation. For those 
data chunks carrying the initiate tag, the verification tag is set to 0, so that the 
receiver will be able to distinguish them between the datagrams received. Upon 
reception of a data block, the receiver checks the Chunk ID field and according to 
predetermined criteria decides upon the acceptance or rejection of the data. The 
Adler-32 checksum is a 32-bit field used to verify the message transmitted and 
identify any possible modifications. The chunk ID 8-bit field is used to determine 
the type of data contained in the Chunk vaiue field. Finally, the Chunk f7ag field 
could be used to specifically locate individual messages inside the data stream, 
though it is not currently used, as described in the SUP specification. 
The employment of the SUP protocol instead of the TCP architecture has 
been set 
to balance the end-to-end secured communication provision. Its realisation in the 
UMTS CN has been based on the transportation of the Session Initiation Protocol 
(SIP) messages, responsible for the establishment of IP specific user calls. 
This 
implies that the deployment of SUP has been set for Release 4 and above of the 
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CN and not for the R99, which does not entail any mechanisms for the information 
protection between the various network elements. 
2.2.2.3 Internet Protocol (IPv6) 
The IPv6 has been designed to overcome problems associated with IPv4 concerning 
security issues and unreliability in the data transmission process. A wide range of 
services can be offered by the protocol instance, in the form of the extension 
headers made available by the network operator for the specific topology. Figure 
2.7 illustrates the architecture of the IPv6 packet header. 
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The version field indicates the version of the IP stack, whilst the Traffic class one is 
used by the switches or routers to indicate the priority level that message should be 
given. Flow label is used to define the flow or the sequence of packets for which 
the source demands special handling from the intermediate routers. The Payload 
length field indicates the packet size, excluding the IPv6 header size. If it is set to 
zero, then the ""Jumbo payload" option can be used, which essentially allows 
packets exceeding 65535 bytes in length to be transferred. The Next header field 
indicates whether any of the optional extension headers will be used for the 
connection, or it is the header of a higher layer protocol,, such as the TCP. Finally, 
Chapter 2- 26 Protocol Security Generation Telecommunication Systems 
the Hop limit field identifies the number of nodes a message could traverse before 
it is discarded by the network elements. 
The main improvements of IPv6 compared to IPv4 are provided by its extension 
headers. Table 2.3 illustrates the meaning of the additional headers in the 
recommended order they should appear [67]. 
Table 2.3: IPv6 extension headers 
Extension headers Meaning (if header is present) 
Hop-by-hop options header This header is processed by all Intervening 
routers and nodes and hence must appear first. 
It is used to indicate the Jumbo payload option, 
which can either be changed en route or not. 
Destination options header A set of options for the destination address in 
the packet (that destination may not always be 
the ultimate one, and hence the presence of a 
header similar to this further down). 
Routing header Contains a list of all intermediate addresses. It 
specifies the type of routing and source routing. 
Fragment header In IPv6 only the source node is allowed to 
fragment and this field specifies whether that 
action has taken place or not. 
Authentication header Provides data origin authentication, 
connectionless integrity of datagrams and anti- 
replay service. 
Encapsulating security payload Provides message integrity, confidentiality 
header and/or authentication 
Destination options header Similar to the one described above. Used if the 
destination for the second extension header is 
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not the ultimate for the packet. 
Upper layer header Indicates the upper layer protocol used on top of 
IP. 
The Authentication Header (AH) and the Encapsulating Security Payload header 
(ESP) form the basis of the IP security architecture (IPsec). Their use enables the 
system to afford the required security features in the user data packets and decide 
upon the acceptance of the messages depending on the policy governing that 
connection. IPsec is analysed in Chapter 3, where an indication is given as to the 
drawbacks and potential implementation pitfalls of the architecture. 
2.2.2.4 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
The TCP is used as the means of ensuring the error-free and efficient transport of 
the user information towards the intended destination. It is an end-to-end 
connection mechanism providing a connection-oriented service to the upper layers, 
managing the flow of datagrams from those layers towards the IP layer and vice 
versa. Upon transmission of the packets, TCP uses the connection (the virtual 
circuit) as its fundamental element. By this method, a protocol port can be utilised 
for several connections at the same time, depending on the application entity 
running on top of the stack. Figure 2.8 illustrates the structure of the TCP 
datagram as set by its specification [68]. 
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Figure 2.8: TCP message structure 
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The Sequence number field is a 32-bit number indicating the current block's 
position with respect to the overall message. It is also used to provide the initial 
send sequence number to the receiver. The Acknowledgement number field is the 
number indicating the next sequence number expected. If the TCP message is sent 
back to the sender, then the field is used to indicate the sequence number of the 
last data received, which will be the last sequence number received plus one. The 
Length or data offset field indicates the length of the TCP header in integral 
multiples of 32-bit words. Reserved bits are set to 0, since they are never used 
and hence ignored by the communicating entities. The Flags have various 
meanings, indicating necessary actions to be taken for each connection. Table 2.4 
surnmarises their uses in the TCP stack. 
Table 2.4: TCP flag Held meanings 
Flags Meaning 
URG flag Urgent pointer flag. if it is set It indicates that the urgent 
pointer field is significant. 
ACK flag Acknowledgement flag. If it is set, it indicates that the 
acknowledgement field is valid. 
PSH flag If it is set it means that the push function is to be performed. 
RST flag Reset flag. If it is set, then the connection must be reset. 
SYN flag Sequence number flag. If 'it is set, the sequence numbers are 
to be synchronised between peers. This flag is mainly used 
during the connection establishment process. 
FIN flag If it is on, then the sender indicates that it has no more packets 
to send. 
Furthermore, the Window size field is a number indicating the number of blocks of 
data that the receiving machine can accept. The Checksum is calculated by taking 
the 16-bit one's complement of the one's complement sum of the 16-bit words in 
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the header. The Urgent Pointer field indicates the portion (blocks) of data that 
should accordingly be treated. The action that will be followed though is 
determined by the application and not the TCP stack itself. Moreover, there are 
currently only three Options defined for TCP. One indicates the end of option list, 
whilst the second one indicates a no operation status and the final option the 
maximum segment size. 
SDH and protocol architectures such as the GPRS stack family are used to 
compensate for UMTS specific issues, including the digital transmission of the user 
and control data, as well as the routing of the respective information within the 
UMTS CN elements. Their implementation though is subject to proprietary and 
operator standards and hence will not be dealt with in this work. 
The CN R99 PS domain has been taken into consideration for the completion of this 
thesis, since the initial UMTS commercial applications will be based on that 
architecture. Its advantages and implementation pitfalls, as well as the drawbacks 
with respect to security of the R6 are also described in Chapter 3, forming one of 
the main motivation notions behind the design of FCNS. 
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Chapter 3: Network Protocol Security 
Chapter 3. Network Protocol Security 
3.1 Overview 
3.2 Network Attacks 
3.3 Protocol Security 
3.3.1 Architectural Analysis 
3.3-1.1 ATM Security Architecture 
3.3.1.2 SUP Security 
3.3.1.3 IP Security Architecture (lPsec) 
3.3.2 OSI Security Model 
An overview of current network and protocol security systems is given, including an 
analysis of the type of attacks that could be launched against the FCNS and the 
environment in which it may run. The architectures currently supporting the 
secured operation of computer and telecommunication systems are also provided. 
The disadvantages of the structures analysed are given with respect to the 
implications their employment may have. Furthermore, an analysis of protocol 
stack security architectures is presented, concentrating on the OSI security 
architecture. The disadvantages of this model are further provided together with a 
comparison with the FCNS stack architecture. The drawbacks and implementation 
pitfalls of the solutions analysed form the motivation behind this work. 
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3.1 Overview 
This chapter offers an insight into the security of communication protocols 
supporting connections in packet-switched architectures. For the reasons identified 
in Chapter 2, their use has been extended in enabling communication establishment 
and maintenance in the UMTS CN PS domain. The analysis provided will focus on 
the latter environment, where stanclardisation bodies have addressed requirements 
in addition to those present for computer network architectures [72], [73]. 
The identification of security threats and countermeasures for telecommunication 
systems resulted in the development of the Network Domain Security (NDS) 
architecture of the UMTS CN. The NDS mechanisms though have been omitted 
from the R99, leaving the network vulnerable to both passive and active attacks 
[74 - 76]. In contrast, R4/5 of the UMTS CN adopted an all-IP infrastructure, 
where IPsec [77) and the Mobile Application Part (MAP) security architecture 
(MAPSEQ [781 have been proposed to protect the user and signalling data in the 
PS and CS domains respectively. 
Computer network security technology has historically addressed only the need for 
protecting the user and/or signalling data transit in a given topology. Encryption 
mechanisms and hash algorithms are continuously being developed to enforce 
integrity and authentication functions to the information exchanged [79 - 81]. 
These solutions lack the specification of mechanisms that could be used to protect 
protocol stack layers from active attacks and to ensure the integrity of the 
interlayer messages sent between the layer protocols of the structure [82]. The 
efforts of the International Standardisation Body (ISO) to provide a secure stack 
framework led to the development of the OSI security architecture [83], [84]. The 
work, however, represented efforts in placing security 
functions inside the OSI 
model layers, to enable their management in providing protection only 
to messages 
external to the operation of a protocol [85]. 
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An approach ensuring the security of the internal stack messages has yet to appear 
in current protocol specifications. FCNS has been designed to address the issues 
concerned with the protection of the service primitive messages used to establish 
communication parameters between the stack layers. Additional mechanisms could 
then be used to afford the required functions for the security of the signalling 
and/or user data exchanged in the topology. 
3.2 Network Attacks 
The UMTS model, where computer and mobile systems have been merged, implies 
the use of the same set of communication rules for supporting both environments. 
This protocol simplification has influenced the design of telecommunication 
systems, since an attacker would now be able to launch attacks similar to those in 
computer networks. 
Communication channels are frequently susceptible to potential attacks or threats 
from malicious users, aiming at either obtaining information as to the data 
transferred, or modifying and fabricating that data at will. Both computer and 
mobile systems are subject to unauthorised connection and data requests, with 
adversaries intending to use services and resources offered by the networks mainly 
for causing Denial of Service (DOS) attacks against legitimate users. 
Security in the FCNS environment has been focused on packet-switched 
architectures, such as computer networks [14] and the UMTS core network 
(CN) 
Release 99 [3]. The security threats presented in this section have been described 
on the packet-switched network basis, meaning that issues concerning radio access 
networks have been left outside this discussion. Work has already 
been completed 
for the access system of the UMTS, where security functions are afforded 
to secure 
the radio links that messages traverse [86]. 
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Regardless of the means used for attacking a system, network attacks can be 
categorised according to the intentions of the adversary manipulating the network. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates this classification, common to both mobile and computer 
environments [28]. 
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Figure 3.1. - Classification of telecommunication network attacks 
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Interruption is an attack targeting the availability of a system, where a service or 
system property becomes destroyed or unavailable, or even unusable. Typical 
examples include hardware destruction, communication line disconnection and 
other attacks that can be mounted on the physical device supporting the 
communication. 
Interception attacks aim at disabling or overcoming the confidentiality features of 
the communication, whereby an attacker gains unauthorised access to a system 
resource or data message, by either wiretapping or using packet sniffing tools. 
Usually, interception attacks do not address connection discontinuity issues, unless 
the adversary moves into launching an interruption attack. 
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Modification threats result in attacks against the integrity of the user and/or 
signalling data, with the adversary aiming at gaining unauthorised access to a 
service or tampering with the data. It is an attack that may occur in a network 
environment, where no encryption mechanisms have been used to secure the 
network resources and/or user data in transit. 
Finally, fabrication or fraudulence attacks are categories whereby message 
authentication is targeted by an illicit node counterfeiting objects into a system. 
Examples include the insertion of malicious packets in the network such as viruses 
or Trojan horses [87]. Usually this type of attack comes as result of a successful 
node impersonation following an interception attack, where users do not 
authenticate their data. Additionally, bogus packets could be inserted into the data 
flow, to increase a node's processing load, build up network congestion, or even 
occupy network resources in such a way that the node will become unable to accept 
any requests made by legitimate nodes. 
Further consideration of the threats to telecommunication systems, enables them to 
be additionally classified into two main categories [28]. 
Passive attacks, in which transmission is monitored or eavesdropped to obtain 
information as to the data being exchanged. Such attempts are usually launched 
against vulnerable communication media, such as coaxial cables, where wiretapping 
can be possible. There are several types of passive attacks, including: 
0 Release-of- message contents, which implies the disclosure of the 
information sent between the peers 
0 Traffic analysis, targeting systems providing for message integrity 
mechanisms, to exploit the location and identification of the communication 
parties. A consequent attack, namely traffic pattern analysis, aims at 
observing the frequency and length of the messages sent to guess the 
nature of the communication. 
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Passive attacks are usually difficult to detect, since no data alteration is involved 
leaving the data stream intact for the peers. Security measures have been 
developed to prevent such a case, by mechanisms varying from authentication and 
data encryption, to traffic padding techniques for the traffic pattern analysis 
avoidance. 
Active network attacks, which involve the modification of the data in transit or the 
creation of false messages and connection requests. These include: 
0 Masquerade attacks failing into the category of fabrication attacks, where 
the adversary impersonates a valid communication node, to either establish 
connection requests or capture data packets and cause interruption attacks. 
Replay attacks involving the replay of a part or a whole communication 
session, having obtained information as to the identities of the peer entities 
and the type of data that has been transferred in the captured session. 
0 Modification attacks, which an adversary launches to alter a portion or the 
whole of the data message or stream to produce the desired effects. 
0 Denial of Service (DoS) attacks targeting the connection lifetime and 
management, whereby the adversary tries to cause the denial or prevention 
of the service access to the legitimate users, leading to connection releases 
and buffer overflows. A possible extension of this type is the Distributed 
DoS (DDoS) attack, where many attackers are joined together in an attempt 
to quickly launch the attack against a node or a system. 
Finally, active attacks can be initiated in the form of malicious code insertion 
on the data stream, such as viruses and/or backdoor programs, aiming at 
causing connection release and protocol procedure destruction, or simply 
identifying any implementation pitfalls of the network architecture, which an 
attacker could use for launching a DoS attack. 
Active attacks can also be difficult to correct or recover from, yet the proper 
application Of the security features of the protocols used could ensure 
their 
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detection and possible recovery. Implementation of both attack categories can be 
found at [87 - 89]. 
3.3 Protocol Security 
Network protocol security addresses the protection of information against 
unauthorised disclosure and/or theft in communication systems. The attacks 
presented in the previous section aim at manipulating the network in the following 
ways: 
0 Information leakage 
0 Integrity violation 
* Denial of Service and 
o Illegitimate use 
There exist numerous methods of protecting a system from unauthorised access 
and usage of resources. Eight protection mechanisms are defined in [84]: 
* Encipherment, to provide via encryption data and traffic flow confidentiality. 
Encryption can also be used to support integrity requirements. 
0 Digitai signatures, to account for non-repudiation and authentication issues. 
Can also be used as a means of ensuring data integrity. 
e Access control mechanisms, whereby users obtain certain privileges for 
accessing network resources and/or data. Typically, access control is 
governed by the use of lists and policies at the server side. 
* Data integrity mechanisms, to provide protection against data modifications. 
These can be based on a single message or on a stream basis, depending on 
the service provided by the protocol supporting the connection. 
9 Authentication exchange mechanisms, whereby the communication entities 
exchange information concerning the processing and identification of the 
data. 
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Traffic padding, which supports the flooding of the network links with 
random data, aiming at defying traffic analysis attacks. 
& Routing control, to prevent sensitive data from traversing insecure channels. 
Notarisation, whereby a trusted third party may act as a legal representative 
to guarantee the data integrity, peer authentication and non-repudiation 
services. 
Numerous other techniques can be provided that may not be specific to a security 
service (pervasive techniques). Only those involved with the mechanisms offered 
by the protocols supporting the operation of the network will be considered in this 
Chapter. Techniques such as firewalls [90] and managing Information Technology 
(IT) systems via security risk analysis and audits [91], [92] will not be dealt with, 
as they fall outside the scope of this work. 
3.3.1 Architectural Analysis 
In this section, an analysis of several modern security protocol architectures is 
given. Information is provided as to the mechanisms used to support the required 
services for the communicating peers. The protocols are also analysed with respect 
to the requirements set for the UMTS environment and more specifically the CN. 
3.3.1.1 ATM Security Architecture 
The ATM Security Architecture (ATMsec) is defined in [93] and [94], with 
information being given on the Network-to-Network Interface (NNI) signalling 
security in [951. 
The identification of the security requirements for ATM environments 
follows the 
principles identified by [84]. Since transmission 
in ATM networks is based on 
packets (cells), attacks fall into the passive and active 
categories aiming at 
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manipulating the data flow. The ATMsec identifies the security Information 
Elements (IEs) that can be used to provide the required protection functions for the 
communicating peers. Figure 3.2 depicts the structure of the ATM security IE. 
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Figure 3.2: ATM Security Znformation Element 
The security IEs are exchanged between ATM elements either in-band, that is, 
inside the ATM data stream, or together with the signalling messages of the NNI. 
The size of the IE varies from 12 bytes to 512 bytes, with security information 
taking up to a maximum of 508 bytes [96]. The Security IE Identifier field uniquely 
identifies the particular IE, whereas the Ext. and Coding Std. fields represent the 
specification used to realise the message (ATM Forum or ITU). The IE instructions 
hold information as to the action that should be taken upon reception of the IE, 
whilst Security IE length field corresponds to the overall length of the IE message. 
Security associations in ATMsec are identified via the Security Association Section 
ID, which is followed by an indication of the length of the section included In the 
Security Association Section Length parameter. The Version field denotes the 
version of the IE, with the Trsp (transport) ID depicting the type of transport used 
to exchange security information. 
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The Flow field indicates the flow number of the exchange whereas the Dsc (discard) 
block identifies whether the node should delete the association section before 
forwarding the security IE. Moreover, the Scope identifier includes information as 
to the node responsible for the processing of the association, with the Relative ID 
field depicting the security association ID. Finally, Target Security Entity ID is a 
parameter explicitly identifying the target node, with the Security Service Data 
section encompassing the type of security information sent. 
The services offered by the architecture are authentication, integrity and replay 
detection. Authentication is realised by means of digital signatures included in the 
Security IEs data sections, supporting replay detection functions via the 
introduction of a timestamp in the algorithm calculation. Message integrity and 
confidentiality are maintained via encryption, either on an end-to-end or hop-by- 
hop basis between the security agents responsible for managing the security 
association. In either case, a dedicated channel (Virtual Channel - VC) should be 
set up to provide secured communication. 
Placement of the security services is subject to the development of the respective 
specification by the standardisation bodies. Both the user and control planes 
should be afforded authentication and confidentiality functions to protect users 
against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The management plane is also of great 
importance, forming an appropriate location for maintaining the security services of 
the model. Since transmission is subject to the operation of the AAL and ATM 
layers, services should also be implemented in those parts of the architecture, to 
provide for confidentiality and integrity of the ATM data. 
The disadvantages and difficulties in deploying the ATMsec, result from the 
complexity of the ATM networks architecture [97]. ATM switches are 
high-speed 
cell routers exhibiting fine grain multiplexing of the 
ATM messages towards the 
intended end-points. Due to this feature, it is very difficult to 
design and construct 
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high-speed cryptosystems that could be used to enable the real-time protection of 
the cells when traversing the VCs. To overcome this, network operators could 
provide a unique key for each VC protecting all information passed through it. The 
establishment of a security association on an end-point basis could further enhance 
the mechanism, with ATM cells being secured on the AAL level. 
The challenge presented in this technique is the assignment of the protection 
mechanisms and their application in the data stream. On the ATM level, functions 
can only be applied on a single-cell basis, due to the mode of the ATM switch 
operation [97]. If confidentiality and integrity mechanisms were to be supported, 
then every cell must be encrypted and decrypted, increasing the processing time 
overhead in the network. Furthermore, current cryptosystems can barely address 
the above requirements on speeds of the order of hundreds Mbps or Gbps. 
Additionally, the secret keys used for the VC encryption should change rapidly but 
no mechanism currently exists that could update the keys as sufficiently and fast. 
The proprietary nature of the ATM networks, as well as of the hardware 
cryptosystems available, could increase interoperability and compatibility problems 
between different environments. The respective ETSI/3GPP specification on the use 
of ATM in the CN [98] does not include any security considerations for this 
transport mechanism. The high-speed requirements on software and hardware 
based solutions prevent the use of ATMsec in realistic network topologies. 
3.3.1.2 Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Security 
The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) described in Chapter 2 has been 
designed to provide a transport alternative to TCP for signalling data. Its use is 
recommended in cases when small amounts of information (of the order of a few 
hundred kilobytes) have to be transferred between two end-systems, inside 
networks such as the UMTS CN. 
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SUP has been developed to overcome security pitfalls of the TCP associated with 
exploitations of the handshake mechanism and replay attacks. Although the 
provision of an enhanced connection establishment mechanism ensures the 
connection integrity, there have been several deficiencies identified, as presented in 
[Pl] of Appendix C. 
SUP does not implicitly compensate for security functions, like the IP protocol 
architecture. Instead, it has to rely on the use of a transport layer mechanism to 
address authentication and confidentiality issues in the SUP associations [991. 
Although the handshake mechanism of the protocol has been designed to overcome 
problems associated with masquerade and flooding attacks, the lack of security 
mechanisms implies that the messages could be sent in cleartext format. If that is 
the case, then an unauthorised party monitoring the communications channel could 
launch man-in-the-middle attacks, whereby information would be intercepted 
resulting in data fabrications. The lack of appropriate functions affording 
confidentiality and integrity measures could jeopardise the SUP association and 
message continuity. 
If the connection is not supported by the IPsec architecture, then problems 
associated with forged messages could be dramatically increased. An attacker 
could mount a masquerade attack at the network level, denying the transmission of 
the SUP messages, ultimately causing a DoS attack. On the other hand, the 
provision of the IPsec architecture would imply the use of several Security 
Associations (SAs) because an SA is only a simplex connection. Should 
multihoming be supported then the number of SAs would rapidly become 
unmanageably large as the network grows. 
The provision of connection establishment functions overcoming vulnerabilities of 
the TCP protocol is subject to the use of mechanisms explicit to the 
SCTP. The lack 
of proper security definitions in the SUP specification could result 
in an increased 
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complexity when deploying a system, due to the need for additional techniques 
protecting the association. The impact on the flexibility and compatibility of the 
mechanism could result in the choice of alternative sets of communication rules for 
transporting signalling information in mobile environments. 
Finally, the lack of a functional SUP stack for use within UMTS CN and computer 
network systems renders the protocol use vague. The possibility of additional 
security requirements in mobile environments [1001 could result in modifications of 
the SUP specification, leading to interoperability problems and more complex 
architectures. Failure in conforming to standards supporting security functions and 
services for mobile systems [101], [102] make SUP an unattractive solution for 
use within the UMTS CN domains. 
3.3.1.3 IP Security Architecture (lPsec) 
IPsec defines a set of security mechanisms and procedures that can be used to 
secure communications between two hosts at the network level [103]. It is a set of 
communication rules designed to act independently of higher layer protocol 
functions compensating for link-based protection services for the data stream. 
The provision of security functions on the packet level has made IPsec the 
foundation for the establishment of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) [104], [105]. 
Companies and other private organisations are able to set up secured dedicated 
communications channels, defining the appropriate policies governing their 
connection as to the traffic allowed to traverse the network. 
IPsec operation is based on the Authentication Header (AH) [106], Encapsulating 
Security Payload (ESP) header [107] and the Internet Security Association and Key 
Management Protocol (ISAKMP) [108]. The AH and the ESP form part of the 
extension headers of the IPv6 protocol and their implementation 
is subject to the 
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requirements set by the network operator. The AH is used to provide data integrity 
and data origin authentication, together with a degree of protection against replay 
attacks. Confidentiality is a security service not defined for AH, and hence no 
encryption takes place on the IP packet. Figure 3.3 illustrates the format of the AH 
header, which should directly proceed the IPv6 header if no other options are 
applied (Table 2.3, Chapter 2). Additionally, ESP usage ensures the confidentiality 
of the information exchanged, together with data origin authentication and data 
integrity. Figure 3.4 depicts the general format of the ESP header. 
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The Security Parameter Index (SPI) field is used to indicate the SA identification to 
the receiver, depending on the security header implemented. The destination 
should use this value to access the Security Association Database 
(SAD) and 
distinguish between the different SAs set. To verify that the required privileges are 
preserved in the received packet, the receiver associates 
this entry with the 
contents of the Security Policy Database (SPD) to 
decide upon the acceptance or 
rejection of the message. For the AH header, the next 
header field represents the 
higher-level protocol following the AH, such as the TCP. 
To enable error detection 
procedures, the Payload length block 
holds the length of the AH header, whilst 
Reserved bits are unused and set to zero. The Sequence number 
is a measure for 
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supporting packet sequencing and for providing a countermeasure to possible 
replay attacks. Finally, for the ESP header, the Initialisation Vector (IV) field 
represents the value driving the cipher algorithm used to apply integrity 
mechanisms for the transmitted packet. 
The specification of IPsec defines two modes of operation for the architecture. For 
both cases, an SA should be set between nodes to manage the exchange of the 
secured information. 
In Transport Mode the AH and ESP are used to protect the data stream in cases 
where the SA end-points are the actual communication end peers. No intermediate 
nodes should be present in this mode, with the security headers protecting the 
transport payload data from a higher layer such as the TCP. The AH provides 
authentication for the whole message, whereas the ESP supports both 
confidentiality for the higher layer header and data authentication for the message 
apart from the IPv6 header. 
In Tunnel Mode, IPsec services are afforded to the user data whenever the 
communicating end-parties are not the SA end-points. This implies the presence of 
intermediate routers in the topology, increasing the number of SAs that need to be 
set. With the ESP security enabled the entire IP packet, including the higher layer 
data, is protected. The ESP adds an additional IP header to enable routers identify 
the next hop message should be forwarded to. Similar to the ESP operation, the 
AH in tunnel mode authenticates the whole IP packet adding an external IP header 
to assist routers in appropriately switching the received messages. 
If both the AH and ESP protection are applied, then two or more SAs must be 
created to support the communication. If such an SA is not available, then the 
ISAKMP protocol should be used to create one via the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) 
mechanism [1091. IKE defines the key exchange process and the parameters of 
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the security services required. The process is initiated by defining an SA that is 
used to negotiate the SAs for the IPsec. The peers then use the Domain Of 
Interpretation document to specify the exact contents and algorithms of those 
parameters. Once the necessary parameters have been set, communication can 
proceed having afforded security measures on the network level [110]. 
IPsec advantages encompass the addressing of security vulnerabilities present in 
the IPv4 architecture. The provision of protection mechanisms in the routers of a 
network topology has signalled the long awaited security consideration of the QoS 
levels for the subnetworks supporting the transport end-to-end communication 
service. If a network operator chooses to apply IPsec for a connection, then any 
traffic not complying with the SPID set will be discarded. This method ensures that 
unauthorised data streams will not bypass any IPsec firewall, protecting the nodes 
present in the communication. 
Additionally, IPsec functions are visible only to the underlying subnetwork since 
they are placed below the transport layer. This transparency towards the 
applications increases the independence of the technique from the users involved in 
the exchange. The processing time that would consequently be required to identify 
legitimate packets by the node instances is decreased, since it falls to the routers to 
recognise and permit lawful packets. Moreover, it provides security for individual 
users by specifying explicit SAs for particular applications and attacks related to 
fabrication and data modification are countered. 
The advantages of IPsec leveraged the design of the UMTS CN NDS for the Release 
4 and above addressing privacy issues in mobile environments [111]. Independent 
hardware vendors have investigated IPsec in solutions regarding security for the CN 
[112], [113] and in network routers for general PS environments [114]. 
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However, the IPsec operation has several disadvantages that may influence its 
implementation. At the time of writing this thesis, most of the IPv6 stack where 
IPsec is based has not been completed [115]. The lack of a functional stack 
prevents vendors in developing test beds for the IPsec that could be used to 
measure the protocol performance in real-network situations. Organisations 
supporting the deployment of IM, such as the European Commission IPv6 Task 
Force, have addressed the need of migrating from the currently used IPv4, for 
which though IPsec is not a standard. Although operating system architectures 
such as Microsoft Windows 2000/XP and Linux families provide an initial 
implementation, network operators have yet to offer security services on the 
network level. 
Specification pitfalls influencing the functionality of the IPsec are the complexity 
and lack of clear conditions of the IPsec documentations [116]. Complex systems 
are deemed to exhibit more complex failures, which are hard to fix and manage. 
The weaknesses that may be present in the design are difficult to identify and 
analyse leading to potential vulnerabilities. The presence of many options in 
supporting the realisation of the IPsec may create confusion as to the mechanisms 
network operators could use. This is due to the fact that the system designer has 
no way of determining the functionality of the architecture, also partially due to the 
lack of a clear service definition. 
Ferguson and Schneier in [116] have also identified several deficiencies related to 
the operation of the AH and ESP headers of the IPsec, as well as of the ISAKMP and 
IKE. It has been suggested to remove the AH from the specification because it 
does not provide for packet encryption but only authentication. 
As a proceeding 
step, [116] addresses the possibility of eliminating the 
IPsec transport mode of 
operation, which forms a subset of the tunnel mode. 
The functionality of the ESP 
architecture can easily match, in terms of bandwidth 
(BW) usage, that of the AH 
and hence become the only protocol supporting 
the security services. At the same 
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time, the removal of the transport mode would eradicate the need for categorising 
the network nodes in hosts and routers (security gateways in IPsec terminology). 
Additional measures could apply for the ESP modification to support both 
authentication and message confidentiality, since encryption without authentication 
is not useful. The network nodes should authenticate the plaintext instead of the 
process currently defined, where authentication takes place on the encrypted 
portion of the packet. Finally, since encryption/decryption are techniques based on 
the use of a secret key, the system should seek authentication in these blocks and 
in every parameter that would be used to interpret the packet. 
Disadvantages have also been identified for the handling of the Internet Control 
Message Protocol (ICMP), which is described in Chapter 6. A note is made on the 
discarding of unauthenticated ICMP messages in [112]. If a router is unaware of 
the SA used, then all ICMP messages sent will be in plaintext format. Dropping 
such messages would consequently have an impact on the IP stack functionality 
that may even cause the termination of the communication. Should the router use 
IPsec then an additional SA will have to be established. The problem associated 
with this approach is that the tunnel endpoint will seek verification at the message 
source. Due to the lack of a functional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the 
disadvantages identified for its use [117], the SA setup will not be possible. 
Several other implementation pitfalls have been acknowledged for the ESP security 
algorithms and the ISAKMP [118], mainly resulting from the inadequacy of the 
respective specifications. Exact details of the drawbacks of the encryption 
algorithms on a mathematical level fall outside of the scope of this thesis but it is 
worth noting the research presented in [119 - 125]. Most of the attacks presented 
in these papers relate to the use of encryption mechanisms for the IPsec, as well as 
disadvantages acknowledged by the use of mobile IP extensions. Again, the vast 
majority of the vulnerabilities presented result from the 
lack of clear definitions in 
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the IPsec specifications, whereby too many options can be used for the 
implementation of a single service. Some of these attacks have been presented in 
[P2] of Appendix C. 
The major disadvantage of the IPsec recognised in this work has been the extensive 
use of additional mechanisms to secure the communication process, which are 
usually explicit to the communication protocols. Although vulnerabilities associated 
with IPv4 and the TCP/IP suite, such as the IP address spoofing [126], have been 
overcome, the protection of the user data still relies on external architectures. 
Problems associated with the stack architectures supporting PS networks [127 - 
130] have led to the development of supplementary mechanisms for the support of 
the IPsec infrastructure [131], [132], increasing the complexity of the resulting 
system and possible interoperability problems between network operators. 
The identification and placement of security mechanisms in protocol stacks are 
issues not addressed by the IPsec, which forms a layered protocol placed directly 
below the network layer of the TCP/IP suite. Research has been focused in 
increasing the performance of current encryption algorithms [133 - 138] but 
without providing an adequate framework for their use. The only attempt made to 
identify security functions in protocol architectures has been the OSI security 
model, described in the following section. It should be noted however that OSI 
defines a reference architecture and not a functional stack. 
3.3.2 OSI Security Model 
The architecture presented in [84] represented attempts made to place security 
functions inside the communication layer protocols of the OSI model [139]. Further 
research undergone concluded in the inclusion of mechanisms such as 
authentication and non-repudiation in specific layers of the protocol stack 
[140], to 
enable the ease in their management and the avoidance of 
functionality duplication. 
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This can be observed in Figure 3.5, which depicts the placement of the security 
mechanisms within the layered protocol environment. 
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The approach is based on inserting any necessary mechanism inside the specific 
communication layer entity. The protocol will consequently have the tasks of both 
managing the functions responsible for the connection maintenance phases, as well 
as those for the realisation of the requested security services. The interfaces and 
variables are held within the respective areas of the protocol layer and are 
exchanged between the peers and/or adjacent layers accordingly [141]. 
The assignment of security functions into the OSI layers has followed two 
directions. Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 indicate those as taken by [84] and [140]. 
The structure presented in Figure 3.6 identifies the importance of the security 
functions within the OSI model, whilst Figure 3.7 shows the position of these in the 
stack architecture. Their categorisation has been based on the method data is 
forwarded down the stack towards the intended destination and the layers that 
could have an impact on the security of that data. As an example, authentication 
has been placed into the application layer, since it is strongly related to the nature 
of the information exchanged and the end-users initiating the connection. 
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In this thesis several deficiencies related to the OSI security framework have been 
identified that led to the design and development of the Future Core Networks 
System (FCNS). Current research papers on OSI security such as [85] focus on 
attacks based on programs and applications representing the layers of the 
reference model. Characteristic results include the physical layer exploitations 
based on disrupting power sources and cutting down cables, or exploitations such 
as Unicode vulnerabilities (for the presentation layer) and viruses (application layer 
specific). The provision of mechanisms ensuring the protection and recovery of the 
system against such attacks is explicit to the operation of the layer protocols and 
the internal to the stack operation messages. An attack could be launched against 
the mechanisms a layer uses to communicate with the protocols adjacent to it, with 
devastating results for the connection. 
The mechanism of Figure 3.5 has been designed to enable the maintenance and 
possible update of a protocol's functionality, without affecting that of the remainder 
of the stack. Implicit functions increase the flexibility and portability of 
the 
architecture, simplifying also the design of the stack by 
defining strict rules for its 
modularisation. 
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However, this approach fails for two major reasons. As is depicted in Figure 3.7, 
access control functions could be placed on several layers of the OSI model, since 
services might be offered at numerous levels of the communication process. 
Depending on the policies governing a system, network operators could choose to 
limit access privileges on network routers by filtering out unwanted addresses 
(network layer), or at the transport layer by blocking illicit ports. The application of 
access control functions for several layers would result in the duplication of the 
functionality for the different protocols supporting the service. Although the 
principles determining the access rules would vary, the mechanisms used to 
support the offered service would be similar if not the same. If the system was 
ever to be updated, the designer would have to repeat the same operation for the 
number of protocols to which access control functions would be afforded. 
Secondly, current advances in communication protocols have addressed the need 
for service realisation in single layered structures, such as the IPsec. The AH and 
ESP headers provide authentication, message integrity and confidentiality, which 
disagrees with the OSI reference model principles. Again, the policies supporting 
the security functions of IPsec could be different than those used for the 
application. Still though, functionality duplication would not be avoided, if for 
example both the application and the subnetwork operator choose to authenticate 
their messages. The amount of processing time and effort required to update and 
modify the stack architecture would decrease the system's portability and flexibility 
in adapting to different environments. 
Additionally, the placement of security mechanisms inside the communications 
layers increases the processing load of the layer protocol instance. As can be seen 
from Figure 3.5, the amount of calls a layer should manage is doubled due to the 
protection functions residing in its core. Additional PDUs and interface access 
points are required to support the protocol operation. Further to 
this demand, the 
protocol entity may call for additional CPU load to support 
the system calls and 
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processes set by its users (the layers above it) due to the addition of further 
parameters. 
Furthermore, the OSI security architecture fails to address an efficient Security 
Context (SC) exchange mechanism. Suppose that the user is establishing a 
network connection between peers belonging to different subnetworks. If the 
necessary mechanisms fail to exchange the security parameters to be used for the 
data exchange, then that would imply the immediate termination of the process. 
Although this is a required action, security mechanisms failure could mean a failure 
in the layer mechanisms as a whole. The network operator will not have an 
immediate view of the error severity and the exact location in which the fault 
occurred. If that is the case, then the layer entity should be reset further delaying 
the connection establishment process. Even if the protocol was to recover without 
losing functionality, it would need additional time in clearing the security variables 
and parameters arranged. 
Finally, the architecture fails to direct the requirement of management simplicity 
and robustness. Security functions placed on numerous layers of the stack 
architecture increase the complexity of the system. Potential errors and design 
problems are more difficult to detect and correct, complicating further the system's 
maintenance. As far as security is concerned, complex systems do not necessarily 
entail more secure ones. On the contrary, complex structures may contain 
deficiencies and vulnerabilities that may be identified only by their exploitation 
by 
an unauthorised party once they have been realised in a real-network environment. 
Chapter 3 has summarised the main concerns forming the motivation 
behind the 
work presented in this thesis. 
The FCNS has been designed to overcome the 
problems associated with the out-of-date specification 
of the OSI reference model 
in providing for the security of the communication 
process. The Security Layer (SL) 
application on the whole of the 
FCNS communication layers, results in simplified 
Chapter 3- 54 Protocol Security 
for Y3 Generation Telecommunication systems 
network management procedures and ensures that a failure in initialising the 
security parameters requested will not affect the operation of the stack 
architecture. Figure 3.8 represents the security architecture of the layered entities 
of FCNS. 
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The FCNS design removes the implicit security functionality of the OSI layers, 
transferring it into a single managed protocol layer. Communication layers are only 
involved with the conformance to the algorithms and functions enforced by the SL, 
included in the respective SC. Variables and parameters, as well as security control 
functions reside only in the SL structure, thus removing any redundant information 
from the rest of the layer entities. 
The benefit of this approach is the preservation of the layered principles, where 
functions specific to a layer are included only in that protocol. Since the OSI model 
dictates that any functionality duplication should be avoided, this work has remove 
any security related mechanisms from the layered protocols involved in the 
communication process. In case amendments need to be made due to possible 
advances in cryptosystern technology, the designer should only 
focus on the SL, 
leaving the rest of the stack intact. By this method, the processing time and effort 
it would take to update the stack entity is reduced compared 
to that required for an 
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architecture referencing the OSI security model. Similarly, changes in the 
Communication layers will not affect the Operation and functionality of the SL. 
Furthermore, the architecture enables the operator in quickly identifying the 
location of any errors that might occur. The clear distinction of the security and 
communication functionality of the FCNS structure enables the system tO 
unambiguously locate error conditions. Faults specific to the SL would not imply an 
erroneous condition at any one of the FCNS communication layers and vice versa. 
By this method, the isolation of the faulty part can be made possible, so that the 
continuation of the communication process is preserved. 
Finally, the FCNS security architecture increases the flexibility and portability of the 
system,, as well as the degree of adaptation in various network environments. The 
preservation of the communication layers functionality enables the network 
operators to use any currently available protocols to serve as one of the FCNS 
layers. The performance of the system is therefore enhanced due to the method 
used in providing the security functions to the communicating entities. The 
simplicity of the FCNS design results in the ease of maintaining the rules governing 
the operation of the stack and the identification of any possible implementation 
pitfalls from the design process. At the same time, security functions realisation is 
a recommended action, which should only be used as an additional measure and 
not as a prerequisite for the operation of the network. This implies that if the SL 
functions are ever needed, then the protocol will provide those to the entity 
requesting the appropriate mechanisms. On the other hand, if such a provision 
has 
already been made (for example the IPsec architecture), then the 
SL can either be 
omitted from the implementation or reside in an idle state waiting 
for inclusion. 
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Chapter 4. Future Core Networks System (FCNS) 
Communication Layers 
4.1 Overview 
4.2 FCNS Architectural View 
4.3 FCNS Functional View 
4.3.1 User-defined Presentation Layer 
4.3.2 User-defined Session Layer 
4.3.3 Transmission Layer 
4.3.4 End-to-End Layer 
4.3.5 Physical Layer 
In this chapter, a description of the FCNS architecture and its layers with respect to 
the OSI 7-layer model [139] is provided. The FCNS layers are analysed and 
explained in detail, in connection with the FCNS protocol and service specification 
and their role in its implementation. The layers' protocol definition subsections 
include information as to the functions each layer performs, whilst the service 
definition subsections indicate how the services offered by the protocol functions 
are realised. The differentiation between functions and services has been made to 
clarify the operation for the reader, since their notions are strongly dependent, in 
the sense that the services' realisation via the protocol functions defines the 
complete specification of that protocol. Management and analysis of the 
FCNS 
security functions are given in the Security Layer (SL) protocol specification 
in 
Chapter 5, since this is responsible for their enforcement and monitoring. 
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4.1 Overview 
FCNS has been developed to provide secure user and signalling data exchange 
between network elements belonging to the same network or across various 
subnetworks in a packet-switched architecture, such as the UMTS core network 
Release 99 [3]. Telephony and wireless voice access systems are ci rcu it-sw itched 
oriented and hence FCNS applicability in such systems has been outside of the 
thesis scope. 
FCNS offers a reliable end-to-end acknowledged connection - oriented service, with 
congestion and flow control mechanisms regulating the information flow in the 
network. Connectionless services have been included in the FCNS design mainly in 
its security part, incorporating functions such as data origin authentication and 
connectionless integrity. Moreover, FCNS incorporates error detection and 
correction mechanisms together provided by the FCNS Error Protocol (FCNSEP), 
affording a secured mechanism for identifying transmission errors and fault 
reporting. 
Finally, FCNS features its own keystrearn generator to provide the secret keys 
necessary to secure the service primitives of the protocol and all inter-layer 
messages exchanged in both sender and receiver. The generator 
has been 
designed to be independent of the network on which FCNS is used, enhancing the 
protocol's flexibility and scalability. 
The FCNS keystrearn generator is described in Chapter 5 and FCNSEP 
in Chapter 6, 
with the design principles of the protocol 
being given in Chapter 7 together with 
information concerning its prototype and source code 
implementation. 
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4.2 FCNS Architectural View 
The FCNS stack is a layered architecture designed according to the OSI model 
principles, to ensure compatibility with current architectures. Its conceptual view is 
depicted in Figure 4.1, while Figure 4.2 illustrates its comparison with the OSI 
architecture. 
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FCNS does not have a definition of a physical layer similar to that of the OSI model. 
The reason for this approach has been that the simulation of that particular set of 
communication rules would not have provided any valuable information as to the 
security of the service primitives and data exchanged using FCNS. Although the 
lack of an adequately secure physical medium forms the motivation behind the 
development of the cryptography research area, the design of such a layer has 
fallen outside the scope of this Ph. D. Thesis. Assumptions were made about the 
environment on which FCNS runs, such as the use of optical fibres that cannot be 
easily tapped and other well known standards (such as RS232 and V. 35) for raw 
data transmission. 
FCNS has been designed to provide services and functions to any application, 
irrespective of its nature. There is thus also no inclusion of an application 
layer as 
defined by the OSI model, since that would imply strict definitions that are outside 
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the scope of this work. However, for the simulation needs of this thesis, the layer's 
functionality has been simulated, to identify and test security functions such as 
authentication and non-repudiation, which are usually application dependent and 
hence vary between several different communication sessions. Their management 
though has been left with the FCNS security layer, whose design is sovereign of the 
rest of the FCNS layers or any other protocol that can be used together with the 
stack, something that had a catalytic effect in the omission of the application layer 
from the design. Figure A. 2 of Appendix A illustrates the specification diagram 
created for the needs of simulating the sender and receiver peer instances running 
on top of FCNS. 
The most important observation that is made by the FCNS conceptual view of 
Figure 4.1 is the position of the Security Layer (SL) with respect to the rest of the 
stack structure. The main implication of this design is that SL is used to intercept 
any messages that are to be transferred, either between the FCNS layers or peers 
and at the same time manage the security functions available to the FCNS 
implementation. This does not have any effect on the way communication should 
proceed, since although the use of the SL functions is recommended, it is not 
compulsory. There are cases where security may not be needed for a specific 
layer, such as the data link layer in cases of real-time video transmission, and 
consequently a network operator may choose to disable the feature for that 
particular session. 
Communication using FCNS follows the principles identified by the OSI model, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.3. The schematic represents the interaction between two 
peers, belonging to different subnetworks. FCNS takes care of the routing and 
security procedures required, regardless of the number of intermediate nodes, to 
ensure a protected and in-sequence message transmission from the initiator to the 
destination node. 
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The SL, when fully applied, in addition to enforcing the necessary security 
functions, has the task of identifying whether the messages have been successfully 
encrypted prior to their sending, as well as when intercepting them at the adjacent 
routers. For a particular connection, the appropriate algorithms and secret keys 
are initiated, exchanged and maintained by the Security Context (SC) exchange 
process managed by the SL. 
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For simulation and development needs an adequate and efficient key exchange and 
management protocol has been assumed when necessary, since it is likely that key 
exchange in the networks in which FCNS would apply would be managed by higher- 
level applications mapped onto the FCNS messages. For example, in UMTS, 
encryption for the external messages to the FCNS operation would be secured using 
the UMTS encryption algorithms, with internal FCNS messages relying on the FCNS 
keystrearn generator. 
The communication between the FCNS layers has been analysed and materialised 
by having each one of the FCNS protocols act as an individual set of communication 
rules, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. In this view, the 
links between the layers are 
actually virtual-based, in the sense that no errors can 
be inserted to them, since 
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these can only be initiated due to a software or hardware fault, a case irrelevant to 
the design and realisation of FCNS. The delays introduced in the FCNS operation 
are produced solely by the protocol stack functions, such as the message 
encryption/decryption processes, message encapsulation, fragmentation, 
reassembly and the like. 
Figure 4.4: FCNS internal communication structure 
The SOURCE and RECEIVER blocks represent the instances of a generator and sink 
that have been designed to provide for the necessary input and output node 
instances of a system, serving much like an application layer on top of FCNS. Their 
use is the initiation and tearing down of a connection or service, via the service 
primitives that will be exchanged between the FCNS instances. In a real-network 
situation, both the sender and receiver (and any intermediate subnetworks) will run 
both input and output instances of the protocol stack, since peers shall be able to 
send and receive data concurrently. 
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FCNS input instance FCNS output instance 
The User-Defined Layer of the FCNS is subdivided into the User-Defined 
Presentation Layer (UDPRES) and the User-Defined Session Layer (UDSES). As 
with the respective layers of the OSI model, UDPRES has the task of ensuring the 
correct encoding of the information that is to be exchanged via the presentation 
context management services. The UDSES layer has the undertaking of 
synchronising a Particular session, whilst handling the data octets transparently, 
that is, irrespective of their syntax. 
The Transmission Layer (TX LAYER) is involved with the provision of an end-to-end 
reliable service, given the Quality of Service (QoS) demanded by UDSES. This 
layer also implements an explicit flow control mechanism and provides error 
detection, error recovery and multiplexing capabilities. Segmentation, reassembly, 
concatenation and separation, as well as stream resynchronisation takes place in 
TX-LAYER, which has been designed as a connection - oriented service provider, 
although connectionless services can also be supported. 
The End-to-End layer (EEI_LAYER) has the task of affording the necessary routing 
mechanisms for internetworking purposes. It is also responsible for the reliable 
transfer of the data messages between two directly linked nodes, providing at the 
same time error detection and correction mechanisms. 
The Physical Layer (PHYS) has the responsibility of transforming the datagrams 
passed by the EE_LAYER into frames, incorporating control information used to 
regulate and synchronise the message flow. It is the layer where implicit error and 
flow control mechanisms are implemented, such as the Automatic Repeat Request 
(ARQ) protocols. 
The SL, apart from intercepting the messages exchanged in the FCNS architecture 
ensuring their protection, is the layer that integrates the FCNS Error Protocol 
(FCNSEP) initiating at the same time the FCNS keystream generator that provides 
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the secret keys used to secure the protocol's internal messages. The SL has to 
make sure that the same secret keys are not used by different sessions, while 
guaranteeing that link and end-to-end encryption keys are independent of each 
other. It is the layer that also has the task of ensuring that traffic padding 
mechanisms can safely be implemented. The SL identifies the various security 
functions that may be required in a connection and appropriately enforces them via 
the FCNS layers, maintaining at the same time the security contexts agreed 
between the peers. 
The following sections contain details of the protocols and functions governing the 
FCNS realisation, while presenting each layer of the FCNS stack separately. 
4.3 FCNS Functional View 
FCNS layers' functions are realised by their respective protocols making use of the 
services provided by the layer below and so on. These presentations form the 
FCNS stack specification, to which the prototype and source code implementation 
had to conform. 
FCNS has been designed as a secure framework into which various network 
protocols could be incorporated, for example by replacing one or more of its layers 
with an existing Set of communication rules. To provide measurements and 
comparisons of the stack with other architectures, functionality has been 
implemented in each one of the FCNS layers, creating the necessary functions and 
services needed to establish a connection and, hence, measure the efficiency of 
FCNS under realistic operational conditions. 
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4.3.1 User-Defined Presentation (UDPRES) Layer 
UDPRES forms the interface of the FCNS stack to the user initiating, maintaining 
and tearing down a particular connection. This user may be a UMTS node, or a 
host present on a packet-switched network topology, with the information to be 
carried varying from signalling to data files. UDPRES services are realised by the 
UDPRES protocol, which makes use of the services offered by the layer below 
(UDSES) to provide in turn facilities to the nodes requesting a connection. Its 
functionality can be surnmarised as follows: 
0 Interface between FCNS and applications 
0 Negotiation of presentation context / transfer syntax 
0 Representation of the abstract syntax requested by an application 
0 Maintenance of the information contents received 
* Use of the UDSES services 
The following two subsections illustrate how these functions are materialised in the 
FCNS stack and how they are translated into the services the UDPRES provides. 
4.3.1.1 UDPRES Protocol Definition 
This particular set of communication rules offers a confirmed service, meaning that 
it has to accept requests that are transformed to indications, and responses 
translated into confirmations. Figure A. 3 of Appendix A illustrates the specification 
diagram of the LIDPRES protocol and its functionality with respect to the services it 
provides to the nodes. 
The requests are initiated, in FCNS terminology, by decisions and the responses by 
the decision responses from the node instances. Table 4.1 depicts the various 
decisions and their responses used by the UDPRES protocol. 
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Depending on the decision and the respective response the UDPRES service 
translates them into the necessary service primitives, as illustrated in Table 4.2. In 
order to implement the UDPRES protocol into a functional architecture, service 
primitives are interpreted as messages exchanged between the FCNS layers, 
traversing from the source node to the ultimate destination and vice versa. 
Table 4.1: Decisions and decision responses of the UDPRES protocol 
Request for an action Decision Decision Response 
Establish connection conn request conn accept/ 
conn reject 
Data transfer data-request data_accept 
data-reject 
Finish data transmission data finish finish accept/ 
finish re _ 
ject 
Release connection release request release accept/ 
release reject 
Error FATAL_error error FATAL / 
NONFATAL errorl error NONFATAL/ 
OTHER_error error OTHER 
Table 4.2: Service primitives exchanged by the UDPRES protocol 
Action Request Indication Response Confirmation 
Initialise connect . nit connect init con_setup con_setup 
Data transfer data data data- transfer 
engaged 
data_transfer 
engaged 
End transfer en ata end data data-end data_end 
Release connect disconnect con_exit con_exit 
Error ult Fault error conn error conn 
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The names of the requests and indications and those of the responses and 
confirmations respectively are the same for consistency reasons. 
Ultimately UDPRES is the layer involved with arranging encoding issues for the data 
to be exchanged. The service primitives originated by this layer are used to 
negotiate the source and destination information representation formats, and agree 
upon the transit format, or transfer syntax, which will be used throughout the 
connection duration. This mechanism enables any higher layer applications to 
exploit the data communication control facilities offered by UDSES, by 
synchronising and maintaining a particular session. Its responsibilities though are 
limited to communicating and maintaining the set of syntaxes that the nodes 
require to be used. It is not involved in determining these and consequently its 
services to the nodes and network elements in a topology are the identification of 
the abstract syntaxes and their negotiation. 
Once the connection establishment and data transfer phases have been completed, 
UDPRES must ensure that the agreed syntaxes are securely removed from the 
context lists present in the nodes, to avoid possible manipulation by an adversary. 
It is up to the UDPRES to ensure that the SL verifies, authenticates and secures the 
lists and messages exchanged between the peers, to minimise the possibility that 
an attacker could be successful in determining the type of syntax agreed for a 
connection. 
4.3.1.2 UDPRES Service Definition 
The UDPRES protocol has the task of presenting the FCNS stack with the requests 
and responses initiated by the network elements, in an attempt to establish and 
maintain a connection, providing the UDSES layer with the parameters necessary to 
ascertain a particular level of QoS in the session. 
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Its services can be surnmarised as follows: 
0 Identification of abstract syntaxes 
0 Selection of the appropriate transfer syntax for a connection 
0 Negotiation and maintenance of the agreed transfer syntax 
9 Maintenance of the QoS level provided by the UDSES protocol 
* Access to the services provided by the UDSES protocol 
As mentioned previously, these services are realised by the UDPRES protocol, in 
various phases of the communication, such as the connection establishment, data 
transfer and connection release. 
4.3.1.2.1 UDPRES Connection Establishment 
UDPRES connection establishment phase is initiated by a decision launched from 
the sending peer, indicating that information has to be transferred to a particular 
destination. Prior to identifying the abstract syntax requested by the application, 
the SL has to verify the validity of the node and arrange for the necessary security 
context to be agreed between the peers, enforcing the FCNS handshake mechanism 
used to enhance system's security (these actions are described in detail in Chapter 
5). 
Immediately after the reception of the initial decision from the node, the SL 
provides all FCNS layers with the necessary security algorithm parameters that will 
be used to secure the messages to be exchanged in the stack. The mechanism 
ensures that since there is no functional FCNS stack created for a connection, an 
adversary wishing to intercept these messages will be unsuccessful. 
FCNS functionality is subject to the active participation of the node running its 
instance in a session, as is the case with every set of communication rules. 
UDPRES is in an idle state, until the node indicates its willingness to communicate 
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with a peer (sending instance), or receive information from one (receiving 
instance). If that is the case, SL instructs the UDPRES, together with the rest of 
the FCNS layers, as to the algorithms that will be used to secure the messages 
intended for the destination. If the process of accepting and verifying with the SL 
the required procedures is successfully completed, then UDPRES may change its 
status awaiting for the node to initiate its request. In any other case an alert is 
issued and the communication is halted. 
Whenever a node issues the initial conn_request decision, UDPRES has to check 
whether it can first accept the request and then establish the status of the node 
with respect to any other activities it might be involved with. If the acceptability of 
the request cannot be achieved, UDPRES issues an alert to notify the application 
and the SL that the particular request cannot be fulfilled. On the contrary, if 
UDPRES can process it, it transforms the decision to the connect init request, which 
is sent to the SL via the CONNECT REQUEST message. The SL initiates a check 
sequence for the request and starts the handshake mechanism used to establish a 
secured communication path between peer nodes and the Security Contexts (SCs) 
to be used throughout the session. 
At the receiving end, UDPRES has the task of identifying the service primitive that 
has arrived and check whether it can be accepted according to the current phase of 
the communication. If the request cannot be met then an alert is sent to indicate 
the error. On the other hand, if the request is validated then it is transformed to an 
indication and sent to the receiving process. 
Upon reception of the confirmation for the initial request, UIDPRES has the task of 
establishing the syntax that will be used for the data that needs to be transmitted, 
hence moving into the context setup and management phase. 
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4.3.1.2.2 UDPRES Context Setup and Management 
Context setup and management functions are involved in negotiating and 
preserving the presentation context agreed between peers for the connection. 
There may be a case where the sending or receiving entities wish to alter this 
context, something that has to be supported by UDPRES, to enable communication 
to proceed without releasing it or causing any service discontinuity. For the 
negotiation of the transfer syntax between peers, UDPRES uses the 
NODE_REQUEST, NODE_REQUEST_RESPONSE and NODE_ ESTABLISH messages, 
depicted in Figures 4.5,4.6 and 4.7 respectively. 
bits: 8 24 32 32 32 8 bits: 8 24 32 32 32 
Flag CM NEoA NEdA CONTEXT ToS Flag CM NEoA NEdA CONTEXý 
IIII 
LIST 
IIIIII 
LIST 
Figure 4.5: NODE REQUEST message Figure 4.6: 
NODE REQUEST RESPONSE message 
bits: a 24 32 32 88 
Flag CM NEoA NEdA ToS DATA 
IIII ITYPE 
Figure 4.7., NODE ESTABLISH message 
The flag field is a variable used in the simulation environment for measurement 
purposes and also to enable nodes to identify and discard any duplicate messages. 
The CM field contains information about the security of the particular message 
agreed during the SC exchange phase, such as authentication and confidentiality 
identifiers. Additionally, the NE6A (Network Element originating Address) and NEdA 
(Network Element destination Address) fields contain the sending and receiving 
addresses, whereas the ToS field of the NODE-REQUEST and NODE_ESTABLISH 
messages includes information as to the type of service that is requested by the 
application. Finally, the CONTEXT LIST field represents the list of the abstract 
syntaxes that will be used for the agreement of the connection transfer syntax, 
whilst the DATA TYPE field indicates whether the information to be exchanged is 
user or signalling data. 
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The negotiation of the syntax is done via the NODE-REQUEST message, where the 
source indicates the most convenient context for it, as well as the type of service 
and data to be in transit. The receiver then initiates a check sequence to identify 
whether it can support the requested syntax and type of service for the connection 
and includes its response at the NODE REQUEST RESPONSE message. If the 
request from the sender cannot be met, then the process continues so that peers 
can come to an agreement of a syntax convenient for both nodes, which will be 
used and preserved throughout the session. This process usually takes one step in 
FCNS, since the initial NODE REQUEST RESPONSE message would include 
information about a syntax that the sender could support, selected from a context 
definition list residing in the original message and found at the receiving entity. If 
there is no agreement though, then a second NODE REQUEST message is sent to 
the receiver, which has to accept the parameters indicated by the source, else the 
connection establishment procedure is halted. 
Success in setting up the transfer syntax for the session (presentation context) is 
indicated by the NODE ESTABLISH message, which includes the type of service and 
type of data that is to be transferred throughout the data transfer phase. 
There may also be cases where the presentation context must be changed during 
the course of a session, for example due to a software fault in one of the peers, 
leading to misidentification of a transfer syntax. Whenever such an issue arises, 
the NODE REQUEST message is issued to indicate that one or many presentation 
contexts are to be added or deleted from the existing list, or that the transfer 
syntax must be changed for that session. The indication for such an action is 
included in the data messages sent to the receiver, prior to releasing the 
NODE REQUEST message, to ensure that the request has indeed been issued by 
the intended peer, and is not part of any insertion or Denial of Service (DoS) 
attack. The procedure in arranging the alteration of the context is similar to the 
one used in the connection establishment phase, though data transfer resumes 
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without the nodes having to issue a data request decision. If the context and the 
requested action are not accepted by the peer, then an alert is issued to the SL to 
indicate the type of error which has occurred. 
Depending on the network running on top of FCNS, context exchange times may 
vary. For the UMTS CN, context agreement should not take more than 100 msec 
[142], a point of measure set for the FCNS implementation and simulation 
environment. 
4.3.1.2.3 UDPRES Data Transfer 
UDPRES offers information transfer between peer nodes depending on the settings 
agreed between them in the connection establishment phase. 
The sending node issues the appropriate decision, which is transformed to the 
respective request and sent to the receiver to check whether it can accept the 
information or not. In case the request is rejected, the sender will have to wait for 
a predetermined period of time before issuing the same request. If the receiver 
rejects the request more than 3 times, then the communication is dropped. In any 
other case, the data accept decision response is interpreted in the respective 
response primitive and sent to the sending instance. 
Information is passed from the sending process to UDPRES, which first performs a 
check to verify that the syntax conforms to that agreed between the nodes. In 
case of a match, UDPRES adds its own header to the message passed to it, making 
sure that it is encrypted with the keys and algorithms arranged for this particular 
connection. Data messages are forwarded to UDSES in the form of the 
NODE TRANSFER message, depicted in Figure 4.8, to make the layer below aware 
of the current phase of the session. If UDSES cannot accept the message, it sends 
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an unacknowledgement back to UDPRES to indicate the reason why it has rejected 
the message, and the time UDPRES should wait before attempting to send it again. 
bits: 8 24 16 16 8a var iable 
Flag CM NEoA NEdA LENGTH TYPE DATA 
Figure 4.8: UDPRES NODE TRANSFER message 
The LENGTH field indicates the length of the whole message, whereas the TYPE 
field includes information as to whether the NODE_TRANSFER is used to transport 
user or control information. 
At the receiving end, UDPRES ensures that the representation of the information 
received is correct, verifies with the SL that the algorithm and secret keys used to 
encrypt the data conform to the parameters set, and decrypts the message arrived 
from UDSES. If decryption and message authentication are completed successfully, 
then UDPRES strips its header and passes the information to the receiver, waiting 
for the next message to arrive. 
For any errors occurring due to internal faults, such as erroneous actions by the 
FCNS layers, the message sent to initiate the FCNS Error Protocol (FCNSEP) is the 
NODE ALERT message illustrated in Figure 4.9, whereas in cases where 
communication must be ended the NODE ABORT message of Figure 4.10 is used. 
bits: 8 24 32 32 
Flag CH NEI REASON 
Figure 4.9: NODE ALERT message 
bits: 8 24 32 32 
NEI ABORT Flag 
I 
CH 
II 
PATTERN 
Figure 4.10: NODE ABORT message 
In the NODE_ALERT message the REASON field includes information as to the type 
of error that occurred, whilst the NEI (Network Element Identifier) field indicates 
the FCNS layer that detected the error. On the other hand, the ABORT PATTERN 
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field contains a series of bits initiating the decision of aborting the communication 
from the particular layer's point of view. It is up to the SL to check the type of 
error and decide whether to initialise the FCNSEP and also whether communication 
should indeed finish or proceed. 
Finally, whenever a node finishes sending information, it sends the data_finish 
decision via UDPRES to the peer. Rejection of the request is indicated by the 
finish-reject response, issued in case there is more data to be received, a situation 
that may occur if some of the data messages have been routed via a different link 
due to congestion or transmission error and did not manage to reach their 
destination on time. On the contrary, finish_accept denotes a decision acceptance 
and also that the connection release phase should normally follow. 
4.3.1.2.4 UDPRES Connection Release 
There are two types of connection releases for the UDPRES, as with every other 
FCNS layer. These are the orderly and disorderly release that may be initiated by 
any peer throughout a communication phase. 
Orderly connection termination takes place whenever a node has completed 
sending or receiving information. The node issues a release request decision, 
which is conveyed to the necessary request primitive via the NODE END message 
depicted in Figure 4.11. UDPRES sends the response back to source going into the 
final stages of completing the session. If the response was negative to the request 
(release reject) then normally another NODE_END message must arrive. If this is 
not the case, an alert is issued to the source and the SL indicating that the 
connection cannot be ended normally. On the other hand, if the release is 
accepted, the source issues the final NODE IDLE message to indicate that its status 
has gone back to the idle state. UDPRES status may still remain in a working state, 
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since it may be involved with other activities, but for the particular application, it 
has to become idle. 
bits: 8 24 32 32 
Flag CH NEI END 
II IPATTE]RN 
Figure 4.11: NODE END message 
In the NODE_END message the END PATTERN field contains a bit series indicating 
that communication may be terminated. 
Disorderly release results from a FATAL alert issue, which is interpreted by the 
COMM ABORT message, which is similar to the NODE_ABORT given in Figure 4.10. 
Upon reception of such a message, the SL verifies that indeed there is such an error 
for which communication must end, prior to instructing the UDPRES to go back to 
the idle state, closing down any pending sessions from the particular node 
regardless of their phases. For communication to proceed, connection 
establishment must take place again, renewing the algorithms, secret keys and 
context list for security purposes. 
4.3.2 User-Defined Session (UDSES) Layer 
The UDSES layer provides the services and functions of the UDSES protocol, which 
is mainly involved with synchronisation issues and address verification of the peers 
involved in a session. UDSES handles the data that is passed to it by UDPRES, 
enhancing the end-to-end transfer services offered by the TX-LAYER, by managing 
the data transfer phase over a session. 
Since for the FCNS realisation the nodes have been assumed to be peers, UDSES 
does not provide any token service that could be used in initiating the release of a 
connection, although support for such services is included in the protocol 
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specification. Any user may terminate the session at any time, either using the 
orderly or disorderly release service of UDSES. Similarly, every node can transmit 
or receive information at will, given that UDSES is able to support this action at that 
time. 
The functions of the UDSES protocol can be surnmarised as follows: 
9 Full duplex communication support 
0 Address verification functions (in conjunction with the SQ 
0 Negotiation and maintenance of synchronisation issues 
Control of connection QoS parameters 
Negotiation and maintenance of 
concatenation/sepa ration parameters 
seg mentation/reassembly and 
* Use of the TX-LAYER services for the UDSES user 
UDSES functions are realised via the UDSES protocol, which makes use of the 
services provided by TX_LAYER, to afford access to the services required by its 
user, that is the UDPRES layer. The following subsections illustrate how these 
functions are realised in the FCNS architecture leading to the provision of the 
UDSES services. 
4.3.2.1 UDSES Protocol Definition 
The UDSES protocol is responsible for providing synchronised communication 
between peers, offering an agreed QoS for the connection and maintaining that 
level throughout its duration. Figure A. 4 of Appendix A depicts an abstraction of 
the UDSES protocol specification diagram and its functionality. 
UDSES functions come into effect whenever UDPRES issues the connection request 
for a particular destination. The protocol enters a new phase where it has to 
negotiate with the peer the required QoS parameters that the sending instance has 
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indicated, making use of the available resources and services that are offered by 
the TX-LAYER. If an agreement cannot be achieved, then the SL seizes 
communication and an alert is sent to indicate the error. 
Sending and receiving information to and from UDSES users though, is a process 
that has to follow an essential address verification procedure. Since there may be 
malicious users and hosts present in a topology, there must be a certain level of 
assurance that the connection has not been initiated or received by an unauthorised 
entity. This feature works in conjunction with data origin authentication issues, 
though at the very first phases of establishing a communication, if a malicious user 
could impersonate a valid node then that could prove any security measures 
ineffectual. An example of this case would be an illicit user that uses its address to 
initiate a session with a legitimate node. If the attacker is able to get hold of the 
SCs exchanged between the peers, then it becomes able to perform any action 
within a session it sets up, since it holds the necessary parameters to masquerade 
as a valid node. With the address verification procedure there is the extra measure 
that, given that the address databases are adequately secured, the messages sent 
and received by the FCNS stack are continuously checked for inconsistencies. Even 
if the security context is compromised, then there is a process that attempts to 
identify any impersonation by the attacker. Although such a measure cannot 
guarantee that address-spoofing attempts would be unsuccessful, with the network 
databases being secured, FCNS should be able to detect any address unknown to it 
and issue an alert to make such a case known to the operator. 
Additionally, UDSES has to ensure that the correct synchronisation parameters will 
be exchanged and controlled between the peers. It may be the case, for example, 
where the sending instance is able to send information at greater rates than those 
at which the destination can receive it or vice versa. There must always be an 
agreement between the peers, to avoid congestion and blocking, and at the same 
time prevent an adversary taking advantage of either of these two cases for a DoS 
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attack. Furthermore, since the communication supported by the UDSES is full 
duplex, synchronisation is used to regulate traffic flow in the network, adding to the 
explicit flow control implemented in the TX-LAYER. 
As UDSES makes use of the services provided by the TX-LAYER to support the 
requested QoS for a session, it is the layer where the control of such parameters 
takes place, so that the application can be aware of the TX-LAYER capabilities in 
supporting and maintaining the required levels. Whenever there is an indication 
that the agreed QoS levels are not enforced, UDSES issues an alert to indicate the 
error. If such errors persist then communication must be ended, since these could 
be the result of a software or hardware fault at the nodes, or due to an adversary 
trying to interfere with the connection. 
Segmentation and reassembly are also issues that can be exploited in the UDSES 
protocol, since they are related to the way UDSES messages can be transferred 
between peer entities. These messages that are initiated by the UDSES user, form 
the Service Data Units (SDUs) of UDSES, which are passed to the TX-LAYER as the 
UDSES Protocol Data Units (PDUs). If segmentation is selected, then a single 
UDSES SDU could be sent to the peer entity in segments, that is, multiple UDSES 
PDUs. This selection could take place as a result of the user data being of a size 
bigger than that set by the Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU) of the particular network 
topology. At the receiving end, the receiver would reassemble these segments to 
obtain the full UDPRES message. This procedure also takes place at the TX-LAYER 
entities, where there is a better understanding of the network capabilities, since 
TX-LAYER sits on top of the subnetwork FCNS runs on. In UDSES, segmentation 
could also be initiated as a result of a limited buffer space, or limited file handling 
capacity, or by large service primitive messages. 
Additional functions of the UDSES protocol include concatenation and separation 
functions that can be used to improve the efficiency of a system in case various 
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small segments are sent from the UDSES users. The UDSES PDUs can be mapped 
into one single TX_LAYER SDU and sent to the peer entity, where they are 
separated to provide the UDSES entity with the appropriate segments. Such a case 
may arise as a result of the transfer of signalling data in a network where MTU sizes 
can be quite large compared to the size of the data that is to be transferred. By 
mapping several UDSES PDUs into a single TX_LAYER SDU will increase the 
performance of the system in two ways. Firstly, fewer packets on the links 
decrease the probability of blocking and, most importantly, the probability of 
segment loss that could result in retransmission. Since the packets are kept in a 
buffer until their reception is acknowledged, a packet loss implies retransmission of 
only that particular packet, which includes the number of segments mapped into it. 
Secondly, it decreases the time taken for TX-LAYER PDUs to be secured and 
exchanged between the peers, since fewer packets means less processing load at 
both the sender and the receiver arising from the encryption/decryption processes. 
The segmentation/ reassembly and concatenation/sepa ration functions have been 
included in the FCNS design to test the performance of the stack with regards to 
the impact such functions would have in the overall security performance of the 
system. They are negotiated and managed by the UDSES protocol and they are 
visible only to the peer UDSES entities, not the UDPRES. 
4.3.2.2 UDSES Service Definition 
The UDSES protoco( has the task of presenting UDPRES with the services offered by 
the TX-LAYER, to implement and maintain the required QoS parameters in the 
connection. The functions present in UDSES have the objective of enforcing the 
services provided by the protocol, which can be surnmarised as follows: 
0 Session establishment and release 
0 Data transfer 
* Session management 
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0 Session synchronisation and QoS negotiation 
The session synchronisation and QoS negotiation services form part of the session 
establishment and management phase, since the parameters agreed are essential 
for the setting up and control of a particular session. Synchronisation management 
and QoS management do not explicitly form phases of the UDSES protocol. They 
are included in the FCNS design to enable the use of these services whenever 
needed and are both treated in this chapter as individual segments of the session 
management phase for illustrative purposes. 
4.3.2.2.1 UDSES Session Establishment 
As with every FCNS layer, the session establishment phase takes place after the SL 
has instructed the UDSES layer of the algorithms and secret keys it can use to 
secure the messages that are to be exchanged with the peer entity. These 
instructions by the SL are mandatory and communication cannot proceed unless 
the required security phases have been completed. Failure in doing so will result in 
the connection being halted and the issuing of an alert to indicate a severe fault of 
the FCNS stack initialisation. 
Whenever a connection request arrives from the UDPRES layer, UDSES checks 
whether it can accept it and set up the session for the particular application 
instance. The address of the sending entity is checked to verify its validity against 
the list of valid nodes for the network topology. Rejecting a particular address may 
be the result of an invalid sending instance, an invalid receiver address or both. 
If the validity Of both nodes is verified, then the request sent by the UDPRES can be 
analysed and the appropriate actions can be taken for the session to be 
established. These actions include the negotiation of the synchronisation points 
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'A 
and parameters between the UDSES peers and the agreement on the required QoS 
levels, as set by the underlying TX_LAYER. 
The mechanism is triggered upon reception of the NODE_ESTABLISH message, 
which indicates that the presentation context for the connection has been agreed 
between the nodes. UDSES initiates the routine for establishing the necessary 
criteria that will be used to set the correct QoS features for the session. Table 4.3 
indicates the possible parameters that user could request for a connection. 
Table 4.3: FCNS QoS parameters 
Parameter Value 
QoS level of support Maximum level: No residual errors 
accepted, throughput above 70%, 
no transit delay, high priority 
Medium level: No residual e rro rs 
accepted, throughput above 50%, 
transit delay below t msec, high 
priority 
- Low Level: Residual e rro rs 
accepted, throughput above 50%, 
transit delay below 2t msec, low 
priority 
- Zero Level: Residual errors 
accepted, no throughput 
restrictions, transit delay below t 
msec, no priority restriction 
Segmentation support - No length restriction, segmentation 
not required 
- MTU can be 1500 bytes long 
- MTU lower than 1500 bytes, of size 
x bytes 
Concatenation support - No concatenation can be accepted 
- Concatenation may take place 
Service access level - Full service access (only case 
supported in FCNS) 
As seen in Table 4.3 the UDSES user can choose between several QoS levels 
varying from high quality communication requirements to low quality ones. For the 
FCNS simulation environment, the stack has been put under test with maximum 
and medium QoS levels to test its performance in cases where transit delay could 
not be acceptable, or at least at a certain level. The QoS level may change 
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throughout the session provided that the change passes through the SL procedures, 
to ensure that the alteration does not form part of an attack by an unauthorised 
user. 
Once the QoS values have been set with the application, UDSES has the task of 
notifying the TX-LAYER of the decisions taken to ensure their support throughout 
the connection. If the requirements cannot be met, then UDSES informs the 
application that the selected parameters need to be changed and the process may 
be repeated only once more provided that UDSES informs the node of the support 
TX-LAYER can offer. If the second attempt is unsuccessful too, then the error is 
deemed fatal and communication is aborted. On the other hand, if the application 
requirements can be met, UDSES issues the required permission to the node to 
start transmitting the data. 
At the UDSES layer, synchronisation encompasses issues involving the instructions 
UDSES makes to the TX-LAYER, mainly concerning the time at which TX-LAYER 
transforms the UDSES PDUs into the messages that are to be sent. The process is 
usually triggered by either one of the peers present in the session, and aims at 
regulating the flow of data in the network, as a result of the UDSES synchronising 
the data flow. Since synchronisation takes place throughout the whole of the 
communication phases, it is discussed in the subsection concerning the 
synchronisation and QoS management. 
4.3.2.2.2 UDSES Data Transfer 
UDSES enters the data transfer phase immediately following the issuing of the 
permission to the sending and receiving instances for the beginning of the data 
exchange. This permission is actually a means of verifying that the session 
establishment phase has been completed as expected and that all the necessary 
parameters and variables have been set as required. 
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UDSES makes a connection request to the TX-LAYER to check the availability and 
status of the layer prior to forwarding the data. Failure in obtaining a valid status 
response, after a maximum of three consecutive tries from the layer below, implies 
the termination of the connection. On the contrary, if TX-LAYER can accept the 
information, then UDSES accepts the data passed onto it by the UDPRES and 
forwards it to the TX_LAYER in the form of the MSG CREATE message, depicted in 
Figure 4.12. 
bits: 8 24 32 32 8 16 
Flag CM I NEDA I NEdA I LENGTH 
I 
PRIORITY 
I DATA from I 
UDPRES 
NODE-TRANSFER 
Figure 4.12: UDSES MSG CREATE message 
The NEoA and NEdA fields indicate the sending and receiving instances of the 
UDSES protocol that the message has been created and is intended for 
respectively. The LENGTH field indicates the length of the whole of the message in 
bytes, whereas the PRIORITY field is a measure given to the TX-LAYER as to the 
priority level at which message should be treated. 
Upon reception of the MSG_CREATE message by the receiving UDSES entity, the 
address verification process is initiated, to check the validity of the addresses 
present in the received data. If the addresses are validated, then the message is 
stripped of its header and is passed to the UDPRES layer, waiting for the next 
message to arrive, provided that the last one received did not have the End Of File 
(EOF) identifier. On the other hand, if even one of the addresses is proven to be 
invalid, then the message is dropped and an alert is issued upon persistency of the 
error. Usually, such a case may arise by finding the sending node to be an invalid 
one. That does not imply though that the address present in the NEdA field would 
contain a valid address identifier. Although it is up to the PHYS and EE_LAYER to 
forward the packets to their correct destination, it may be the case that a message 
intended for another node has somehow reached the node actively participating in 
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this session. For the UDSES layer this is regarded as an error and the reception of 
three such messages results in a FATAL error report and consequently the 
disorderly release of the connection. 
If the sending application instance finishes transmitting the data, then the UDPRES 
notifies the layer of its intention of releasing the session and terminating any 
outstanding processes for this particular connection. 
4.3.2.2.3 UDSES Session Release 
UDSES session release phase follows similar principles to that of the UDPRES 
connection release in the sense that it provides both the orderly and disorderly 
session termination services to its user. 
Orderly release follows the appropriate request made by the UDPRES protocol in 
the form of the NODE_END message. The layer has the task of identifying whether 
there any outstanding activities in the session for which the request has been 
made, before proceeding into terminating the connection. If there are any pending 
service actions, UDSES has to reject the request, so that these processes can 
finish, prior to resetting all parameter values set for the connection. Such a case 
may occur due to an error made by the application assuming that data transfer has 
normally finished before accepting any acknowledgement for the last message sent. 
Furthermore, an adversary could try to force the tearing down of the session by 
inserting bogus NODE_END messages into the traffic flow. It is up to the UDSES 
layer to ensure that, in conjunction with the address verification procedure, the 
connection cannot be released until all session processes have come to an end. 
The reception of the NODE_END message by both the sending and receiving UDSES 
peer entities forces the protocol into entering a waiting state, whereby the SL has 
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to issue a command before UDSES can go back to its initial idle condition. This is 
achieved by using the SET STATUS message as depicted in Figure 4.13. 
bits: 8 24 32 32 
Flag 
I 
CH 
I 
NEI 
I 
STATUS_ 
Figure 4.13: SET STATUS message 
The STATUS field of the message contains a series of bits indicating that the layer 
should go into an idle state, since its particular instance is not needed in the FCNS 
stack at that time. Although UDSES may be used moments after the release of a 
session to establish a new one, it is imperative that it returns to an initial idle state, 
as is the case with all the FCNS layers, to avoid livelocks and deadlocks in the 
protocol implementation. The process ensures that all parameters used throughout 
the connection are reset and that the protocol temporarily loses its functionality to 
avoid attacks aiming at the source code used to provide it. Lack of protocol 
functionality implies that an attacker would not be able to launch an attack at the 
protocol, simply because no instance of it would exist. 
Disorderly release in the UDSES protocol may occur for a variety of reasons, 
including routine failures, bad encryption/decryption processes, lack of negotiation 
successions and the like. Whenever such an error, classified in FCNS as fatal, 
occurs, the COMM-ABORT message is used to indicate the immediate termination 
of the connection. This tearing down though has to be first validated by the SL, to 
protect the system from possible DoS attacks, aiming at connection discontinuity. 
Following the reception of such a message, the UDSES layer goes into an idle state, 
resetting all parameters and QoS values set for the connection. All nodes 
participating in a connection may break the communication with the peer, if the 
COMM-ABORT message is issued. 
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4.3-2-2.4 UDSES QoS and Synchronisation Management 
QoS and synchronisation management are services provided to the UDSES user 
throughout the duration of the session and fall into the session management 
services category provided by the UDSES protocol. They can be initiated at any 
time from a peer UDSES entity and are used to enable users to comply with 
changes that the network topology may endure during the data transfer phase. An 
example of such a case would be the blocking or congestion built up in a particular 
link, where time-sensitive data is in transit. The peer processes may then choose 
to alter some QoS parameters, like for example tolerance in the transit delay, and 
hence have their packets routed via a different link. Similarly, the receiving entity 
due to a possible involvement in several activities may not be able to cope with the 
sending rate of the messages after a period of time already in the session. It is up 
to the UDSES protocol to facilitate the renegotiation of synchronisation parameters 
to increase the efficiency of the protocol and its adaptability in network changes. 
If the QoS parameters need to be changed, then the node indicates this by 
inserting in the data flow a normal data message containing a parameter signifying 
that the message to follow does not contain user but control information. Upon 
acceptance of this message the receiver will have to put the messages already 
received in a buffer, and acknowledge any outstanding messages on hold. The 
sending instance then issues the request to the UDSES protocol to depict the values 
that need to be changed. Upon reception of the message, UDSES has to negotiate 
those with the peer entity, as well as with the TX-LAYER. If negotiation cannot be 
established, then the communication is terminated since it cannot further proceed. 
On the other hand, success in arranging the new QoS levels will result in the UDSES 
layer issuing permission to the peer nodes, signifying that communication should 
continue on the new basis set for that session. 
Synchronisation management is achieved by monitoring the response of the peer 
entities in sending and receiving the information in transit. Upon reception of the 
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service primitive message, UDSES starts a check routine to establish whether the 
request has been significant, meaning that parameters should actually change for 
the continuation of the session and the request is not a product of a possible 
connection manipulation attempt by an adversary. If synchronisation has to take 
place, then the necessary adjustments are made and signalled to the SL. 
Communication can then proceed as normal, yet there cannot be more than three 
requests for synchronisation made by the same peers. Such a situation would 
imply the immediate abortion of the connection and signalling of the error to the 
system. 
4.3.3 Transmission Layer (TX-LAYER) 
Transmission layer is the FCNS layer responsible for providing the UDSES protocol 
the services offered by the EE_LAYER. It handles the data that is passed to it by 
UDSES, realising the end-to-end data transmission service of the FCNS, taking 
advantage of the link-based transmission nature of the EE_LAYER. 
TX-LAYER functions can be surnmarised as follows: 
0 Provision of end-to-end transmission services 
0 Setup, control and release of connections 
0 Data transfer 
e Multiplexing of TX_LAYER connections onto an EE_LAYER connection 
0 Datagram segmentation/ reassembly and concatenation/sepa ration 
0 End-to-end error detection and recovery 
o QoS management 
Support for synchronisation services 
End-to-end security services 
0 Explicit flow control 
9 Use of the EE_LAYER services 
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The TX-LAYER functions are fulfilled by the TX_LAYER protocol, which is mainly 
involved with the establishment of secured end-to-end transmission connections 
between the peers. Figure A-5 of Appendix A illustrates the specification diagram of 
the TX-LAYER protocol, in relation to the layers adjacent to it. 
4.3.3.1 TX-LAYER Protocol Definition 
The TX-LAYER protocol forms the interface between the FCNS upper layers and 
those involved with the realisation of the subnetwork on which FCNS runs. Its 
involvement in the overall communication is essential for the maintenance and 
support of a certain quality of service requested by the user, incorporating security 
and error detection functionality. 
End-to-end based communication implies the transmission of the data from the 
sending instance to the receiver, irrespective of the underlying subnetwork and the 
number of intermediate nodes the messages could be routed through. TX-LAYER 
entities recognise only the end addresses of the peers involved in the 
communication and it is on this basis that the protocol services can be deployed. 
Communication support in FCNS is full duplex and the TX-LAYER has been designed 
so that its instances running on the peers can act both as senders and receivers. 
The end-to-end nature of the protocol is achieved throughout the transmission 
connection phases as set out in the TX-LAYER Service Definition section. 
To facilitate and enhance the services the TX-LAYER provides to the UDSES layer, it 
employs QoS and synchronisation management functions. These aim at 
maintaining the quality of the connection according to the levels agreed between 
the peers during the connection establishment phase. Nodes participating in a 
transmission may request the alteration or renegotiation of the QoS parameters, in 
cases where these cannot be supported for a particular reason, as described in the 
UDSES service specification. The TX_LAYER has to ensure that it can sustain the 
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agreement of the new values, without the process affecting the overall quality of 
the connection. Such processes may take place throughout all phases of the 
transmission, except its disorderly release, where communication is immediately 
broken. 
Re-synchronisation of the connection may also be required in cases where sender 
and receiver rates deviate from the ones agreed between the TX-LAYER users, due 
to possible hardware faults in the nodes affecting the realisation of the FCNS 
instances, or attacks launched by an adversary aiming at connection manipulation. 
The TX-LAYER needs to ensure that the service is supported between the peer 
UDSES instances, without making the nodes aware of the situation that has arisen. 
In such an occurrence, the TX-LAYER shall not discontinue the normal data flow of 
the network instead it has to provide the necessary messages to the node instances 
alongside the data messages (datagrams). It will then be up to the connection 
users to comply with the new values and parameters set by the TX-LAYER for the 
transmission to proceed as normal. Failure in doing so will result in the 
connection"s immediate release and the notification of the SL of the error situation. 
An exception of this case may occur due to an error detected only by the underlying 
subnetwork. If the error is not signalled to the TX_LAYER, then the protocol may 
not be able to recover from the situation and hence arrange for the new parameters 
to be agreed between the peers. 
Moreover, since the FCNS Transmission layer has been designed to promote the 
end-to-end connectivity of the network topology nodes, it is the layer where 
functions such as end-to-end error detection and recovery are afforded. Usually 
the errors residual to the TX-LAYER instance concern the flow of the data between 
the ultimate peers or other problems that may have arisen from the transmission of 
the data messages. These may include timer expirations whilst waiting for the data 
acknowledgements,, messages not being secured prior to their exchange, corrupted 
datagram headers, miscalculated checksums, corrupted or duplicate messages, 
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invalid end-to-end address identifiers and clatagram sizes outside the length 
restrictions imposed during connection setup. 
To compensate for corrupted received messages, the TX-LAYER uses a checksum 
value calculated on the whole of the datagram. At the receiver, immediately after 
the decryption and authentication of the datagram, the TX-LAYER instance 
recalculates the checksum value for the message received. If the value matches 
the one received then the message is stripped off its header and is then passed 
onto the UDSES layer. On the other hand, if the two values differ, then the 
message is dropped. To protect against message corruption by either a 
transmission link error or an attacker launching a modification attack, the 
TX-LAYER notifies the SL of the situation after receiving more than three such 
messages. The SL has the task of informing the system of the situation and 
establishing new parameters for the connection, such as the transmission of the 
datagrams via a different route. Persistency of such an error will result in the 
communication being seized by the SL to protect the protocol stack mechanisms 
against possible attacks. 
More severe error cases include the transmission of datagrams in plaintext form, 
even when the end-to-end security functions are in effect. These types of errors 
can be the result of either a software fault in the FCNS implementation at the 
specific node originating the situation, or due to an attack aiming at manipulating 
the FCNS implementation on that particular node. These errors cannot be signalled 
by the subnetwork since the EE_LAYER cannot process the datagram headers to 
check their validity. If the receiving TX-LAYER entity detects such an error, then 
the SL is given notice of the situation so that it issues an alert via the FCNSEP to 
the sending entity. The connection is then entered a new mode, whereby all 
messages intended for the particular destination are explicitly monitored by the SL, 
prior to their forwarding to the TX_LAYER. Communication is disorderly released if 
the TX_LAYER is not able to recover from the error occurred and the node in 
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question is put into a suspension mode from future connection requests, until the 
situation is cleared by the network operator. 
Other residual error circumstances like invalid end-to-end address identifiers are 
usually treated as a result of a fault in the transmission link. Although an aggressor 
could launch a modification attack for various reasons including the denial of the 
transmission service, it is not very likely that modifying the end-to-end address 
identifiers will have great effect as to the success of the attack. Severe problems 
could also arise by an adversary aiming at changing the security fields of the 
message in such a manner that he/she could impersonate a valid node and manage 
to get the modified messages through. Yet, FCNS offers several degrees of 
protection in all levels of the communication, making the chances of success for 
such attacks very low. In any case, if the TX-LAYER instance originating the error 
cannot recover from it, then the SL has to seize the communication. It is 
recommended that the connection be routed via another node or serving 
environment, so that the service can still be offered to the user. 
Another category of residual errors includes situations where acknowledgements for 
the datagrams sent do not arrive in a predetermined period of time. This may be 
the result of faulty or congested network links, or a software fault on the node 
running the TX-LAYER instances. In the first case, the FCNSEP is used to indicate 
to the sender that timers should be altered to compensate for the time it would 
take to either solve the problem or route the datagrams via another channel. In 
the second case, the problem may be a severe one in the sense that even if such a 
suggestion is made, the TX-LAYER instance may not be able to adjust to the new 
situation. Such errors fall outside the scope of the FCNSEP and error detection and 
correction mechanisms, given that any source code implementation failure would 
affect the stack as a whole. 
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Finally, TX_LAYER errors may be the result of clatagrams arriving with length larger 
than that agreed between peers in the connection establishment phase. This error 
is quite significant since its existence indicates that either it is the consequence of a 
software fault, or a modification attack. Since the parameters governing the size of 
the datagram to be exchanged are decided and verified prior to the data transfer 
phase (QoS negotiation), an error of this nature signifies the use of the FCNSEP and 
the explicit monitoring of the connection for recovery purposes. 
Flow control in the TX-LAYER is achieved by using a mechanism similar to the 
sliding window algorithm of the TCP/IP architecture [28]. This method is used to 
provide basic reliable message transport, however many different techniques can 
be implemented to enhance it further. In FCNS, the TX-LAYER obtains the 
necessary information to enforce the flow control mechanism by consulting its users 
regarding their requirements and their ability to support the traffic flow once 
established. The mechanism in this layer is explicitly enforced, meaning that flow 
control is implemented irrespective of the underlying subnetwork and the 
technology supporting it. The intention of the TX-LAYER is the ordered and in- 
sequence delivery of the datagrams between the peers, no matter the route they 
will traverse to reach their destination. 
The sender must first be able to adjust its sending rate to the respective one of the 
receiver, a requirement partially fulfilled by the synchronisation process. Secondly, 
the receiver should be able to recreate the required data for forwarding to the 
UDSES protocol by the received segments, so it is imperative that a method of 
selecting the appropriate segments is enforced. The procedure is realised by 
selecting the appropriate number of messages that can be sent before an 
acknowledgment is sent back to the sender and at the same time by identifying 
these segments accordingly. Moreover, since segmentation and multiplexing is 
available at the TX_LAYER, FCNS provides the means of identifying the clatagrams 
belonging to the same group, or the same transmission connection, and also those 
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multiplexed onto an EE_LAYER connection. As is described in the TX-LAYER 
Service Definition section, the TX-LAYER provides this service throughout the data 
transfer process by using the necessary identifiers in the datagrams. 
Finally, the TX-LAYER has the task of imposing the end-to-end security services 
dictated by the SL. These are agreed via the 10-way handshake mechanism that 
takes place during the connection establishment phase and aims at providing the 
necessary means of enhancing the security of the system. The mechanism is 
described in Chapter 5 in relation to the various layers of the FCNS architecture. 
By providing security parameters to the TX-LAYER protocol, users may encrypt 
their data on an end-to-end basis, ensuring the authentication, integrity and 
confidentiality of the connection throughout the transmission. It is recommended 
that the end users secure their messages using end-to-end encryption to protect 
their data against unauthorised disclosure or modification attempts. Interruption 
and insertion attacks cannot be avoided with this particular mechanism, yet the 
process offers a great degree of protection against replay attacks, minimising the 
possibility that an attacker would use any knowledge of the connection to replay 
part of it or in whole. The TX_LAYER is responsible for initiating the handshake 
mechanism upon instruction by the SL. It is the layer that will notify the SL of any 
problems that may arise throughout its deployment, such as corrupt or missing 
messages. In FCNS, two consecutive unsuccessful handshake attempts result in 
the connection termination and the parameters securely been reset, destroying the 
SCs created for the transmission. 
The responsibilities though of the TX-LAYER protocol as far as security is concerned 
do not only involve the end-to-end message security. The TX-LAYER must be able 
to secure internal messages intended for the UDSES layer as well as the EE_LAYER 
and the SL, all with different keys to ensure the protection of the layers in case the 
communication with another FCNS layer is compromised. The level at which such 
an attack could be launched falls down to the software and hardware 
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implementation of the FCNS, yet the possibilities that such attempts would be made 
cannot be negligible. 
4.3.3.2 TX-LAYER Service Definition 
TX-LAYER service realisation forms the very essence of the TX-LAYER, which 
promotes the end-to-end capabilities of FCNS to its users. The functions of this 
protocol as described in the TX-LAYER protocol definition section are used to 
implement end-to-end session support including: 
9 QoS management and Monitoring and, 
End-to-end UDSES connection support via: 
Connection establishment phase 
Data transfer phase 
Connection release phase 
Connection monitoring and management 
Connection monitoring and management does not actually form a separate 
communication stage of the TX_LAYER, since it is an integral part of the 
transmission. Its differentiation is made only for presentation purposes of the 
thesis. 
4.3.3.2.1 TX-LAYER Connection Establishment 
Connection establishment in the TX-LAYER follows the appropriate request made by 
the UDSES instance. The TX-LAYER user has to inform the layer of the QoS and 
synchronisation requirements for the transmission, before setting it up. In order 
for the TX-LAYER to support the requested levels, the user has to choose between 
the two classes of the TX-LAYER service available. 
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Class 1 provides the basic end-to-end transmission service of the user data. If this 
class is chosen then no error detection will be in effect for the connection, in the 
sense that the checksurn validation process as well as the flow control mechanism 
of the FCNS will not be used. 
Class 2 on the other hand offers error detection and recovery, as well as 
multiplexing functions for the TX-LAYER user. The basic transmission service is 
enhanced with the capabilities offered by the FCNS in detecting transmission errors 
and recovering from them. Furthermore, several transmission connections can be 
multiplexed onto a single EE_LAYER connection, increasing the performance of the 
network by minimising the processing time and load it would take for the 
subnetwork to set up and support several connections. 
Initiation of the transmission connection establishment phase is signalled by the SL 
protocol, which implements the 10-way FCNS handshake mechanism. The 
TX-LAYER actively participates in the process since it is the layer where the end-to- 
end security algorithms and keys are negotiated between the peers, according to 
the security context of the connection. The SL issues the ENCRYPT ETE and 
DECRYPT ETE messages to the TX-LAYER instances, as a step in the handshake 
mechanism, with the messages being depicted in Figure 4.14. 
bits: 8 24 32 32 32 
Flag 
I 
CM 
I 
NEoA 
I 
NEdA 
I 
STATUS 
ENC/DEC 
I 
TECHQ 
I 
PRIORITY 
I 
TC_ID 
bits: 8 16 8 16 
Figure 4.14: ENCRYPT ETE and DECRYPT ETE messages 
The ENCIDEC field indicates whether the message is the ENCRYPT_ETE or the 
DECRYPT_ETE one. Information is given as to the algorithm that TX-LAYER will 
have to use for that connection to secure the datagrams. Secret key information is 
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transferred in the TECHQ field of the message. The field includes facts such as key 
lengths and whether they form part of a symmetric or asymmetric key encryption 
scheme. The actual keys are negotiated and transferred to the respective layers 
during the SC establishment phase of the SL protocol and not with these messages. 
The PRIORITY field contains an indication as to the way the TX-LAYER should 
process the message immediately upon reception. Finally RýJD field is used to 
provide TX_LAYER with the necessary connection identifiers that could be used if 
multiplexing is requested for this layer. 
If the handshake mechanism is completed successfully, then the TX-LAYER user 
will have to choose the service class for the connection. That choice signals the 
transition of the TX-LAYER from its waiting state to a processing mode, where 
agreement for the QoS and synchronisation levels for the connection has to take 
place between the peers. If TX_LAYER cannot support the service required then it 
notifies the UDSES with the values it can sustain. On the other hand, if the 
TX-LAYER can support the services in question, then it communicates with the peer 
the QoS and flow control values that should be used throughout the data 
transmission. 
The values agreed between the TX-LAYER and its user are saved and kept in a 
temporary memory module, so that they can be cross- referenced with those 
obtained via the negotiation of the necessary variables with the peer entity. If the 
receiving entity agrees with the parameters invited by the sender, the it informs 
the destination of the values agreed, releasing at the same time the memory 
module from its contents. The TX-LAYER entity then notifies the UDSES protocol 
that connection can proceed and waits for the data messages to arrive. 
Table 4.4 depicts the values that can be negotiated between the communicating 
entities. These values may change during the data transfer phase as a result of a 
Chapter 4- 97 Protocol Security for 3rd Generation Telecommunication Systems 
situation altering the behaviour and capabilities of a node in supporting the 
requested QoS. 
Table 4.4: 7X LAYER QoS parameters 
Parameter Values 
QoS level Values presented in Table 4.3 
Data message length Values presented in Table 4.3 
restriction (in bytes) 
Timer restriction in - 300 msec 
acknowledging messages - 250 msec 
(values are - 50 msec 
representational) - 25 msec 
Flow control restrictions - 32 message window 
- 16 message window 
-8 message window 
1 message window 
Checksum algorithm No checksum (for Class 1 services) 
parameters Checksum enabled with method x 
Reserved for future use All zeros 
The difference between the QoS level parameter values negotiated at the UDSES 
level (Table 4.3) lays on the fact that transmission connection delay times are 
greater than the actual time it would take for the message to reach the peer. Users 
have to deal with issues like acceptance of datagram loss, corruption, duplication 
and out-of-sequence delivery, prior to the establishment of the connection between 
the peers. These levels will determine to a great extent the level of QoS that will 
be maintained throughout the data exchange, although they can be changed in due 
course if that is requested by a peer. 
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Additionally, the Row control restrictions parameter is used to indicate the number 
of datagrams that can be sent before an acknowledgement is sent back to the 
sender. The value can indeed be changed during the data transfer phase, with the 
TX-LAYER instance storing the outstanding messages on a buffer for their explicit 
acknowledgement, to avoid unwanted and unnecessary datagram retransmission. 
Finally, the CHECK parameter represents whether the checksum calculation process 
will be enabled for the connection and the method that will be used to calculate 
these values. It is recommended that all TX_LAYER users calculate the datagram 
checksum prior to its transmission, since it provides a measure in identifying 
transmission errors that may modify the contents of the data messages. 
Upon the success of the mechanism negotiating the QoS and synchronisation 
parameters for the connection, the TX-LAYER issues a transmission permission to 
the UDSES protocol, which in turn has to inform the application of the QoS values 
agreed and forward the data messages to the protocol. The permission is an 
indication of the TX-LAYER status in supporting the transmission data phase. 
4.3-3.2.2 TX-LAYER Data Transfer 
The data transfer phase involves the mapping of the data messages arriving from 
UDSES into the TX_LAYER datagrams and their forwarding to the peer entity, 
making use of the end-to-end connection service of this layer. 
Whenever a MSG_CREATE message arrives, TX_LAYER has to check whether the 
EE_LAYER can accept the information and the assignment of the TX-LAYER 
connection into an EE_LAYER one. Supported options in the FCNS architecture 
include multiplexing, that is, the mapping of many TX-LAYER connections over a 
single EE_LAYER one, and splitting, that is, the handling of a single transmission 
connection into various EE_LAYER ones. 
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If EE_LAYER does not respond within a predetermined period of time, then an 
un acknowledgement is sent back to the TX-LAYER. Failure in responding to this 
notice, or in providing TX-LAYER with the necessary parameters to proceed with 
the data transfer phase will result in an alert sent to the SL and the suspension of 
the connection, until the EE_LAYER can respond or the communication is released. 
Upon success in arranging the above parameters with the subnetwork, the 
TX-LAYER maps the data passed to it into the appropriate datagrarn format. The 
issues surrounding this process involve checksum calculation procedures and the 
segmenting of the UDSES data, if that is required. The available clatagram 
structure is given in Figure 4.15. 
,: 1 .7k i*-- 
Flag CM 
NEoA 
NEdA 
Sequence Number 
SEG. I TC-IDJ LENGTH 
Checksum 
DATA FIELD 
(variable) 
Message 
Header 
Figure 4.15. - DATAGRAM and DATAGRAM SAR structure 
The same message configuration is used for messages transmitted either as 
segments, forming the DATAGRAM-SAR messages, or in whole, denoted as 
DATAGRAM messages. Their difference, apart from the length size of the datagram 
is that segmented messages have the SEG field set, whereas its value becomes 
zero when no segmentation is required. The TC ID field of the message is the 
value of the transmission connection, which should be used in cases where 
multiplexing or splitting are used, enabling the receiver to identify th e appropriate 
datagrams for the required connection. 
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The field denoted Sequence Number contains the sequence number of the 
datagram used to promote the explicit flow control mechanism of the TX-LAYER. 
Its value is dependent on the number of messages that are selected as the window 
size and is calculated as: 2 no. messages _I. The flow control mechanism of the 
TX-LAYER is similar to the one used in the PHYS layer. Their difference though 
comes from the complexity of the function from the TX-LAYER point of view, since 
flow control involves the interaction of the UDSES, T)(_LAYER, EE_LAYER and PHYS 
layer, and also has to compensate for the transmission delay between the 
TX-LAYER entities, which is usually significantly larger than the actual transmission 
time. The sequence number though present in the respective DATAGRAM field does 
not relate to the one used for the PHYS layer frames. 
The LENGTH field is an indication of the length of the overall DATAGRAM or 
DATAGRAM-SAR message, so that the peer entities can verify that the restrictions 
imposed during the connection establishment phase are followed. If the receiver 
identifies clatagrams with sizes larger or smaller than the length agreed then it 
issues an alert to the SL indicating the error situation. The value of the field is 
included in the checksurn calculation routine, to protect the messages from 
modifications caused by a faulty transmission link or an adversary, thereby offering 
an extra protection degree for the FCNS messages. 
Finally, the Checksum field contains that calculated value, which must be verified at 
the receiver, prior to the data message forwarding to the UDSES user. The 
receiving entity resets the value of the field and recalculates the checksum value 
for that particular segment. If the values match, then the datagram is stripped off 
its header and is passed onto the UDSES layer. On the contrary, if there is a 
deviation in these two values, then the message is dropped and an 
unacknowledgement message is sent back to the sender. 
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Upon reception of the datagram, receiver has the task of decrypting the message to 
obtain the actual datagram sent from the peer network element. Decryption takes 
place using the parameters provided by the SL to the TX-LAYER. If the process is 
successful then the receiver moves into validating the length size and checksum 
value of the message, prior to forwarding it to the application. If the decryption 
process either fails or the obtainable message's header security field is different 
than the one expected, then an alert is issued to signal the error. Decryption may 
fail due to a transmission fault altering the contents of the message, or a datagram 
manipulation with an attacker trying to tamper the security fields. Both cases are 
handled by the SL, which must notify the system operator of the error situation, 
which may cause retransmission of the datagram in question and hence create 
congestion on the network links. 
It is worth noticing the effect encryption and decryption processes have on the 
overall delay of the transmission connection between the peers. As with every 
FCNS layer, the TX-LAYER sending entity must secure the datagram with the 
appropriate secret keys and algorithms dictated by the SL. The process has two 
downsides as surnmarised below: 
0 Security headers increase the datagram length 
9 Security functions add to the datagram processing time 
The encryption process produces a message of length greater than the original one, 
since it includes information concerning its encryption and also random information 
used for padding, to create a message that would appear as garbage to an attacker 
trying to intercept it. Additionally, encryption and decryption processes add to the 
overall time the datagram would take to be processed in the peer nodes, since 
these functions take some time to complete. 
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4.3-3.2.3 TX_LAYER Connection Release 
Connection termination in TX_LAYER follows the reception of the appropriate 
request by the UDSES protocol. It can either be an orderly or a disorderly release 
depending on the situation and the way data transfer has been progressed. 
Orderly release follows the acknowledgment of the request by the peer entity, via 
the NODE-END message. If the receiving entity can release the connection, then it 
sends a confirmation message back, to indicate that it waits for the SET_STATUS 
message by the SL to go back to its idle state and reset any outstanding 
parameters for the specific transmission. The latter may take place in cases where 
an entity is involved in more than one connection at any time. At the same time, 
the TX_LAYER informs its service provider that communication can be terminated, 
so that the EE_LAYER can release any relationship between TX-LAYER and 
EE_LAYER connections. 
However, a TX-LAYER element may not be able to accept the request for the 
release of the connection. Upon reception of the request it will have to notify the 
SL of the situation and send an unacknowledgement back to the sender, which will 
include the necessary justification for which the NODE_END message has been 
turned down. The reasons governing this action include the pending of outstanding 
datagrams, which could be delayed by a congested link or a lower rate route than 
that the NODE_END message was sent through. The sender will have to wait for a 
predetermined period of time until reissuing the request to the receiving entity. If 
the receiver is unable to cope with the second request, then the FCNSEP is 
employed to provide the sender with the appropriate timer values before sending 
the request again. If the process is unsuccessful after the third try, then the 
connection is disorderly released and any outstanding datagrams are discarded. 
Disorderly release does not form part of the confirmed service provided by the 
TX-LAYER. At any time, any of the peers may request the release of the 
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connection no matter the phase communication could be. The release is achieved 
by issuing the COMM-ABORT message to the peer by means of inserting the 
message into the normal data flow. Upon reception of such a message, the peer 
TX-LAYER entity will have to notify the SL of the condition so that it can decide on 
whether to permit the node issuing the COMM-ABORT message to proceed with 
clearing the parameters and variables used for the connection from its memory, as 
well as destroying the SCs set for it. Since the message is related to the release of 
the end-to-end transmission connection it is recommended that is secured with the 
end-to-end security algorithm, to minimise the possibility of an attacker issuing the 
message to force a DoS attack. 
4.3-3.2.4 TX-LAYER Connection Monitoring and Management 
Connection monitoring and management are actually services offered to the 
TX_LAYER users throughout all phases of the transmission connection. At any 
given time any peer may wish to alter the parameters governing the transmission. 
FCNS offers these services at the end-to-end communication level, via the functions 
of the TX-LAYER protocol. 
The TX-LAYER has the task of preserving the agreed quality of service for the 
transmission connection, set during the connection establishment phase. This 
includes the end-to-end transmission of the datagrams at the throughput levels 
requested by its users, maintaining the transit delay tolerance levels to a minimum. 
Depending on transmission link capabilities, the TX-LAYER monitors the rates of 
clatagram arrival to the peer entity. The transit and transmission delays and delay 
jitter are taken into consideration, to respond accordingly in case the acceptable 
rate falls beneath the agreed threshold. 
If the QoS levels must be renegotiated, then the entity that has identified the 
situation has to issue the appropriate message to its peer. The transmission of the 
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datagrams should proceed as normal so that data is not lost or further delayed by 
the process. Upon reception of the message TX-LAYER will have to inform its user 
of the request made and renegotiate the necessary parameters for the connection. 
The clatagram transmission will be terminated only if the negotiation of the new 
parameters fails to complete. 
Requests for the alteration of the QoS levels for the connection can also be initiated 
due to an increase of the data messages loss ratio and the TX-LAYER residual error 
rate. Prior to connection set up, TX-LAYER entities have to calculate an 
approximation of the transmission failure probability for the connection. If the 
error tolerance rates agreed do not prohibit the establishment of the transmission 
connection, then TX-LAYER proceeds in forwarding the connection request to its 
peer. These rates have to be monitored by the protocol in order to be kept to a 
possible minimum and hence not to cause problems in the data transfer phase of 
the connection. If these rates though cannot be maintained, then the connection 
must be halted so that the nodes can negotiate new parameters for that particular 
connection. Failure in arranging new error tolerance rates for the connection will 
result in its release by the TX-LAYER users. On the other hand if an agreement is 
achieved, then communication proceeds by forwarding the buffered data messages 
to the receiver. 
Management of the transmission connection also implies the monitoring of QOS 
services such as the end-to-end security of the datagrams. Since the levels of 
message protection are agreed during the connection establishment process, the 
TX-LAYER in conjunction with the SL must ensure that those are preserved 
throughout the communication phases. A user may require, for example, that 
protection against replay attacks be of no importance for the data messages, 
instead, passive monitoring and data transfer interruption should be avoided. The 
protocol has to ensure that the requested services will be supported, 
by 
implementing the appropriate mechanisms in the transmission. An example of such 
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a situation would be the protection of the system against traffic flow analysis. The 
TX-LAYER will have to work with the underlying subnetwork and implement the 
FCNS traffic-padding scheme, whereby whenever there are no datagrams to be 
sent for a certain period of time, the sending entity will have to produce garbage 
messages that will be encrypted as normal datagrams and sent to the receiver, in 
an attempt to prevent an adversary from gaining knowledge of the transmission 
times and patterns. 
In all cases, communication will have to be ended if the TX-LAYER protocol 
becomes unable to support the service levels requested by the UDSES layer. Their 
renegotiation may not be possible due to strict restrictions imposed by the UDSES 
protocol, leading to re-establishing the transmission connection via a different 
subnetwork and EE_LAYER protocol instance. 
4.3.4 End-to-End Layer (EE_LAYER) 
The FCNS End-to-End layer is responsible for implementing the EE_LAYER protocol, 
which offers the TX-LAYER datagram transmission services via the realisation of its 
functions. These can be surnmarised as follows: 
* Reliable link-based transmission of the TX-LAYER clatagrams 
e Routing and internetworking 
9 Multiplexing of EE_LAYER connections to PHYS layer ones 
0 Error detection and recovery 
0 Error signalling 
& Link-based security functions 
* Use of PHYS protocol services 
The EE_LAYER protocol is responsible for the secure transmission of the TX-LAYER 
messages to their ultimate destination across any intermediate subnetworks 
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present in the topology. Its specification diagram is illustrated in Figure A. 6 of 
Appendix A. 
4.3.4.1 EE_LAYER Protocol Definition 
The task of the EE_LAYER is to ensure that the TX-LAYER messages are 
appropriately mapped into packets and are assigned to the suitable EE_LAYER 
connection. Since multiplexing and splitting are options that the EE-LAYER 
supports, the EE-LAYER must provide the TX-LAYER with the necessary details 
during connection establishment about supporting the connection and also the 
required QoS set by the peers. 
The reliability of the EE_LAYER transmission phase is dependent on the correct 
implementation of its functions and on the fact that any restrictions imposed by the 
protocol are kept throughout the packet exchange process. There may be cases 
where the underlying physical medium supporting the packet transmission is not 
reliable, introducing errors such as packet loss and message modification and is 
also susceptible to passive attacks launched by an adversary. The EE_LAYER must 
provide the necessary services that minimise the possibility that such errors may 
occur, but more importantly, that it would recover if such conditions even arise. 
Whenever a packet is received by a node, it has to be acknowledged by the 
receiving entity no matter whether the node intercepting it is the ultimate 
destination or an intermediate router. This is a measure intended for providing the 
sender with an early notification of any message loss that could occur, minimising 
the time that it would take for its retransmission by waiting for its acknowledgment 
directly from the receiver, which may be several subnetworks away. Additionally, 
to reduce the load on the network channel that could build up by the insertion of 
the message acknowledgements, a technique referred to as piggybacking is 
supported in the FCNS architecture. In this method, the acknowledgment is 
Chapter 4- 107 Protocol Security for 3rd Generation Telecommunication Systems 
mapped into another message going back towards the sender, hence reducing the 
processing time at the intermediate routers that would be required to route 
additional messages. The receiver will then have to send an unacknowledgement 
back to the sender if it detects a missing packet, only if after a predetermined 
period of time the message does not reach its destination. Due to the identifiers 
present in the EE_LAYER packets, the destination will be able to recognize both the 
missing segments and the TX-LAYER connection to which they belong, notifying its 
user about the error to avoid the discontinuity of the connection. 
The link-based transmission reliability of the EE_LAYER protocol is also enhanced by 
the use of error detection and recovery techniques. Early detections of fault 
situations such as message corruption, message duplication and message insertion 
may lead to an immediate response by the protocol and consequently its recovery, 
if that is at all possible. The probability failure of the packet transmission may 
increase as a result of either a faulty transmission link, an unauthorised party or 
both. The EE_LAYER has to ensure that it can at least detect such cases, if not be 
able to prevent them, and devise a plan in conjunction with the SL for recovery. 
For the realisation of the error detection and recovery services, the EE_LAYER uses 
a combination of the error detection and link-based security functions the protocol 
provides. Whenever a message is to be sent to the peer, the EE_LAYER ensures 
that a checksurn value is calculated on the whole of the message prior to its 
encryption and network transmission. 
Recalculation of the checksurn value takes place upon the decryption and 
authentication of the received message pending its dispatch to the TX-LAYER. If 
any limitations imposed by the underlying subnetwork, such as length restrictions, 
have successfully been imposed on the transmitted data,, then the checksum value 
calculated at the peer should match the one present in the received packet, given 
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that its security has not been compromised. If these values do not match, then 
EE_LAYER checks the type of error that may have occurred during its transmission. 
If the packet is successfully decrypted then the security identifier of the field should 
remain intact. This means that the error detection process has to check whether 
the message has been received with either a corrupted flag or length field, before 
shifting into the possibility that the error has infected the datagram mapped onto 
the packet. By this method, the EE_LAYER ensures that modification errors caused 
by either a faulty transmission link or an adversary are successfully detected. As a 
consequence of the error identification, the protocol will be able to recover from it 
and notify the peer of the situation, providing an action suggested by the SL for its 
future prevention. 
Since there is always the possibility that the error has been produced by an 
attacker's attempt to manipulate the connection, the EE_LAYER supports the 
necessary functions that afford link-based security features for the TX-LAYER. All 
packets are secured on a link basis, meaning that the messages are protected for 
their traversing through the various subnetworks that may be present in the 
topology. By this method, even if an adversary was able to decrypt a packet on a 
router, the only information that he/she could extract would be the next adjacent 
node the message would be forwarded to, but not the message contents. The 
FCNS security architecture is further enhanced at the PHYS layer, where encryption 
is combined with traffic padding mechanisms affording protection against both 
passive and active attacks aiming at interrupting or modifying the data flow. 
Furthermore, the EE_LAYER is responsible for the internetworking and routing of 
the packets across different subnetworks or network environments. Routing is 
based on route calculation functions or mechanisms, which fall into two major 
categories: 
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0 Datagram routing: A very sophisticated algorithm that enables nodes to 
route messages individually. It is usually not implemented in network 
architectures due to the expensive equipment that would be required to 
support the determination of the requested routes for the individual packets. 
e Path - oriented routing: It is the most commonly used technique, in which 
packets traverse through the same route if they are assigned to the same 
connection. The downside of the mechanism is that route changes caused 
by link failures are not quickly realised. 
In the FCNS architecture both mechanisms can be supported, yet for the simulation 
of the FCNS stack, path-oriented routing techniques have been implemented. 
These techniques have been based on the Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) method 
[14] using the Dijkstra"s algorithm for the calculation of the best route, based on 
the algorithm's ease of use and simplicity. The criteria used in these calculations 
have been the link delay of the routes, security weights and the number of hops 
that could be present, in between the sending and receiving peers. This 
information is usually made available and exchanged via flooding techniques, in 
which data is sent to all links of the network measuring the performance of the 
channels in question in delivering the messages. The parameters are then kept in 
the routing tables every node possesses and are used whenever a packet is to be 
directed to another node. These tables can either be static or dynamic, with the 
latter offering greater performance, since any changes on the links that could affect 
their performance are automatically being added to the tables. Static tables have 
the disadvantage that a change in the link delay parameters will result in the 
downloading of the whole of the table to the nodes, increasing the time it would 
take to update their respective information. 
The EE_LAYER protocol is responsible for the calculation of the routes that exist 
between the peers and the selection of the most appropriate one for a particular 
connection. There may be cases where it is important for the application that data 
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is transferred with the minimum delay possible and situations where errorless 
transmission is of maximum importance regardless of the delay packets may 
experience. During the connection establishment phase the EE_LAYER has to 
ensure that the user requests can be fulfilled and devise a plan for their support in 
conjunction with the SL protocol. 
The process is initiated by implementing Dijkstra's algorithm for the given network 
topology. The results of the route calculation will be saved in a temporary table of 
the node commencing the mechanism, which will inform the SL protocol about the 
route selected for the packet transmission. The SL will verify the validity of the 
nodes present in the chosen path, if the network can support that process, and 
reply to the EE_LAYER as to the acceptance or rejection of the route and their 
respective nodes. If the chosen route is rejected, then the EE_LAYER selects the 
next alternative from the list for another verification. Failure in obtaining a 
clearance from the SL will result in the termination of the particular connection 
establishment phase and the issuing of an alert to the system indicating the error 
situation. On the contrary, acceptance of the path choice made by the EE_LAYER 
will result in the information being removed from the temporary table and saved in 
the respective routing table. 
The route calculation process is directly related to the internetworking issues of the 
FCNS stack, where the intended data recipient may be located on a different 
network environment to that on which the sender resides. Path identification 
procedures identify the network to which the destination belongs and enable the 
EE_LAYER to devise the appropriate route for the connection. If the network 
environment can be supported, then the SL protocol will forward the suitable 
address formatting rules to the layer, whereas in any other case it will instruct 
EE_LAYER to find an alternative network or subnetwork through which messages 
should be routed. The reasons for rejecting a particular subnetwork or network 
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environment vary from unidentified nodes to suspicious (in security terms) 
networks. 
An additional EE_LAYER protocol function represents the error signalling procedures 
of this layer, which are used for the signalling of any conditions that may occur. 
The process of signalling the TX-LAYER of particular fault conditions is initiated in 
the presence of either unrecoverable or specific for the TX-LAYER errors, so that 
the EE_LAYER user can be made aware of the problem and perhaps request the 
alteration of the communication services offered by that time. In contrast, error 
signalling between the peer nodes involves the identification of errors including 
route calculation fa iIu res, seg me ntati o n/ rea sse m bly fa u Its, miscalculated 
checksums, wrong security identifiers and the like. For both cases, the FCNSEP is 
implemented as described in Chapter 6. 
Unrecoverable errors detected by the EE_LAYER usually involve conditions whose 
effect is catalytic in increasing the failure probability of a particular EE_LAYER and 
consequently TX-LAYER connection. Due to the fact that the EE_LAYER instance 
detecting the error is unable to recover from the condition, it has to signal its user 
for guidance as to the way transmission should proceed, that is, either the 
negotiation of a different set of parameters, or the release of the connection. Table 
4.5 indicates those faults that may lead to such a condition and their respective 
meaning inside the NODE_ALERT message issued to the SL. 
Table 4.5: Ef LAYER recoverable / signalled errors 
Error field Meaning Recoverable Signalled 7 
FATAL A fatal error Signalled 
ROUTE_CALC-FAIL Route calculation failed Recoverable Signalled 
PROT_ERROR Protocol procedural error Signalled 
DEST_UNREACH Destination cannot be reached Recoverable Signalled 
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NODE-SUSPECT Node is suspect Signalled 
DOWN-NODE Node may be down (hardware) Signalled 
NET_DOWN Network is down / not available Recoverable / Signalled 
NO-SUBNET Subnetwork does not exist Recoverable / Signalled 
ERROR_NODE Error in the node (software 
hardware) 
Signalled 
Signalling of these errors does not imply that EE-LAYER cannot recover from them, 
and similarly that peer signalling does not exclude their notification to the 
TX-LAYER. Indication of recoverable errors takes place whenever such an error 
requires the re-evaluation of the QoS levels requested by the TX-LAYER, since it 
could directly affect the datagram exchange process. On the contrary, notification 
of only the EE_LAYER user denotes that the transmission has to be released and 
the TX_LAYER connection be assigned to another EE_LAYER connection. Usually, 
recoverable errors are not immediately signalled to the TX-LAYER, since 
communication can proceed without the user being made aware of the error 
condition. 
Finally it is the responsibility of this protocol to ensure that the services of the PHYS 
layer are used as dictated by the parameters governing the connection, to facilitate 
the transmission of the TX_LAYER datagrams. Functions used for this purpose 
include the assignment of the EE_LAYER connections to their respective PHYS layer 
ones, as well as the implementation of the traffic padding mechanism of the PHYS 
layer, which enhances the system's protection against traffic monitoring and 
analysis. 
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4.3.4.2 EE_LAYER Service Definition 
The EE_LAYER functions are used to realise the services offered by the protocol, 
enabling and supporting the TX-LAYER communication process across the networks 
data has to be transferred through. 
The services of the EE_LAYER protocol can be surnmarised as follows: 
e QoS parameters support for the TX-LAYER communication 
0 Error notification 
* EE-LAYER communication support 
e TX_LAYER internetwork data support 
0 Security services 
9 Access to PHYS layer services 
9 Connection monitoring and management 
The services carried out by EE_LAYER protocol are offered to the TX-LAYER 
throughout the EE_LAYER communication phases, including: 
9 EE_LAYER connection establishment 
0 EE_LAYER data transfer 
9 EE-LAYER connection release 
Monitoring and management of the EE_LAYER connection is supported in all 
communication phases of the protocol, varying from QoS monitoring, routing 
information updates and error signalling. 
4.3.4.2.1 EE_LAYER Connection Establishment 
The connection establishment phase is initiated by the transition of the EE_LAYER 
protocol status from the initial idle to the processing state. This alteration is 
signalled by the SL protocol in the form of the SC information exchange, related to 
the EE_LAYER only. 
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Upon reception of the necessary information that will be used for the appropriate 
link-based packet encryption/decryption functions, the EE_LAYER confirms their 
reception and stores information obtained for the peer entity, as dictated by the 
TX-LAYER. The EE_LAYER has the task of calculating a suitable route towards the 
destination enabling reliable EE_LAYER transfer of the FCNS clatagrams. 
The process is initiated by implementing the OSPF method realised by Dijkstra's 
algorithm. The criteria used to calculate the best available path to the ultimate 
receiver include a security metric, which should be available to the FCNS stack via 
the network operator, in addition to the link delay information. The former is used 
to enhance the selection process, by identifying not only the faulty or heavily 
congested and delay susceptible links, but also channels that have been classified 
either as suspicious or unreliable. This categorisation involving link security 
information can be based upon data exchange process experience and the 
underlying medium technology supporting the FCNS operation. 
Upon identification of the routes that could be followed by the EE_LAYER packets, 
the protocol signals to the SL the results obtained, which in turn initialises a check 
sequence to verify the validity of the nodes present in the chosen path, and advise 
the EE_LAYER accordingly as to the acceptance or the rejection of that selection. 
In the FCNS architecture, the use of two metrics offers the advantage of a multiple 
path provision, where several paths could be used to transmit the EE_LAYER 
packets in case the primary route fails. The variety of the weight calculation 
enables the EE_LAYER to support the TX-LAYER connection according to the QoS 
requirements set by the EE_LAYER user. 
If the SL protocol can verify and support the connection via the chosen path, then it 
replies with an acknowledgment to the EE_LAYER. If further information has to be 
sent as to the nodes present in the route, then that request is included in the 
respective field of the service primitive message. If for any particular reason the 
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path chosen is either invalid or cannot be supported by the FCNS architecture, the 
SL must notify the EE_LAYER, indicating the reasons for which the chosen route has 
been dismissed. 
Success in verifying and accepting the routing options will result in the EE_LAYER 
being notifying the SL of the format of the packet address fields for transmission. 
The response of the SL can either be an acceptance of the formatting options 
indicated or a rejection of the mechanism. The reasons for which rejection of the 
selected address format procedures may occur, are given in Table 4.6, together 
with the action taken by the EE_LAYER. 
Table 4.6: Reasons for rejecting address-formatting requests 
NEI-REJECT field Meaning Action by EE_LAYER 
value 
NO-SUCH_NODE No such node exists in the Obtain new parameters 
topology 
NO-SUBNET No subnetwork present or Obtain new parameters 
unknown 
NO-SUCH_LINK Link included on the routing Route must be re- 
list is unavailable calculated 
DOWN_NODE Node is not available Node is down, signal the 
(hardware fault) SL and the peer entity 
NODE_SUSPECT The node is suspicious Node is suspicious, signal 
unknown the SL and the peer 
entity 
NODE_NOT_CAPABLE Node is not capable of Obtain new parameters 
supporting the connection 
ERROR_NODE A FATAL FCNS procedural Cannot proceed release 
error at the node the particular 
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Depending on the rejection reason, EE_LAYER must provide its TX-LAYER user with 
another alternative, even if that would mean the re-calculation of the routing 
information. If the error is unrecoverable in the sense that communication cannot 
be supported in the given network topology, then the EE_LAYER will have to notify 
the SL protocol of this situation, which will in turn enforce the FCNSEP to signal the 
condition to the peer. If the FCNS instance identifying the error resides on an 
intermediate node/router, then the FCNSEP will be used to notify both peers of the 
situation. 
The routing information sent to the receiving SL protocol entity is followed by the 
FCNS handshake mechanism, which concludes the connection establishment phase 
for the EE_LAYER protocol. Upon verification that the connection has successfully 
been set up, the EE_LAYER goes into a waiting state for that particular connection, 
pending the TX-LAYER data transfer request, to appropriately allocate its network 
connection resources to the TX_LAYER connections. 
4.3.4.2.2 EE_LAYER Data Transfer 
The initiation of the EE_LAYER data transfer phase follows the reception of the 
appropriate service primitive request by the TX_LAYER. If the EE_LAYER can 
support the datagram transfer, given any length restrictions that may imposed by 
the underlying medium, then it replies with an acknowledgment to the request 
made. 
The reception of the ACK message by the TX-LAYER entity denotes that the 
datagram exchange can successfully be supported and that EE_LAYER is able to 
accept the datagrams for the transmission. If for any reason the EE_LAYER cannot 
accept the datagram, it notifies its user so that the request can be resubmitted. 
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Table 4.7 provides the parameters used to indicate the reasons for which the 
EE_LAYER can reject the forwarding of the datagram to it. 
Table 4.7. - EE LAYER datagram rejection parameters values 
Value Meaning 
FATAL A fatal error occurred, communication cannot proceed 
PROT-ERROR A protocol error disabling EE-LAYER accepting the 
connection 
SEC-ERROR Security option not supported 
ERROR_NODE An error occurred in the node (hardware error) 
Decryption of the message is done according to the dictations of the SL, which 
provides the EE_LAYER with the appropriate mechanisms to secure the messages 
intended for its user. If the process is not successful, then the message is dropped 
and the request is reissued. Failure in establishing the EE_LAYER status and 
necessary parameters for the mapping of the datagrams into the appropriate 
EE_LAYER connection(s) after three consecutive tries, results in the connection's 
disorderly release. 
If the communication can proceed, then the datagram forwarded to the EE_LAYER 
is assigned to the appropriate EE_LAYER connection, depending on the requests 
made by the TX-LAYER. The EE_LAYER identifies the next node in the network 
topology to which message should be routed, and maps the datagram received into 
the EE_LAYER packet, shown in Figure 4.16. 
The NEoA and NEdA fields of the packet correspond to the network addresses of the 
nodes that the messages will be routed through, depending on the extracted 
topology information. The NC ID field is an indication of the EE_LAYER connection 
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that will handle the transmission of the TX_LAYER datagrams for the specific 
TX-LAYER connection between the peers. 
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Figure 4.16: PACKET message structure 
Additionally,, the P LENGTH field holds the value of the packet length, to provide an 
indication to the receiving entity that any length restrictions have been met, by the 
sender. 
To enable the detection of corrupted packets, a checksum value is calculated at the 
sender and is included in the packet header inside the CHECKSUM field. The value 
is recalculated at every node where the packet is processed to facilitate the early 
detection of possible message modifications. If the value received does not match 
the one calculated, then the message is dropped and the appropriate 
unacknowledgement is sent back to the sender. If the error persists, then it is 
signalled to the respective peers via the FCNSEP. 
Following the insertion of the checksum value in the packet header, the EE_LAYER 
notifies the PHYS protocol that the data transfer process is in effect, in order to 
forward its packets. The message used to arrange the necessary details with the 
PHYS protocol is realised via the MSG_FINAL structure, depicted in Figure 4.17. 
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Figure 4.17: MSG FZNAL message structure 
The WINDOW SIZE field is used as a measure for enabling the subnetwork to 
implement the flow control mechanism that will be used throughout the 
communication. The field indicates the number of messages requested by the 
application that could be transmitted prior to the receiver acknowledging their 
reception. As a consequence, PHYS layer will negotiate this value with the 
EE_LAYER to provide the most appropriate support level possible for the data 
transfer process. The STATUS field contains an indication of the EE_LAYER status 
as far as the packet format is concerned. Its use is dictated in cases where 
segmentation may be required due to PHYS layer restrictions on the length size its 
frames can support. 
Mapping of the EE_LAYER packets into the PHYS protocol messages may not be a 
direct process, in the sense of replacing the frame data payload field with the whole 
of the received packet. If the application requires the transmission of small sized 
data, such as signalling information, then several EE_LAYER packets could be 
placed inside the FCNS frames. The process though may involve the padding of the 
frames with extra random bits to create a 32-bit multiple PHYS message. 
Notification of the parameters' acceptance initiates the forwarding of the EE_LAYER 
packets into the PHYS layer. The node receiving the packet will have to decrypt its 
header and verify that the sender indicated in the packet's NEoA field is indeed the 
one claimed. If the message's integrity has not been compromised by an 
unauthorised party, the receiving node will check the packet's destination against 
the routing table it contains in its memory. If the address contained in the NEdA 
field is not included in that table, then the message is discarded, and a notification 
is sent back to the sending entity to signal the error. On the other hand, if the 
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addresses are validated, then the EE_LAYER entity that received the packet will 
have to verify the checksum value present in the message header. 
When the receiving entity is the packet's ultimate destination, then the message is 
stripped off its header and the datagram is forwarded to the TX-LAYER entity. The 
mechanism is further supported by the examination of the length field of the 
received message, where the protocol has to identify whether the sender has 
obeyed the length restrictions imposed by the underlying medium technology. 
Failure in obtaining the appropriate field value results in message discard and the 
signalling of the error to the SL protocol and the peer. 
If the data transmission is successful, then the received packet should contain 
either no errors, or a number of errors that is correctable by the EE-LAYER. 
Following decryption and authentication, the destination will have to identify the 
TX-LAYER connections that have been mapped into the particular EE_LAYER 
connection. The process involves the monitoring of the NC-ID field of the packet 
obtained, to forward it to the suitable TX-LAYER access point. The EE_LAYER user 
will have to implicitly identify the TX_LAYER connection to which the datagram 
belongs and appropriately forward it to the destination instance. Failure to do so 
after a predetermined period of time shall result in discarding the message, so that 
the protocol's buffer can be made available for any consecutive packets. 
The EE_LAYER enables the monitoring and consequently management of the data 
transfer phase to maintain the requested QoS level by the TX-LAYER. 
Communication discontinuity should become an option only in cases where the 
error is either unrecoverable or when the TX-LAYER is unable to alter the necessary 
QoS parameters, having received the error signalling by its service provider. The 
data transfer process is hence orderly terminated when a packet is received bearing 
the EOF identifier. The EE_LAYER enters a new state where reception of the 
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NODE_END message should follow, to release the particular network connection 
and reset the security parameters for the transmission. 
4.3.4.2.3 EE_LAYER Connection Release 
The NODE_END message indicates that the TX-LAYER end-to-end transmission can 
be terminated and any associations made between the TX-LAYER connections and 
the EE_LAYER ones should be finished with the parameters used being reset. Upon 
verification of the NODE_END request by the SL protocol, the EE_LAYER notifies the 
peer entity of the connection release demand. The receiving entity will have to 
check whether there exist any outstanding messages to be received prior to 
accepting the request. An unacknowledgement is sent back to the sender to 
indicate pending messages, since the expected packets may have been routed via a 
slower link than the one the release request has been sent to. 
However, if the receiver confirms the release request, the EE_LAYER changes its 
state to a waiting status, bearing the reception of the SET-STATUS message by the 
SL. The transition to its initial idle state cannot be completed unless temporary 
routing tables and the respective path lists for the particular connection are 
removed from the node's memory. If the layer is involved in another 
communication process initiated by a different TX-LAYER instance, then it goes 
back to its processing state to fulfil the requests made by its user. On the other 
hand, if the layer is able to return to its idle state, it will have to provide the FCNS 
architecture with the necessary security mechanisms for the link-based encryption 
of the random packets that may be used, in case the traffic padding mechanism of 
the stack has been requested. 
The EE_LAYER connections can also be disorderly released at any given time by the 
peer entities. As a consequence, the node identifying a fatal error condition can 
issue a COMM-ABORT request to the SL instance, which will in turn have the 
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responsibility of signalling the error to all nodes present on the given topology, via 
the FCNSEP. By this method, any errors that could affect any future routing 
calculation procedures, as well as the support of the EE_LAYER data transfer 
process via the routing of the peer packets, are indicated to the network nodes. 
Subsequently, the routing tables residing on the nodes can be updated accordingly, 
minimising the effect such errors may have to data transmissions on that network. 
4.3.5 Physical Layer (PHYS) 
The FCNS PHYS layer constitutes the interface of the FCNS architecture with the 
underlying medium where data is to be transferred, offering a reliable and in- 
sequence data transmission between the network nodes. The protocol is 
responsible for the transmission of the PHYS layer frames and the management of 
the PHYS connection, via the realisation of its functions, which can be surnmarised 
as follows: 
0 Synchronisation and sequencing of the data stream 
* PHYS communication between two directly linked nodes 
o Communication control 
0 Error detection and correction 
9 Flow control 
0 Framing of the EE_LAYER packets for transmission 
Frame routing 
0 Use of the channel technology for data transmission and connection control 
Functions of the PHYS layer are realised by the PHYS protocol, which attempts to 
provide the EE_LAYER with the services necessary to maintain the required QoS 
levels for the particular connection, throughout the communication phases. Figure 
A. 7 of Appendix A illustrates the specification diagram of the PHYS layer protocol, 
for both the sending and receiving layer instances. 
rd 
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4.3.5.1 PHYS Protocol Definition 
The PHYS protocol of the FCNS stack architecture has been designed to support the 
EE_LAYER connections between two directly adjacent nodes, given the current 
network topology and the route calculated by its user. 
The functions used to provide the necessary means for the EE_LAYER packet 
transmission, include the mapping of the EE-LAYER messages into the PHYS layer 
frames (framing), PHYS connection establishment, as well as synchronisation and 
sequencing of the data stream. Error detection and flow control functions are used 
to enhance the PHYS connection transmission phase, making use of existing 
knowledge about the underlying channel technology where frames will be in transit. 
The PHYS communication establishment indicates the assignment of a particular 
EE_LAYER connection to the appropriate PHYS one. The PHYS layer should advise 
the EE_LAYER protocol about the level of support it can provide via its services, 
given the transmission medium available on a link. If the required QoS cannot be 
met for the connection, then the PHYS layer must notify its user of the condition 
and suggest either the arrangement of another EE_LAYER to PHYS connection 
assignment, or the re-consideration of the QoS levels afforded for the 
communication. 
Synchronisation and sequencing of the network data flow is achieved via the use of 
control identifiers present in the PHYS layer frames. The messages include fields 
indicating the exact frame that has been sent, as well as the next one that should 
be expected. If flow control is implemented, then the frame will include a field 
identifying the block to which the frame belongs. The receiving entity will then 
have to verify that the correct messages are received, and wait for any frames 
arriving out-of-sequence to enable their placement at the respective block. If the 
receiver identifies a missing segment, then it will signal the error to the sending 
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entity, requesting the re-transmission of either the particular segment, or the whole 
block of PHYS frames. 
Synchronisation management is carried out throughout the communication process, 
by means of monitoring the rate at which sender forwards its frames towards the 
destination, and similarly the rate at which the receiver is able to accept those. To 
avoid possible re-synchronisation via the FCNSEP protocol that would introduce 
extra delay on the communication due to the presence of the FCNSEP messages, 
the PHYS frames contain an indication of the rate at which the messages or the 
blocks will be transmitted. This value is actually an approximation calculated by 
identifying the overall length of the frame to be sent and the channel transfer rate, 
as dictated by the underlying medium. If the receiver cannot accept the value, 
then a notification is piggybacked onto a frame acknowledgment message, hence 
enabling the sender adjust its mechanisms to a more appropriate level. The 
FCNSEP is only implemented in cases where the persistence and severity of the 
error lead to an unrecoverable situation, where the peer entities are unable to 
communicate at a mutually accepted transmission rate. A failure in establishing the 
required synchronisation levels for the connection will result in its release and the 
consecutive discarding of any outstanding frames. 
The maintenance of the PHYS communication is further enhanced by the flow 
control functions of the PHYS layer. The mechanisms available in the FCNS 
architecture are based on the sliding window Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) 
techniques, including the Selective Repeat and the Go Back N methods [143]. 
Selective Repeat ARQ is a highly sophisticated mechanism where each frame is 
individually retransmitted in case of an error, no matter whether it belongs to a 
frame block or is transmitted as an individual PHYS PDU. The problem with this 
approach is that expensive hardware may be required to support not only the 
identification of the frame that has to be sent, but also its correct placement into 
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the frame sequence at the receiver. For the FCNS simulation, the sliding window 
Selective Repeat ARQ mechanism has been considered to measure the network 
performance in cases where every single frame of the sender has to be 
acknowledged, introducing extra load on the network and processing delay at the 
node instances. 
The Go Back N ARQ technique is the one most commonly used in current access 
network architectures such as Local Area Networks (LANs). In this scheme, the 
receiver acknowledges the frames received only after its window has reached the 
maximum threshold agreed during the connection establishment phase. This 
means that if for example the window size has been set to be equal to 32 
messages, then the frame acknowledgment should be sent after the reception of 
the block of the 32 frames sent by the peer entity. The disadvantage of this 
scheme is that if a frame is received in error and hence is discarded, then the 
sending instance will have to retransmit the whole block of frames prior to 
continuing with the transmission of the rest of the frame blocks. The receiver will 
have to maintain a list of the blocks that have arrived to correctly place them onto 
the appropriate sequence, pending their retransmission. The Go Back N flow 
control mechanism has also been implemented in the FCNS simulation environment 
for performance measurement issues. 
An additional PHYS connection support is realised via the error detection and 
correction mechanisms of the PHYS protocol. The technique used in this layer is 
the Cyclic Redundancy Check Code (CRC) algorithm [144], which is used to protect 
the PHYS frames from bit pattern modification, resulted either from a faulty 
transmission link, or an adversary launching a modification attack. In the FCNS 
implementation the frame checksum calculation process has been based on the 
CRC-32 algorithm, which has been used to enable the receiver to identify any 
errors present on the whole of the frame structure. 
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CRC-32 provides for a low failure probability in the order of 1 in 2 32 (or 2.3xlO-'O) 
chance that a message arrives corrupted at the receiver. Its use has been widely 
spread due to its ability to detect single bit errors, two-bit errors, errors with an 
odd number of bits, as well as burst errors that may affect the whole frame [145]. 
Following the checksum calculation for a particular frame, PHYS protocol appends 
the value to the message prior to its transmission. The receiver then recalculates 
the CRC-32 checksurn of the received frame and verify the received value with the 
one computed. If there is a mismatch between these two parameters, then the 
receiver will check whether the error can be corrected, so that retransmission of the 
frame in question can be avoided. If the error is unrecoverable, then the message 
is discarded and the error is signalled to the peer entity. 
The CRC-32 checksum computation takes place in the data transfer phase of the 
PHYS connection and forms part of the connection management capabilities 
provided by the PHYS protocol. Its choice for the FCNS implementation has been 
based on the wide acceptance of the mechanism, with additional available 
techniques, including turbo codes [146] and ADLER-32 calculations [147] also being 
ofinterest. 
Further to the provision of connection monitoring and management services, the 
PHYS layer has the responsibility of routing the frames towards their intended 
destination. The PHYS layer connection involves the transmission of the EE_LAYER 
packets onto the FCNS frames between two directly adjacent nodes. The EE_LAYER 
provides the necessary information as to the path chosen for the data transmission, 
enabling the PHYS layer to appropriately format the address fields of the frame 
header and afford the requested security services to the outgoing messages. 
The PHYS protocol will have to identify the channel capabilities in transferring the 
requested information, including issues such as the channel capacity and the Round 
Trip Time (RTT) delay. Their association in calculating the frame sending and 
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receiving rates is essential, since frame transmission is directly affected by the 
quality of the communication provided by the underlying medium. At the same 
time, knowledge of the RTT of the channel provides an indication as to the time it 
would take for the frame to reach its destination and that of the acknowledgment to 
come back to the sender. It can be seen that their calculation offers great support 
in providing the necessary QoS to the EE_LAYER connection, since the PHYS 
protocol becomes able to identify not only whether the communication can be 
supported at that time, but also the level at which this can be achieved. 
The communication quality of the PHYS protocol data units can be further improved 
by affording the PHYS security services to the outgoing messages. Although 
security at this FCNS layer is not imperative, it is recommended that unless 
explicitly requested by the application, all frames be secured prior to their 
transmission. Message integrity and access control are the two notions PHYS layer 
security functions realise, given the appropriate security parameters by the SL 
protocol. It is the FCNS upper layers responsibility to enforce the authentication 
and confidentiality functions of the protocol stack, since they are dependent on the 
particular application instance and should not be viewed by the subnetwork 
supporting the connection. The reason behind this approach is that the EE_LAYER 
and the PHYS layer of the FCNS architecture are involved with the routing of the 
data or control messages across the various subnetworks that may be present in 
the network topology, and not the processing of the information transferred in 
those messages. 
Message integrity is a function implemented on a host-to-host basis, since the PHYS 
protocol instance may be shared among various PHYS users and services, 
minimising the feasibility of realising the security services of the protocol on a 
single service basis. Such mechanisms are included in the FCNS upper layers, 
where connection can only be specific for a single application instance, that is, 
down to TX_LAYER. At the same time, the PHYS layer provides access control 
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services via restrictions and limitations embedded on the intermediate nodes 
Supporting the connection. If a node is regarded as suspicious or unknown, then 
the FCNS stack will disable that node's access from the services the protocol 
provides, ensuring that any unauthorised requests are filtered out. 
Achievement of the security services is realised via the encryption functions used to 
secure the PHYS frames prior to their transmission. The receiving entity will be 
able to identify from the frame header whether the message has been tampered 
with and if the connection request has been made by an illicit node instance, 
discarding any frame failing into this category. In all other cases the message is 
forwarded down the route, since the PHYS layer can safely assume that the 
EE_LAYER mechanisms have ensured message's confidentiality. 
As a final measure in protecting the system's integrity from passive monitoring and 
traffic analysis launched at the PHYS layer, the traffic padding mechanism of the 
FCNS architecture can be implemented. In this case, whenever the node remains 
at an idle state, bogus data messages are constructed and processed by the FCNS 
layers as normal data. Security services are afforded to the random data, which 
will flood the part of the network for which a user has requested protection against 
channel monitoring attacks. With the random data traversing the network, the 
attacker will be unable to identify any transmission patterns of a given 
communication by listening to the particular route. The disclosure of the random 
data and hence its differentiation from the valuable user data can only be achieved 
by overcoming all the FCNS security features applied to the message. Although 
there is a possibility that such a condition may arise, FCNS implementation ensures 
that this is kept to a minimum, provided that the FCNS user secures its messages 
according to the specification of the protocol stack and the recommendations made 
by the network operator. 
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4.3.5.2 PHYS Service Definition 
Service definition of the PHYS FCNS layer encompasses the issues involved with the 
provision of the communication support services of the PHYS protocol to the 
EE_LAYER. These services, which are realised by the PHYS layer functions can be 
summarised as follows: 
0 Qos support 
0 Error notification 
9 Connection monitoring and management 
0 PHYS layer connection realisation via: 
PHYS connection establishment phase 
PHYS data transfer 
PHYS connection release 
The facilities offered to the EE_LAYER protocol aim at providing for the transmission 
of the user data across the network nodes, supporting a wide range of 
communication transmission media, such as coaxial cables and optical fibres. The 
provision of such services is carried out throughout the whole connection set by the 
PHYS protocol, which has also the task of ensuring a certain degree of protection 
against passive attacks. The management of the PHYS connection is therefore an 
internal part of the communication process, with the EE_LAYER instances being able 
to request a modification or even the recalculation of the QoS parameters set by 
the nodes, depending on the level of support the subnetwork can offer. 
4.3.5.2.1 PHYS Connection Establishment 
Connection establishment in the PHYS layer is initiated by the reception of the 
appropriate encryption/decryption parameters provided by the SL protocol. The 
PHYS layer entities identify the connection for which information is intended, and 
provide the SL with the confirmation of the variables received. In case the 
particular PHYS layer instance is already involved in another communication, then 
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the protocol has to ensure that it can first support the additional request prior to 
allocating the necessary resources for the new association. If the request cannot 
be met, then the condition is signalled to the SL, which will have to wait for a 
predetermined period of time before reissuing the call. 
An error condition may also arise upon reception of the security parameter 
primitives intended for an already functional connection. The secret keys used for 
an already established association cannot be changed, in fear of unauthorised 
attempts to manipulate the SC allocated for the connection by an adversary. If the 
alteration of that context is imperative, then the connection has to be released in 
order for the PHYS layer protocol to securely destroy the previous context, 
discharge its memory from the residing parameters and identify whether it can 
continue providing support for the particular connection. In any other case, the 
error is regarded as FATAL, especially when the same request is received more than 
three consecutive times, leading to the disorderly release of the communication 
process. 
Success in confirming the security parameters for the particular connection 
indicates that the PHYS protocol can accept the required service primitive requests. 
These will provide the layer with the necessary information as to the QoS levels 
that must be supported throughout the association and also the route messages 
should follow, to apply the appropriate address formatting rules dictated by the 
EE_LAYER instance. 
Upon acceptance of the required parameters information, the PHYS layer will 
perform the necessary calculations, knowing the channel capacity and the length of 
the EE_LAYER packet to be sent, to identify the amount of time it should wait until 
the transmission of the next frame. Failure in identifying the sending and receiving 
rates of the PHYS entities, as well as initialising the flow control mechanism 
for the 
frames transmission, will result in a notification of the error condition to the SL 
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protocol, pending the recovery from that situation. If the PHYS instance 
experiencing the error is unable to recover from it, then the connection will be 
terminated due to the failure in supporting the necessary parameters governing its 
realisation. 
If the connection variables can be correctly set, the protocol may enter the data 
transfer phase, waiting for the EE_LAYER packets to arrive from its user. The 
EE_LAYER connection must be assigned to the appropriate PHYS one, depending on 
the underlying medium and the level of support it can provide to the association. If 
for any particular reason the EE_LAYER connection must be assigned to another 
PHYS layer connection, then this is signalled to the SL, which will negotiate the new 
parameters with both the EE-LAYER and PHYS protocol, before ordering the layers 
to continue with the data transfer process. The time it would take for this 
alteration should be kept to a minimum, so that the application user will not 
comprehend the condition. 
4.3.5.2.2 PHYS Data Transfer 
Data transfer of the PHYS layer involves the framing of the packets forwarded by 
the EE_LAYER, the construction of the PHYS header for the frames' realisation, as 
well as the calculation of the CRC-32 checksum for the message and its protection 
using the security parameters sent by the SL. 
Framing of the EE_LAYER packets is the process involving the mapping of those 
messages into the PHYS protocol frames for transmission. The EE_LAYER packets 
are broken up to form the necessary payload information field of the PHYS frame, 
for which a checksurn value will be computed to enable the receiving entity to 
identify any bit errors that may occur during the frames transmission. The FRAME 
structure of the PHYS protocol is illustrated in Figure 4.18, which also provides the 
fields of the control information present in the message. 
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Figure 4.18: PHYS protocol frame structure 
The ADDY S and ADDY R fields contain the addresses of the sending and receiving 
nodes frame is directed to inside the network topology, and the route chosen for 
the particular connection. The CRC-32 checksum field holds the value of the CRC- 
32 checksum calculated on the whole of the frame, whereas its payload area is 
filled with the link-based encrypted EE_LAYER packets. 
The CONTROL field of the PHYS frame contains various information that are used to 
regulate the synchronisation and sequencing issues of the data transmission 
process. The SEND SEC RATE field holds an indication as to the rate transmitter 
will send its frames, unless otherwise requested by the receiver. BLOCK FRAME 
field contains the number of the block this particular frame belongs to, whereas the 
PEER STATUS field denotes the sender status at the moment of the frame 
transmission, indicating whether there are consecutive frames receiver should 
expect, or this one forms the last of the whole segment. The FRAME EXPECTED 
and the NEXT FRAME TO SEND fields provide the identifier of the frame in transit, 
as well as the one of the next frame receiver should wait for. If the frame sent is 
the last one for the communication, then this is indicated in the PEER-STATUS field, 
with the FRAME_EXPECTED and NEXT_FRAME_TO_SEND values being set to 0. The 
WINDOW SIZE field identifies the amount of messages that should be received 
prior to acknowledging the frames, facilitating the flow control mechanism of the 
PHYS protocol. The receiver uses this information to identify the block at which the 
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frame arrived belongs to, and to discern in case of an unrecoverable error the exact 
frame that should be retransmitted. Finally, the DI field is used to carry the 
identification of the specific message sent, whereas the LNG field represents the 
length of the overall frame. 
Depending on the flow control mechanism enforced by the PHYS Protocol, the PHYS 
entity will either have to acknowledge each frame separately, or after the receiver's 
window has reached a maximum threshold. The acknowledgment service in the 
PHYS layer is not imperative, though its use enhances the reliable data transfer 
services of the protocol to its users. 
Acknowledgment of the frame received should come as a result of a series of 
successful checks the receiver should perform on the particular message. The 
initial verification comes alongside the decryption of the message and the 
confirmation that its contents have not been tampered with by an unauthorised 
party monitoring the connection. Failure in successfully decrypting the frame will 
result in it being discarding with the notification Of the error to the SL, if more than 
three frames received have been subjected to the same fault. 
The unacknowledgement indication may also be sent to the sender as a result of a 
checksum calculation failure at the receiving entity. Usually, such a bit pattern 
error is signalled to the sender only if it is unrecoverable. The error notification of 
both the SL protocol and the peer node should occur in cases where the message is 
discarded and as a consequence retransmission is required. 
Furthermore, the receiving PHYS entity will have to identify the exact segment 
location which the frame belongs to, to appropriately recreate the EE_LAYER packet 
for its forwarding to the PHYS user. Following the request for a frame or block 
retransmission, the PHYS entity will have to maintain a buffer in which the received 
frames should be placed for sequencing with the remaining data stream. If after a 
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predetermined period of time the requested frames do not arrive, then the buffer is 
emptied of its contents for the next block to arrive. This time value should be a 
function of the RTT delay of the transmission channel, which affects both the 
frames and acknowledgments transmission. Similarly, the sending PHYS entity 
maintains a timer used for the acknowledgment of its messages, which should be 
set according to the RTT value and the window size of the node involved in the 
association. The window size is the value used to enable receiver to distinguish any 
frames it has previously received, in case a duplicate is sent as a result of a lost 
acknowledgment and the resetting of the sender's timer for that message. 
In-sequence delivery of the frames will result in the receiver constructing the 
EE_LAYER packet and its forwarding to the EE_LAYER protocol, waiting for any 
pending frames that may arrive. If the frame arrived is the last one sent by the 
peer PHYS entity, then after reconstructing the received packet and acknowledging 
the frame, the protocol enters a waiting state pending the reception of either the 
connection release request or another data transfer demand by the particular user. 
If the layer instance is involved in another communication, then it is only the 
particular connection for which the connection release request has been issued that 
should be terminated, enabling the PHYS layer to support any other associations 
with a peer. 
The management services of the PHYS protocol are available at this communication 
phase, including the connection monitoring, error notification and QoS support of 
the association established. The services are realised via the PHYS frame, as far as 
the data transfer process is concerned. The CONTROL field of the PHYS protocol 
data unit contains information concerning frame delivery, the flow control 
application by the protocol, as well as the rate at which the sender transmits its 
packets. Whenever the renegotiation of such parameters is imperative, the new 
values are denoted on the frame headers sent between the peer entities at any 
time, on account of the full duplex nature of the PHYS connection. 
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Embedding of the new parameters requested for the particular connection into the 
frame header minimises the need for the additional messages to realise the process 
and the network load that could be increased by the redundant messages. An 
additional advantage of this reasoning is that connection is maintained throughout 
the communication of the new parameters and hence the protocol can continuously 
support the service requested by the application user. Service discontinuity should 
come only as a result of unsuccessful attempts for the renegotiation of the 
necessary parameters used to realise the PHYS connection, leading to possible 
unrecoverable errors for the association. The FCNSEP should be used prior to 
issuing a disorderly release request, so that the peer is notified of the error 
situation to update its information about the nodes and the links present in the 
network topology. 
4.3.5.2.3 PHYS Connection Release 
Orderly connection release follows the appropriate request made by the PHYS user 
upon conclusion of the data transfer process. The PHYS protocol will have to reset 
the parameters set for the particular connection and move into releasing the 
connection resources used for the communication support. At the same time the 
entity should check whether it is involved in a communication with another user, so 
that the PHYS entity does not return to its initial idle state that would result in the 
immediate breaking down of any other association already set up. 
The request made by the EE_LAYER for the release of the PHYS connection is 
signalled via the NODE_END message, which is also sent to the peer entity for 
confirming the demand. If the receiving entity can acknowledge the release call 
sent by the source node, then a confirmation is sent back to the sending instance, 
whilst the request is forwarded to the SL protocol. The tearing down of the 
communication is signalled to both peers via the SET-STATUS message of the FCNS 
SL protocol, indicating that any SCs set up for the connection in question should be 
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destroyed. If the traffic padding mechanism of the protocol is enforced, then the 
security contexts are kept for securing the random data messages used for 
enhancing the system's protection against traffic analysis attacks. 
On the other hand, disorderly release of the PHYS connection has to be verified via 
the SL protocol, for fear of a DoS attack by an adversary. If the verification 
process is not successful, then the communication party issuing the demand is 
instructed to continue with the frames data transfer. However, verification of the 
COMM-ABORT request, signals the release of the association and the transition of 
the layer to its idle state, given that there are no other connections supported at 
that time. Again, if traffic padding is supported for the particular application 
instance, then the peer instances should create random data for transmission 
across the network topology. In any other case, the PHYS layer protocol will move 
its state to an idle condition, pending any connection requests by the EE_LAYER 
protocol. 
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Chapter 5: Future Core Networks 
System (FCNS) - Security Layer 
Protocol 
Chapter S. Future Core Networks System (FCNS) - Security 
Layer Protocol 
5.1 Overview 
5.2 FCNS Security Layer (SL) 
5.2.1 SL Protocol Definition 
5.2.2 SL Service Definition 
5.3 FCNS Keystream Generator 
5.3.1 Description 
5.3.2 Statistical Tests 
5.3.3 Cryptographic Tests 
5.3.4 Applicability 
Chapter 5 provides information relating to the security considerations of the FCNS 
architecture and the functions used to provide the necessary services to secure the 
FCNS stack. A general overview of the FCNS security architecture is given followed 
by an analysis of the Security Layer (SQ, depicting its protocol and service 
definition with respect to the FCNS communication layers. Finally, the FCNS 
keystream generator is presented, which forms part of the SL protocol, producing 
the secret keys used for the protection of the FCNS interlayer messages. 
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5.1 Overview 
Network system architectures have evolved greatly since their first establishment in 
the 1980s, leveraging the design and development of communication protocols 
used to support their operation. Chapter 3 has described the need for security 
functions and services and has made reference to the reasons why the protection of 
the user and/or signalling data has been imperative, leading to a new era of 
communication rules such as IPv6 [67], ATM [15] and SUP [66]. 
The main implication of currently used secure communication protocol structures is 
the protection of the user data across the Internet and the networks that might 
route the messages towards their intended destination. In FCNS, the need to 
enhance these sets of communication rules has been identified, providing a 
framework where security would be used to safeguard the messages exchanged 
between the layers of the protocol stack and then to offer the necessary services to 
enhance the user data transfer process. 
The FCNS communication services, presented in Chapter 4, are protected by the 
security functions afforded by the protocol stack, via the use of the SL protocol. 
FCNS differs from existing architectures in that message protection mechanisms are 
offered in all layers of the communication, and are managed and maintained by a 
single protocol. 
The FCNS security architecture was developed to provide a simple design and the 
ability to modify the security features of the stack without affecting the FCNS 
communication layers. Furthermore, the mechanism ensures that compatibility 
with existing architectures would be maintained in cases where an existing set of 
communication rules replaces one of the FCNS layers. An example of the latter 
case could be the use of IPv6 as the EE-LAYER of the FCNS, or the SUP replacing 
the TX_LAYER of this structure. 
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The SL protocol has consequently been developed to provide the following features 
and requirements to the FCNS communication process: 
0 Confidentiality, ensuring the connection and data protection against 
unauthorised access and disclosure, 
0 Integrity for protecting the user and signalling data from either accidental or 
malicious modifications 
9 Availability to guarantee the reliable and legitimate network resource usage 
and 
9 Accountability to associate the events and service usage to the specific peers 
responsible for these actions. Authentication and Non-repudiation are 
functions associated with accountability features since they provide for the 
verification of the users originating and receiving the messages. 
In the following sections, the SL protocol and service mechanisms are described 
followed by the FCNS keystrearn generator, which provides the necessary 
parameters for the security context exchange between the SL and the FCNS 
communication layers. 
5.2 FCNS Security Layer (SL) 
The realisation of the SL functionality is based on the SL protocol and the tasks the 
layer accomplishes, as surnmarised below. 
0 Security functions including: 
Peer entity authentication 
Connection integrity 
Connection confidentiality 
Non-repudiation 
Access control 
FCNS 10-way handshake mechanism 
Security Context (SC) exchange 
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0 Error signalling 
0 Interface to the system operator 
The following subsection analyses the functions of the SL protocol, whereas the SL 
Service Definition indicates the services of the SL supported throughout the 
communication phases. Figure A. 8 of Appendix A depicts the abstracted 
specification diagram of the SL to which its implementation should conform. 
5.2.1 SL Protocol Definition 
The Security Layer of the FCNS protocol stack affords the required security services 
to both the internal and external FCNS messages. Its functionality is based on the 
exchange of the appropriate SCs for a particular connection both for the peer 
messages, as well as the primitives exchanged between the FCNS protocols. 
The application and use of the security functions of the SL is not mandatory at any 
level of the communication, though it is recommended that the transmission be 
secured at the highest possible degree. The initiation of the protocol mechanisms 
can either be triggered by the particular user, or be offered on a basis dictated by 
the network operator. 
5.2.1.1 Peer Entity Authentication 
Authentication is one of the most important functions the SL protocol provides 
FCNS with. It ensures that only a legitimate user can access the services offered 
by the FCNS stack and the network, denying their admission to any unauthorised 
parties. For the user data transfer process, authentication implies that only a valid 
user can send information down the communication channel, which in turn can be 
obtained and viewed by any listening party. 
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The UDPRES and UDSES protocols are involved with the negotiation of the 
information syntax and session synchronisation and management functions of the 
FCNS connection and hence need not be afforded such services by the SL protocol. 
This does not imply that any messages originated from these two layers intended 
for their peer instance or for another FCNS layer will not be secured prior to their 
transmission. Indeed, at the UDPRES level, data manipulation functions such as 
compression and encryption may be negotiated between the nodes, as parameters 
of the context exchange process, taking place during the connection establishment 
phase. Additionally, security functions apply to the UDSES protocol as well, for the 
protection of the synchronisation information and the setting up of the secure 
session between the peers. An example of such function is the Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) protocol [148]. The authenticated operation of the UDPRES and UDSES 
protocols relies on the TX-LAYER and EE-LAYER of the FCNS architecture. 
The secret keys used for the EE_LAYER and TX-LAYER instances are negotiated 
between the peer entities during the SC establishment phase and more specifically 
the 10-way handshake mechanism. The SL provides the essential information to 
the protocols, which then negotiate the parameters that will be used throughout the 
connection, via the use of a session key separate for each layer. The process is 
usually dependent on either a trusted third party that would provide the 
appropriate keys for the secure SC exchange, or the network operator supporting 
this process. Key management and exchange techniques are widely available in 
communication systems [109], [149], with their design being outside the scope of 
this thesis. For this work, the existence of an adequate mechanism for the key 
exchange process has been assumed. The mechanism could be implemented in 
FCNS if needed, if a key administration authority is offered by the operator for the 
specific network domain. Release 6 of the UMTS CN supports such a method in the 
Network Domain Security (NDS) Authentication Framework (NDS/AF) [150]. 
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Authentication functions are also supported on a connectionless service basis, in the 
form of data origin authentication. In this case, the source and data recipient 
authenticate only the origin of the data messages, due to the lack of a distinct end- 
to-end based communication. The notion of a peer entity does not apply in 
connectionless connections where the operation of the UDSES and TX-LAYER 
protocols should normally be of minimal impact. This results in the lack of a 
session connection establishment and the transmission of the data stream via the 
EE_LAYER connections towards their destination. 
The functions supporting the authentication services either for the peer-entity or 
data origin case should normally be similar, if not the same, in that the algorithms 
and secret keys used should be identical unless explicitly requested by the network 
operator. As long as the SCs for subsequent connections are independent of each 
other, the chances that prior connection knowledge be used to attack another 
association are dramatically minimised. 
5.2.1.2 Connection Integrity 
In addition to authenticating the user, it is very important to verify that the 
information received has not been tampered with. It is of minimal benefit to secure 
a message and not to guarantee its authenticity and similarly validate its 
authenticity without verifying the integrity of the message. Figure 5-1 below 
indicates by means of sample network attacks the reason for which authentication 
and integrity are issues strongly coupled together. 
A. Authentication vvith no integrity B. Integrity but no authentication 
Node Attacker Node Node 
Attacker Node 
F xc 
B A] 
msgidata, HMACmsgl 
i 
msgidatam, HMACmsgl 
msg(S(data), Al 
Figure 5.1: Sample communication attacks 
i 
msgIS(data), X) 
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In the first case, the peer node A sends an authenticated message to B, via a 
channel where the attacker X is assumed to have channel monitoring capabilities, 
as well as the ability to launch an active attack on the user data. Since the 
message is authenticated, the HMCACmsg value depicted in Figure 5.1 cannot be 
altered without the modification becoming unidentified by the peer entity B. The 
attacker simply alters the contents of the message, from data to datam, which will 
consequently reach the recipient in error. Node B will verify that the message 
actually was originated by Node A, though it may have to discard it due to its 
tailored contents. 
On the other hand, if the message is sent encrypted over the communications 
channel but lacking authentication measures, then the attacker can intercept it and 
present the data as its own. No matter what the situation, imposing both 
authentication and integrity security functions, protects the user data messages in 
the sense that only the legitimate user can actually forward the information onto 
the communication link. 
Data integrity is available to all FCNS layers, since message security between peers 
is believed to be of utmost importance for the protection of the interlayer FCNS 
messages and consequently the user data. Service primitives and requests 
exchanged between the FCNS protocols and the peers should always be secured, to 
prevent an adversary from manipulating a connection. In the FCNS architecture it 
is recommended that integrity functions be employed to verify not only individual 
messages but also their respective sequence as a whole. 
Nevertheless, authentication and integrity functions only ensure the legitimacy of 
the sending instance among the peers, since any listening party could read the data 
messages of the channel. To provide the necessary service whereby only a 
legitimate receiver would be able to interpret the data exchanged, confidentiality 
functions should be enforced for the particular connection. 
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5.2.1.3 Connection Confidentiality 
Connection confidentiality functions are usually employed in cases where sensitive 
data is transferred in a network, enabling only the two communicating peer parties 
to comprehend the messages exchanged. Figure 5.2 illustrates, by means of 
sample network attacks, why confidentiality is necessary in a network topology 
consisting of various nodes. 
A. Encryption & Integrity but not 
confidentiality 
Attacker 
Node msg 
msgIS(DATA), HMACmsgl 
Node 
Attacker can also diSEIDSe 
information sent 
B. Encryption, Integrity, Confidentiality enabled 
Attacker 
Fx-l Node X cannot decrypt msg 
msgfs B 
(DATA). HMACmsgl Node 
O'ý 
M. S- 
ýg- 
F 7B 
Figure 5.2: Sample attack against message confidendaW 
In the first case, the user data is assumed to have been afforded only the 
authentication and integrity functions of the SL protocol. If the attacker X launches 
an interception attack, then the messages will never reach the node B, hence 
succeeding in launching a network DoS attack. 
When the messages are only encrypted with a symmetric key algorithm, any party 
gaining access to that key will be able to decrypt the data and obtain the 
information transferred to it, breaching the data stream's integrity. The node X can 
either cause the discontinuity of the connection, or re-insert the packet into the link 
for transmission to the peer node B. If no alteration is performed on the data 
payload, the receiver will never be aware that the attack has occurred, assuming a 
protected communication. 
In contrast, employing confidentiality functions in the data transfer process ensures 
that the messages in transit cannot be manipulated. The peer node A encrypts the 
packet with an asymmetric key encryption mechanism, whereby only the node B 
can decrypt the received information and hence prevent any disclosure of sensitive 
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data to unauthorised parties. The attacker X will not be able to decrypt the 
messages sent and hence is only able to discontinue the connection, given channel 
monitoring capabilities and interception privileges. In any case, only the peer node 
B will understand the enciphered message, thus verifying the confidentiality of the 
data sent. 
In FCNS, confidentiality functions are available to all layers of the protocol stack, 
providing that integrity mechanisms are used. This is because the same 
mechanisms can be used to enforce these two services, as their secret keys are 
completely different. It is recommended that confidentiality is enforced in all 
message sequences and not only to individual FCNS packets. The latter may come 
into effect in a connection less- based transmission, where the SL will provide for 
data confidentiality services. 
5.2.1.4 Non-repudiation 
Non-repudiation is an optional function provided by the SL protocol, whereby proof 
of origin or data delivery is employed prior to the initiation of the connection data 
transfer process. The purposes of this function can be summarised as follows: 
0 To protect the sender against false denial of data receipt by the peer node 
* To protect the receiver against false denial of data transmission from the 
sender 
It is clear that success in employing the non-repudiation security function is 
dependent on the presence of a trusted third party acting as an impartial judge for 
resolving any disputes that may arise. If the network environment can provide 
such an authority,, then non-repudiation can be applied in the application layer 
running on top of the FCNS architecture. Although it could be used in conjunction 
with the TX-LAYER protocol, non-repudiation requires the negotiation of certain 
issues prior to its employment. For example, to protect the sender from false 
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reception denial, the peer entity should first send a digest or a part of the data that 
is to be transferred to the receiver, which should in turn reply upon the acceptance 
or rejection of the connection. The communication should be monitored by a 
certification authority, which would then provide the necessary mechanism enabling 
the application of a digital signature to the user data. 
Non-repudiation functions are recommended in cases where the sending instance is 
unaware of the network through which messages travel. The home environment 
should ensure that if intermediate networks are unknown or suspicious, then the 
appropriate measures should be enforced to provide protection from false service 
denial by an illicit node. 
5.2.1.5 Access Control 
The final security function category supplied by the mechanisms of the SL protocol 
is the access control operation, in which the network administrator wishes to 
identify and check the user privileges in setting up and accessing the various 
services offered. The issue is usually invoked alongside network management 
procedures, since at any time the provider may request the examination of the 
users accessing the network resources and/or services. 
Access control implementation is dependent on the authentication mechanisms for 
the user or network node instances, since authentication is the measure ensuring 
that only legitimate subscribers can actively request access to network services, 
including data transmission. Nevertheless, the two notions should be separated 
since the legitimacy of a user does not necessarily imply permission 
to access all 
services. 
In the FCNS communication architecture access control functions are available 
to a 
number of layers, from the PHYS layer up to the application running on 
top of the 
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stack with realisation dependent on the available hardware in the network. A 
possible scenario would be the implementation of such functions in network routers 
limiting the network addresses for which service access is unconstrained, in 
addition to filtering at the intermediate bridges of an Ethernet network supporting 
the communication. 
Since access control is a strongly application dependent function, it has not been 
considered in depth in the SL protocol implementation. Although support is 
provided for such services, their provision does not imply any necessity in a peer 
environment routing the messages towards their intended destination. 
The appropriate secret keys and algorithms required to support the SL protocol 
functions are distributed to the FCNS layers during the SC exchange procedure at 
the connection establishment phase. The context contains all the information 
relevant to the particular layer or the peer to which information is sent. 
Communication should not proceed without the transfer of the necessary data that 
will be used to afford the security services of the SL, since such an action would 
imply the vulnerability of the connection against both passive and active protocol 
and network attacks. 
The SC exchange is realised by the provision of the 10-way handshake mechanism 
initiated by the SL protocol, given in Figure 5.3. The FCNS communication layers 
provide the connection request for the connection establishment to the SL, which 
identifies whether the same request has already been made for the particular 
connection. If such a demand has been made twice then the communication setup 
phase is released as an error has occurred. Otherwise, upon successful verification 
of the request, the SL initiates the SC exchange between the FCNS layers and the 
peer entity. 
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Security contexts are created for each FCNS communication layer separately, with 
the keys involved being different and independent of each other. The SC 
associated with the peer-to-peer connection protection is a distinct context, which 
should not be correlated with any other parameter set for the connection. If the 
system becomes unable to produce the SC for the end-to-end communication due 
to a possible protocol procedural error or a software fault, then depending on the 
necessity of the particular connection, this will either be terminated or 
user/signalling data will be sent in cleartext format. It is recommended that such a 
connection should never be established to avoid interception and modification 
attacks on the data in transit. 
Stop traffic 
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If(confirmation) 
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Connect Request 
Security Contexts 
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Peer Security Context 
is 
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Figure 5.3: FCNS 10-way handshake mechanism 
Verify message 
if(confirmation) 
11 
Table 5.1 depicts the notions used in Figure 5.3 together with the explanation of 
the messages exchanged. Those messages should contain identifiers specifically 
assigned for the connection, to offer the system protection against possible replay 
attacks. 
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Table 5.1: Message explanation for the FCNS 10-way handshake function 
Messages T i Meaning ea n 
ýSSLAMSgb HMACmsgj ' m Message secured (integrity and confidentiality) with 
secret key specific for the peer SL, message 
authenticated 
ýSJMS9), HMACrnsgj Message secured (integrity and confidentiality) with 
secret key specific for the FCNS layer, message 
authenticated 
ýSsp(msg), HMACmsgj Message secured (integrity and confidentiality) with 
secret key specific for the FCNS peer, message 
authenticated (in this case for the sending instance) 
ýSSL(msg), HMACmsgj Message secured (integrity and confidentiality) with 
secret key specific for the SL, message authenticated 
Following the completion of the SC negotiation, the SL instructs the entity to 
proceed with the NODE-REQUEST message transfer, concluding the FCNS 
handshake mechanism and signalling the beginning of the connection establishment 
process. Failure in completing any of the verification and confirmation functions of 
the FCNS stack during the handshake procedure will result in the release of the 
connection and the re-issuing of the connect request by the node. This action 
implies the destruction of any old SCs and the negotiation of a new set of 
parameters for the connection. 
The security functionality of the SL protocol is ended during the connection release 
phase of the communication, where all SCs associated with that connection are 
destroyed and the parameters used erased from the node's memory. Failure in 
completing this phase will result in an alert being sent to the system operator, since 
used keys should be removed from the system so that an attacker cannot use 
them 
to force a replay attack. 
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The SL protocol is also involved with the mechanisms ensuring the secured 
signalling of any errors occurring throughout the communication phases, via the 
implementation of the FCNSEP. Error signalling procedures are triggered upon 
reception of a NODE_ALERT message issued by any of the FCNS communication 
layers, as described in Chapter 4. The message may be the result of a protocol 
procedural error, whereby a message sent by another layer may be received in 
error, or a condition that has occurred at the peer, initialising the FCNSEP to inform 
the entity of the fault situation. The SL protocol has the task of intercepting such 
messages and identifying the error so that its correction may proceed. The SL 
should identify the fault condition and attempt to devise the appropriate corrective 
action, without notifying the system operator about the circumstances that initiated 
the transmission of the FCNSEP or NODE_ALERT messages. 
Usually, the network provider should supply the SL protocol with a list of 
recommended actions associated with a particular error condition, such as for 
example the recalculation of a given route in cases of a subnetwork failure. Only 
errors failing into the fatal category should be signalled to the system, following the 
release of the connection for fear of an active attack by an adversary. 
As a final remark it should be noted that the SL protocol has been designed to 
serve as the interface of the FCNS communication layers with the system on which 
FCNS is implemented. Security and network management functions are uploaded 
to the node's memory and are consequently handled by the SL protocol, which will 
decide on the FCNS layers' functionality whenever the particular instance 
is actively 
participating in a connection. 
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5.2.2 SL Service Definition 
The functions of the SL protocol are realised throughout the communication phases 
of the connection, implementing the services of the protocol for use and access r)y 
the FCNS communication layers and the peer entities. These services can be 
summarised as follows: 
Security services such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non- 
repudiation and access control 
* Security services to the FCNS communication layers 
o Traffic padding services 
9 Connection monitoring and management via the 
SL connection establishment 
SL data transfer monitoring 
SL connection release phases 
The connection monitoring and management service is in a sense the most 
important one offered by the SL protocol, since it involves the applicability and 
enforcement of the SL security functions for the particular connection. The SL 
service definition is presented in the form of the communication phases of an FCNS 
instance in relation to the FCNS communication layers and the requests intended 
for the peer entities. 
5.2.2.1 SL Connection Establishment 
FCNS stack functionality is subject to connection requests made by an application 
entity, either on behalf of a subscriber or a particular network element transferring 
signalling information to a peer network node. Assuming that the protocol resides 
in its idle state, then the necessary resources can become available to the node 
issuing that request, with the SL protocol being able to support the consequent 
connection and offer the required services to its users. In contrast to the FCNS 
communication layers where a protocol user is the 
layer protocol directly above 
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the SL constitutes the service Provider of the whole FCNS stack structure, arranging 
security issues for each layer independently 
Upon reception of the connection request, the SL initiates the handshake 
mechanism for the SC exchange between the FCNS layers and the peer entity. If 
the definition of an SC appropriate for the connection cannot be made, then the 
request is dropped and the protocol returns to the idle mode. Otherwise, the SL 
initiates the FCNS keystream generator, in case original secret keys do not exist for 
the SCs to obtain the necessary parameters used for the protection of the FCNS 
interlayer messages. Simultaneously, the protocol identifies the presence of any 
Certification Authority (CA) in the network, which will provide the keys for the SC 
between the peer nodes. 
Success in generating the appropriate contexts for the connection results in their 
exchange and confirmation by the instance's communication layers and the 
intended data recipient. If the context can be accepted, then the connection 
request is forwarded to the destination, which will decide upon its acceptance or 
rejection. The SL protocol will have the task of monitoring the exchange of the 
service primitives required to complete the communication setup process and 
provide the FCNS layers with the appropriate security services to fulfil the user 
requests. 
As far as the application instance is concerned, the SL protocol has to identify that 
the data transferred is afforded the necessary security facilities, such as 
authentication, message integrity and confidentiality. If non-repudiation provision 
needs to be made, the SL will have to negotiate the service with the CA and send a 
data digest to the recipient, which will in turn inform the SL protocol and the 
authority upon the acceptance of the information that is to be sent. The realisation 
of the SL security functions to the application instance is subject to the correct 
enforcement of the SC exchanged between these two entities, with the SL protocol 
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identifying that the service primitive to be sent has indeed been provided with the 
requirements set by the user. This implies the interception of such a message prior 
to its forwarding to the receiver in an attempt to identify any miscalculated security 
headers, false encryption, inadequate authentication and the like. If the message 
successfully passes the check routine, an acknowledgment is sent back to the 
instance, which then forwards the message to the FCNS communication layers for 
transmission. Persistent failure of the application in correctly enforcing the security 
rules imposed results in the connection's release. 
For the UIDPRES connection establishment phase, the SL protocol assists the 
UIDPRES layer in protecting its messages against possible attacks by using the 
parameters obtained by the SC for issues including message integrity and possibly 
confidentiality. Usually, encryption issues in the UIDPRES layer are negotiated with 
the peer during the context exchange process, where ASNA encryption extensions 
may be used to facilitate the enforcement of the network's security policies to the 
connection [151]. Nevertheless, UDPRES messages should always be secured for 
integrity and confidentiality reasons using the appropriate keys provided by the SL. 
Confidentiality may not be requested for this protocol, since information regarding 
UDPRES is only visible to the ultimate destination and not any intermediate network 
nodes. 
Assisting the UDSES layer in establishing the session between the peers and 
negotiating the appropriate QoS parameters for the connection, the SL protocol 
offers a number of services to the protocol such as integrity and confidentiality. In 
addition to the protection of the UDSES messages intended for either the FCNS 
communication layers adjacent to it or the peer entity, SL provides the necessary 
services for address verification and synchronisation procedures. UDSES issues the 
respective primitive whenever a connection is established or a message is received 
by the destination to verify that the nodes present in the session conform to a list 
identifying the valid network elements. Moreover, the SL decides on whether it can 
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support the session data transfer Process and the requested QOS for the 
connection. 
For the TX_LAYER protocol, security services include the identification and 
enforcement of the required mechanisms for message protection, both on an FCNS 
internal and end-to-end basis. The mechanism for the protection of the TX-LAYER 
messages sent to adjacent protocols follows the same principles of the context 
exchange process similar to the rest of the FCNS communication layers. As far as 
the end-to-end provision of security services is concerned, these are initialised 
during the handshake mechanism where the TX-LAYER protocol is informed of the 
keys and algorithms it should use to secure the peer messages. If authentication is 
requested, then the necessary mechanism should be enforced to create the 
message digest of the data to be sent, which should be identifiable only by the 
intended peer. 
Similarly, the EE_LAYER is informed of the appropriate mechanisms that should be 
used for the internal and link-based encryption of the data packets sent between 
the network nodes. The process is again initiated via the handshake mechanism, 
although the algorithms and keys uploaded to the EE-LAYER instance concern the 
protection of the messages when traversing the intermediate nodes of the network 
topology. To minimise the possibility that any malicious hosts could intercept the 
message, the EE_LAYER informs the SL protocol of the route calculated for the 
connection and the formatting of the nodes present in it. The network operator 
should have been providing a temporary list of all routes present in the current 
network topology to facilitate the SL in performing the check routines on the routes 
sent by the EE_LAYER. If a node is listed as malicious or illicit, due to knowledge 
previously obtained by the network, then the route is rejected and the EE_LAYER is 
informed of the situation together with an action recommended by the SL. In any 
other case, the acceptance of the routing list signals its uploading to all nodes 
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present in the topology and its exchange with the intended destination for routing 
table updates. 
Finally, the SL protocol has the task of providing the PHYS layer with the respective 
security mechanisms that should be used for the security of the FCNS frames prior 
to their transmission and the validation of the measures upon reception of the 
message. The appropriate functions are applied depending on user request, and, 
the FCNS provides the flexibility in supporting virtually any kind of data that may be 
in transit. 
5.2.2.2 SL Data Transfer Monitoring and Management 
The FCNS communication data transfer phase is signalled via the confirmation of 
the respective service primitive between the involved peers. The issues governing 
the security services afforded for the connection should have been negotiated 
during the connection establishment phase, with the SL protocol instructing the 
FCNS layers as to the keys and algorithms to be used for the messages protection. 
The data transfer phase of the SL protocol actually forms a monitoring and 
management function of the layer, since no actual data is exchanged between the 
peer SL entities. Instead, the SL performs a series of actions used to facilitate the 
support of the requested QoS levels for the communication, both for the end-to-end 
peers, as well as for the intermediate routing nodes. These functions involve 
mainly the validation of the address fields present in the data messages, as well as 
error monitoring capabilities offered via the FCNSEP. 
For the node instance it is recommended that whenever a new data block is to be 
transmitted the SL should check the security fields of the message forwarded, by 
obtaining a dummy data message from the application. 
The purpose of this check 
routine targets the early detection of any miscalculated authentication 
digests, 
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corrupted data and/or integrity and confidentiality features present in the data. It 
is up to the FCNS communication layers to ensure the appropriate enforcement of 
the security rules for the connection, yet, detection of implementation pitfalls may 
decrease the possibility of an undetected error from the network and a possible 
successful active attack. 
The same principle applies for the UDPRES messages, where the receiving entity 
identifies whether the correct context extensions have been employed, that is, 
whether the transfer syntax has been effectively applied for the connection. If an 
error is detected at the UDPRES protocol, this is signalled to the SL in the form of a 
NODE_ALERT message, with the SL having the task of devising an appropriate 
solution for the recovery of the FCNS instance. 
UDSES is also the protocol point where address validation procedures take place for 
every block of messages arriving at the receiver. Although the reliable 
transmission of the user and/or signalling data is left to the lower FCNS layers, 
UDSES provides an extra measure in identifying the validity of the nodes 
participating in the connection. This measure comes into effect to verify that the 
messages have not been tampered with at the sending instance prior to their 
transmission. The list maintained by the SL should have been exchanged between 
the peers during the SC exchange and the handshake process, bearing information 
for the nodes present in that particular connection. 
The TX-LAYER protocol addresses the issues of the end-to-end security for the peer 
messages by applying the necessary functions needed to support the required QoS. 
Following the validation of the message, the TX-LAYER should inform the SL of only 
the unrecoverable errors that might occur, in addition to any requests 
for SC re- 
negotiation between the peers. The latter case should only come as a result of a 
detected message manipulation, where an adversary has allegedly compromised 
the keys used for the connection. In any other case, communication should 
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proceed based on the parameters agreed in the establishment phase. If re- 
synchronisation has to be applied to the data stream, then this is supported by the 
SL, which monitors the exchange of messages notifying the users of the support it 
can provide for the new connection factors. 
Connectivity support is also offered to the EE_LAYER and PHYS layer, which 
constitute the subnetwork responsible for the routing and transmission of the data 
messages. Link-based encryption and frame security are the two functions for 
which the SL protocol has to afford services, in addition to error monitoring via the 
FCNSEP. Routing functions, including recalculation of the used path in the case of 
an error, should be signalled to the SL, which would have to verify the new route 
and nodes present on the path before notifying the peer of the alteration that has 
occurred. 
5.2.2.3 SL Connection Release 
Following the data transmission phase, nodes should confirm the appropriate 
request for the orderly release of the association set between them. Connection 
termination is signalled to the SL via the NODE-IDLE message by the UDPRES 
protocol, upon reception of the approval by the peer entity. The SL protocol will 
have to instruct the FCNS communication layers to return to their idle state for the 
particular application instance, an action achieved via the SET_STATUS message. 
If the operator has requested the implementation of traffic padding mechanisms for 
the specific topology, then the FCNS stack should produce random data that would 
be secured as if it were normal data and sent along the same path data messages 
have been routed through. In this case the security parameters used for the bogus 
messages should remain unaltered until another connection request 
has been 
made, where new contexts should be agreed 
before terminating the traffic padding 
mechanism. On the other hand, if the operator 
decides upon maintaining clear 
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paths in the topology, then the SET_STATUS message should instruct the FCNS 
communication layers to reside in their idle state, waiting for a new connection 
request to be made. 
In contrast, disorderly release should result in the immediate termination of the 
connection, which may include the discarding of any pending data messages or 
service requests. Traffic padding procedures should not be supported, unless there 
exists a specific context set for this implementation, since contexts allocated for the 
connection should have been released upon reception of the COMM-ABORT 
message signalling the termination. 
5.3 FCNS Keystrearn Generator 
The FCNS keystream generator is a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) 
structure used to produce the secret keys necessary for the protection of the FCNS 
internal messages. It is based on the multiply-with-carry generators (MWCG) 
[152], providing periods of the order of 2 32 and above before repetition. 
Its design has been based on the fact that the keys used to secure the data 
messages should be different to those used for the exchange of primitives and be 
independent of the network on which the FCNS is implemented. As an example, 
the UMTS CN provides for the user and network authentication via its security 
functions offered by the Home Location Register (HLR) entity. These should not be 
used for the encryption of the messages to be transferred between the CN network 
elements or the layers of the FCNS stack, since that would increase the possibility 
of a successful attack on the network protocol in case the attacker obtains 
information as to the keys used for the data protection. 
The following subsections outline the architectural and functional view of the FCNS 
keystrearn generator, as well as the statistical and cryptographic tests the 
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generator has undergone to provide a measure of the security services it can 
provide FCNS with. 
5.3.1 Description 
FCNS keystream generator uses three MWCGs basing its operation on three 
different internal states, as depicted in Figure 5.4, increasing its protection against 
cryptanalytic attacks. The seeding of the generators can either be done by the 
user, by the operator or by the protocol in the form of a list containing numbers 
acting as possible seeds for the machine. In the first two cases, appropriate 
security measures are clearly required to transfer and store the keys. 
I seed, I 
carry I MWCG -I 
pool 
distiller 
seed 2 
carry2 MWCG -2 
1 
pool 
Idistillerl 
carry 3 
I seed 31 
MWCG -3 
I Pool I 
distiller 
Output test 
sequence 
Processing 
(SHA-1, etc. ) 
Key 
Figure 5.4: FCNS Keystream generator architectural view 
distiller 
Each of the individual generators accepts an initial seed and carry value, which will 
be used for the consequent calculations of the random sequences. These output 
sequences are then used to form an entropy pool, whereby a 
distilling function, 
such as the SHA-1 hash algorithm [153], should be employed to remove any 
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correlation and bias in the numbers obtained. The numbers are then fed into an 
XOR operation creating the output sequence used for the FCNS keystream 
generator statistical measurements, which in turn is passed onto the final SHA-1 
function to create the 160-bit FCNS key. 
Other options for the processing of the output pseudorandom stream include 
algorithms such as RC5 [154] or MD5 [1551. SHA-1 currently constitutes the state- 
of-the-art hash function in that it provides a 160-bit long key and has still to be 
successfully cryptanalysed. 
The calculations of the values from each generator have been based on the 
following random number generators: 
9 Simple MWCG 
Xn-I =axs+b mod(m) 
Equation 5-1 
X= CVC 
n-I (@ bx n-I + carry mod(m) 
Where s is the initial seed value and m should be 2 32 . 
e Recursion with carry (RWQ - MWCG extension 
Xn = a, Xn-I + a2Xn-2+... + ar Xn-r + carry mod b 
Equation 5-2 
m= ar r+a, I, r-I +... + alb -I 
The length of the generator will be the order of b for the modulus value m given 
above [156]. 
For the FCNS architecture, the example generators have been built to test their 
performance in producing pseudorandom number sequences. The design has been 
based to produce random sequences conforming to the specifications for security- 
purposed implementation of the generator, defined in the Federal Information 
Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 [157] and [158]. 
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PRNG tests fall into two main categories depending on the purpose of their use in 
an operational environment. The first set of tests is classified as statistical tests 
[159), whereas a further step in addressing performance measurements of the 
generators for use in security applications is denoted as cryptographic tests. Both 
categories concentrate on specific factors and properties of the PRNG in question, 
enabling the comparison of the output sequence against the properties of a truly 
random one. The following two sections identify these categories and depict the 
performance of the FCNS keystrearn generator whilst subjected to both sets of 
tests. 
5.3.2 Statistical Tests 
The aim of these measurements is the optimisation of the generator to conform to 
regulations governing its use in security applications, such as the provision of 
secret keys for data and/or signalling security. In broad terms, the generator 
should experience [160]: 
0 Good distribution, in the sense that its output sequence should not be 
distinguished from a random sequence, given the unawareness of the 
algorithm used to produce the numbers. 
0 Long period, providing a minimum level of security against 
direct 
cryptanalytic (brute force) attacks. 
0 Repeatability, meaning that the PRNG should 
be able to produce a 
subsequence of the whole stream without having to produce the whole 
sequence of numbers. 
0 Portability to ensure that the generator can 
be implemented in any platform 
and that for the same input sequence, the same output one is generated, 
and 
0 Efficiency in accurately performing 
necessary calculations the algorithm is 
intended for. 
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The package DIEHARD [161] has been used to enable the identification of the FCNS 
keystrearn generator statistical properties and its conformance to the above 
requirements. Other packages include the pLab [162] and the NIST [163] test 
suites for PRNG structures, sharing similar characteristics to the DIEHARD battery, 
in relation to the tests provided for the generator output sequences. The selection 
of the DIEHARD suite was made on an ease-of-use and implementation basis. 
This particular battery contains fifteen tests among which there are included those 
requested by the FIPS 140-2 recommendation for PRNG use in security 
environments. The proposal requires that 20,000 consecutive output bits be 
subjected to the following tests: 
e The Frequency (monobit) test whose purpose is the identification of the 
proportion of Vs and O's in the output sequence. The number of l's and Os 
should be counted and found to be between 9,725 and 10,275 for the test to 
be successful. 
e Poker test, in which the stream is divided into 5,000 consecutive 4-bit 
segments. The number of occurrences of the 16 possible 4-bit values should 
be counted and stored, denoting as f(i)the number of each 4-bit value i, 
where 0!! ýI:!: 'ý:. 15. The test is passed if the number x, where 
15 
X 
16 )x Ef 02 5000 has a value between 2.16 and 46.17. ý5000) 
* The Runs test, whereby the sequence of 
the 20,000 bits is inspected to 
identify the maximal successions of ls and Os in it. These successions are 
then measured to provide the number of ls or Os forming them, 
denoting 
the received value as a run. The test is regarded as successful, when 
the 
length, in number of bits, of the run conforms to the intervals presented 
in 
Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Required length intervals for the Runs statistical test 
Length of run Required internal --7 
1 2,315 - 2,685 
2 1,114 - 1,386 
3 527-723 
4 240-384 
5 103-209 
6+ 103 -209 
9 Finally, the Long Runs test where the output sequence is checked against 
possible successions of ls and/or Os of length more than 26-bit long. The 
test is passed if there are no long runs present in the output under 
measurement. 
In addition to those required by the FIPS 140-2 recommendation analysis, the 
FCNS keystrearn generator has been subjected to the following tests provided by 
the DIEHARD battery: 
0 Birthday test, where the generator sequence is checked against the level of 
occurrence between the output bits. The idea is based behind the birthday 
paradox used in cryptographic systems, where the probability that two 
people sharing the same birthday (normally 1/365) is increased together 
with the number of people present in a room [159]. For the FCNS 
keystream generator, the test provides a measure of the number of values 
occurring more than once in the list, detecting possible patterns of the 
output sequence that could minimise the generator's susceptibility to 
cryptanalytic attacks. 
0 Serial (two-bit) test, which represents a variation of 
the poker test, required 
by the FIPS 140-2 recommendation. In this case, the output sequence is 
divided into m-bit long overlapping sections and is checked as to the number 
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of occurrences of the 2m m-bit overlapping patterns. The idea behind this 
test is that the obtained number of occurrences should be approximately the 
same as would be expected from a random sequence. 
The FCNS keystrearn generator has been successfully examined by all 15 tests of 
the DIEHARD battery, providing an adequate measure of the characteristics of the 
output sequence produced by the PRNG structure. The tests have been realised on 
an Athlon 900 MHz PC, running the Windows 2000 operating system with the FCNS 
generator being implemented under the Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 environment. 
The selection of the seed and carry values for the three MWCG comprising the 
machine was made on a random basis, with the results of the above statistical tests 
being given in Appendix B. 
Instead of providing the results of the statistical tests in the numerical form 
depicted in [157], the Figures of Appendix B illustrate the p values obtained by the 
experiments. These values represent the assumed distribution of the random 
variable(s) used for each test and should be uniform in (0,1) for random sequences 
[1611. 
The applicability though of the FCNS PRNG in security environments has been 
further tested against proposed cryptanalytic attacks, which could lead to the 
compromise of the generator by an adversary. Although their use as a means of 
measuring the performance of such a generator is not officially recommended, they 
could be used to enhance the capabilities of the designer in identifying potential 
flaws of the developed system. 
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5.3.3 Cryptographic Tests 
The cryptanalytic tests against random number generators have been suggested in 
[164] following the identification of possible attacks that could be launched against 
PRNG structures, in an attempt to manipulate the output sequence produced. Such 
attacks could be defined as the challenge in distinguishing between the 
pseudorandom output bits and those obtained by a truly random sequence. In a 
sense, the adversary would try and gain knowledge of the algorithm used to drive 
the generator, even if such information has been unavailable prior to the attack. 
One of the most commonly launched attacks against any environment, either on a 
network or process level, is the brute - force attack, where the adversary performs 
an exhaustive search of the system parameters to disclose any information vital for 
its operation. In the PRNG context such an attempt is denoted as a direct 
cl-yptanalytic one, whereby the adversary is able to distinguish between the 
pseudorandom and random sequences with usually minimal effort. The attack is 
based on finding any particular patterns of the output stream, such as periodicity, 
which would imPlY the use of a deterministic mechanism in producing the numbers 
of the machine. The FCNS keystream generator, if correctly applied, should be 
immune to such attacks due to the long periods provided by the MWCG and RWC 
generators (order of 2 32 and above) and the use of the one-way SHA-1 hash 
function acting as the distiller for the FCNS machine (Fig. 5.4). Any attempts at 
identifying the nature of the key produced should entail the thorough search of all 
possible combinations used for the stream production, as well as the cryptanalysis 
of the SHA-1 algorithm, something that has yet to be successful. 
Another category of PRNG attacks encompasses the input - based attempts in 
which the attacker focuses on using 
knowledge or control of the PRNG inputs to 
predict the output sequences. The classification consists of 
the following three 
types of attacks: 
ication Systems 
0 Chosen - input attacks, whereby the adversary attempts to manipulate the 
input of the generator usually provided by either the user or the system. 
Typical environments include the smart cards and other applications making 
use of passwords and identification numbers initiating a particular 
generator. The FCNS stack ensures the protection of the generator inputs, 
as long as the initial seeds and carry values are adequately secured in the 
databases containing this particular information, which should only be 
provided by the system operator. 
9 Replayed - input attacks, which are similar to the chosen-input attempts 
used to gain access and control of the generator output. The attack is 
successfully launched in cases where the user inputs the same password or 
same initial seeds feeding the generator, and the adversary monitors the 
communication to disclose the parameters in transit. The FCNS 
environment ensures the protection of the keystream generator by 
destroying previously used seeds and carry values, in an attempt to secure 
future communication requests and security contexts exchanged by the SL 
protocol. 
* Known - input attacks, which can be applied when the attacker is able to 
know part or the whole of the input sequence used to initialise the 
generator. The particular attempt can be realised in software-based 
generators using operating system values, such as time parameters, since 
these could easily be monitored by the adversary. Protection against such 
attacks is similar to the previously described input-based types, with the 
FCNS generator being fed with values independent of the network or 
system environment on which the stack is realised. 
The final category of PRNG attacks is denoted as the state compromise extension 
attempts, including: 
e Backtracking attacks, whereby the attacker 
is able to use knowledge of a 
PRNG state compromised at a given time to disclose information for previous 
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outputs. Such an attack could be successful in cases where correlations and 
0 
0 
0 
biases are identified in the produced sequence, wherein generation of the 
output bits of the generator is related to bits already produced. The FCNS 
generator distiller functions are used to provide a measure against the 
possibility that such an attack could be effectively launched against the 
system, resulting in the disclosure of the key generation mechanism. 
Permanent compromise attacks where all PRNG outputs are subjected to 
direct manipulation, provided that a certain state has been compromised at 
a given time. This particular attempt is an extension of the backtracking 
attack, with the generator been protected using the measure described 
a bove. 
Iterative guessing attacks, which could be launched by an attacker using 
knowledge of a secret state compromised at a given time to disclose a state 
at a later timer, even when the generator inputs cannot be identified. In a 
sense the adversary attempts to obtain information as to the internal states 
of the generator, even when an input-based attack has not been launched. A 
method used in the FCNS architecture to overcome such an attack is the 
distilling functions of the generator, which remove the correlations between 
the streams of each one of the three individual MWCG used forming the 
internal states of the machine, thus removing any dependence between 
them. 
Man - in - the - middle attacks, in which the attacker uses knowledge of a 
state at time f and t+2e to recover a state at time I+e. The attack is 
essentially a combination of the iterative guessing and backtracking attacks, 
as described above. Protection against these two types should result in 
securing the system against the man-in-the-middle one, although in this 
case the generator should be afforded functions protecting the internal 
states of each individual MWCG used. 
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5.4.4 Applicability 
The mathematical background of the cryptographic PRNG attacks has fallen outside 
the scope of the thesis. Further information can be obtained in [159 - 1691. The 
scope of the FCNS keystrearn generator cryptanalysis has been the provision of an 
additional measure of security for the design of the stack architecture to the 
requirements imposed by the FIPS 140-2 recommendation. It could therefore be 
concluded that the generator should safely be used for the generation of the 
appropriate secret keys used in the SC exchange between the SL protocol and the 
FCNS communication layers, given that such tests should take place whenever new 
parameters need to be fed to the machine prior to its use in a new connection. 
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Chapter 6: Future Core Networks 
System Error Protocol (FCNSEP) 
Chapter 6. Future Core Networks System 
(FCNSEP) 
6.1 Overview 
6.2 Architectural Analysis 
6.3 FCNSEP Functionality 
6.3.1 Interlayer Error Signalling 
6.3.2 Peer Error Signalling 
6.3.3 System Error Signalling 
6.4 Security Considerations 
6.4.1 Security Measures 
Error Protocol 
6.4.2 FCNSEP and Currently Used Error Signalling Protocols 
6.5 Applicability 
Chapter 6 outlines the details of the functionality and implementation of the 
FCNSEP used for signalling error conditions between protocol stack elements and 
peer entities. The protocol forms part of the overall FCNS stack architecture and is 
initiated by the communication instances whenever a fault condition arises, to 
enable its correction and the continuation of the connection. FCNSEP can be used 
as a stand-alone error signalling and control system in packet-switched network 
architectures, provided that its messages are secured prior to their transmission via 
the communications channel. The chapter provides an overview of the system, 
followed by the architectural analysis of the FCNSEP depicting the messages format 
used to implement the protocol, as well as the actions suggested by the SL to the 
FCNS communication layers. Its functionality is then analysed with regards to the 
stack architecture, tracked by the security considerations and requirements for its 
deployment and applicability in network environments. 
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6.1 Overview 
Error and control protocol architectures are essential to the adequate operation of a 
set of communication rules, whereby conditions that could prevent the normal 
communication flow are identified and signalled for correction. Their 
implementation usually follows the unsuccessful attempts of the system entity 
and/or process to recover from such a situation, consequently resulting in the 
necessity for external mechanisms to support and provide the required functions. 
The parameters exchanged between peers are vital and hence a measure of 
protection should be available to secure the information in transit from passive 
and/or active attacks. FCNSEP has been designed to enable the protection of the 
data exchanged irrespective of the network running its instances. Security 
consequently becomes inevitable, and any messages sent and/or received 
unauthenticated and unencrypted should be ignored and discarded. By this 
method, FCNSEP ensures that at any time and under any protocol stack 
architecture, error control signalling is protected, to minimise the possibility that an 
attack could be successfully launched against the system. 
The security context used for the FCNSEP messages should be different from those 
set for the peers and the FCNS communication layers. Although its implementation 
is supported by the protocols realising the connection, security forms an 
independent notion for the FCNSEP. The mechanism ensures that any security 
related information disclosure will not affect the FCNSEP operation or that of the 
data transfer process. At the same time, the mechanism removes any dependency 
of the signalling mechanism to the underlying protocol maintaining the particular 
communica ion. 
FCNSEP is initiated by the SL protocol, upon reception of the error indication by an 
FCNS communication layer, as dePiCted in Figure 6.1. The NODE_ALERT message 
signals the error condition to the SL, which should reply by providing the 
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appropriate action required for the recovery and correction of the fault situation. If 
such an action cannot be offered, then the FCNSEP is used to advise the system of 
the circumstance and inform the protocol instances of the steps to be taken. 
Sending Instance SL Receiving Instance 
NODE-ALERT 
if(notify peer 
== true) 
4 
ERROR_RESP 
ERROR-REP 
SL 
NODE_ALERT 
0 
ERROR-RESP 
ERROR_RESP orJACK 
if(ERROR-RESP) 
can solve? 
ý 
YES 
ACK 
NO 
Connection 
Request 
Release 
Figure 6.1: FCNSEP realisation in the FCNS stack architecture 
On the other hand, if the necessary mechanisms can be made available by the SL, 
then FCNSEP is realised to provide the FCNS communication layers and/or the peer 
nodes with the respective indication. Depending on the layer that has detected the 
error, the appropriate security mechanisms should be enforced prior to the FCNSEP 
message transmission. This function enhances the identification of the layer for 
which the report is intended, in cases where due to a protocol error the message is 
forwarded to a layer different than the one intended. At the same time, the 
mechanism ensures that it is only the anticipated instance that could decipher the 
message, minimising the possibility of a successful disclosure attack at a certain 
FCNS communication layer point. 
The following subsection identifies the messages used for the attainment of FCNSEP 
functions, providing also a description of the conditions signalling its initialisation. 
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6.2 Architectural Analysis 
The FCNSEP architecture is based on the ERROR_REP and ERROR_RESP messages 
illustrated in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 respectively. They form part of the exchange 
procedure depicted in Figure 6.1 and are responsible for the transmission of the 
information representing the error condition and the action suggested for its 
recovery. 
bits: 8 24 16 
Flag cm ERROR PARAMS ERROR_ REPORT 
NEoA NEdA USER INFO CONN 
-IDD 
bits: 32 32 16 16 
Figure 6.2: ERROR REP FCNSEP message structure 
For the ERROR_REP message, the following fields contain the necessary signalling 
information for the fault condition: 
* ERROR PARAMS field, which includes parameters such as the sending node 
and intended destination of the FCNSEP message, as well as information 
about the user and the connection on which the error has been identified. If 
the destination is not directly adjacent to the transmitted instance, then the 
message should be mapped onto an EE_LAYER packet and be encrypted 
with link-based mechanisms, to ensure the secured traversing of the 
ERROR_REP via the intermediate nodes. The USER INFO and CONN ID 
fields include details on the network connection upon which communication 
is based, as well as QoS parameters that should be used to identify the 
priority the SL should give the message upon its reception. 
* ERROR REPORT field, which is used to indicate the condition that triggered 
the FCNSEP message. Table 6.1 contains the possibilities for each of the 
FCNS communication layers, as well as for the SL protocol. 
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bits: 24 16 
Flag cm ERRII ERROR_REPORT 
f '% 
L 
NEI 
I 
ACTION-REC 
bits: 32 16 
Figure 6.3: ERROR RESP FCNSEP message structure 
For the FCNSEP ERROR_RESP message, the fields containing parameters as to the 
action that the peer or layer should follow for the error correction are as follows: 
e ERROR_RESP or ERROR_RESPONSE field that includes information about the 
network element or peer for which the action has been suggested (the NEI 
field), as well as the ACTION REC field containing that particular action. 
9 ERROR_REPORT field, which is similar to the respective one of the 
ERROR_REP message and whose inclusion denotes the error for which the 
ERRORREP and consequently ERROR_RESP messages have been sent. 
Failure in including such data in the message results in the discarding of the 
FCNSEP response and the indication of the error to the peer entity or the SL 
protocol. 
The specification diagram of the FCNSEP architecture is given in Figure A. 9 of 
Appendix A, including information as to the states governing the operation of the 
protocol. For every possible error situation there exists a list of suggested actions, 
to which the SL protocol should refer prior to choosing the most appropriate one for 
the connection. 
Table 6.1: Error conditions for the FCNSEP ERROR REPORT message field 
Error condition Representation Layer(s) that could detect it 
Fatal error FATAL All (leads to disorderly 
connection release) 
A non-fatal error NON_FATAL All 
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Error not yet classified OTHER All (system signalling 
imperative) 
Network is down NET_DOWN TX-LAYER, EE_LAYER, PHYS 
Node / application 
instance is down 
NODE_DOWN UDPRES, TX_LAYER, 
EE_LAYER, SL 
Link failed LINK_DOWN EE_LAYER, PHYS 
Link is congested LINK_CONG EE_LAYER, PHYS 
Node instance is busy 
cannot accept request 
NODE_BUSY UDPRES., UDSES, TX_LAYER, 
SL 
Wrong padding 
mechanism 
PAD_BAD TX-LAYER, EE_LAYER, PHYS 
Wrong checksum value CHECK_BAD TX-LAYER, EE_LAYER, PHYS 
Wrong security header CM-BAD All 
Wrong timer TIMER_BAD UDPRES, UDSES, TX_LAYER, 
PHYS 
Message header corrupted HEADER_BAD All 
Timer is too high TIMER_HIGH UDPRES, TX_LAYER, PHYS, SL 
Timer is too low TIMER_LOW UDPRES, TX_LAYER, PHYS, SL 
No ACK received NO-ACK UDSES, PHYS, SL 
No NAK received NO-NAK UDSES, PHYS, SL 
ACK message corrupted ACK_BAD All 
NAK message corrupted NAK_BAD All 
Route calculation 
procedure failed 
ROUTE_CALC-FAIL EE_LAYER, SL 
Segmentation / 
reassembly failed 
SAR_FAILURE UDSES, TX-LAYER, EE_LAYER 
Continuously received 
duplicates 
DUPLICATE_MSG All 
No such node present in NO-SUCH_NODE UDSES, EE_LAYER, PHYS, SL 
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the route 
No such link present in 
the route 
NO_SUCH_LINK EE_ LAYER, PHYS, SL 
No subnetwork to support 
the connection 
NO-SUBNET EE- LAYER, PHYS 
Subnetwork is down DOWN_NODE TX- LAYER, EE-LAYER, PHYS 
Node classified as 
suspicious 
NODE_SUSPECT EE_ LAYER, SL 
Node cannot fulfil request 
(for the subnetwork) 
NODE_NOT-CAPABLE TX 
-LAYER 
Hardware error ERROR_NODE EE _LAYER, 
PHYS, SL 
Protocol procedural error PROT-ERROR All 
Destination unreachable DEST_UNREACH EE _LAYER, 
PHYS 
Security / security context 
error 
SEC-ERROR All 
Each of the error conditions can be identified, if such capability exists, by most of 
the layers of the FCNS architecture. As Table 6.1 indicates there may be cases 
where an error can only be detected by specific layers, since those errors may not 
affect the operation of the rest of the protocols. Although there is no need for a 
clear distinction in parameterising the network or protocol error conditions 
appearing in Table 6.1, it is imperative that the FCNSEP actions should differ for the 
interlayer and peer layer signalling, as described in the subsection below. 
6.3 FCNSEP Functionality 
The responsibilities of the FCNS error protocol can be summarised as follows: 
0 Interlayer error signalling 
0 Peer error signalling 
System signalling for unrecoverable and unidentified errors 
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These functions form the very essence of the FCNSEP and are used throughout the 
various phases of the communication. Since FCNSEP represents an integral part of 
the FCNS architecture, its use and initialisation should be independent of both the 
protocol phase and the FCNS state. 
6.3.1 Interlayer Error Signalling 
Following the reception of the initial connection request by the application instance, 
the node running the FCNS stack proceeds to establish a functional set of 
communication rules, to enable the necessary services requested for the 
connection. The FCNS protocols transition to a processing state, whereby the 
appropriate service access points are made available for accepting the respective 
primitives for the particular application. 
Each of the FCNS layers forms a valid protocol, which is used to provide the 
suitable services to its user, virtually communicating with the peer entity at the 
same level (Chapter 4). A protocol could be used as a stand-alone set of 
communication rules, without the node running the entire FCNS stack. In such 
cases, the FCNSEP only provides peer entity error signalling capabilities due to the 
lack of a complete functional stack. 
The FCNSEP self-sufficiency is thereby limited by the operation of the FCNS stack as 
a whole, in which case the means of signalling error conditions to the protocols of 
the FCNS structure becomes imperative. A protocol procedural error for example in 
the subnetwork layers, such as the EE_LAYER and the PHYS, could render the 
connection establishment or data phase impossible. Hence, the FCNSEP should be 
used to enable the upper FCNS layers notify the node of the fault condition and at 
the same time allow the system to assign another network connection for the 
particular session. 
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Usually the FCNSEP implementation is subject to the reception of a message in 
error for more than three consecutive times, or the failure in establishing certain 
connection parameters after an equal amount of attempts. This feature is used to 
minimise the possibility that FCNSEP functions come into effect for situations where 
error recovery may be achieved at no extra cost by other FCNS mechanisms. The 
FCNSEP is implemented only if this is regarded as an absolute necessity by the 
system or the node process, to enable the suitable use of the available link 
resources for the data transfer phase only. 
When error signalling takes place, the protocol detecting the error should inform 
the SL of the fault condition, to provide the suggested for recovery action. If the SL 
protocol can offer the required action supporting the error correction and recovery 
procedure, then this is indicated to the layer via the ERRORRESP message, 
including the reason for which the message has been sent to distinguish between 
any other NODE_ALERT requests made. Table 6.2 includes some of the possible 
values the ACTION_REC field (Figure 6.3) might take, notifying the FCNS protocol 
of the mechanism and procedure that should be followed to correct the error. 
Table 6.2: Sample suggested error correction and recovery procedures 
Error signalled Action recommended ACTION_REC value 
NET_DOWN, NO-SUBNET, Recalculate the route RECALCULATE-ROUTE 
DOWN_NODE chosen 
LINK-DOWN, LINK-CONG Follow an alternative FOLLOW-ALTERNATIVE 
route from the list 
DUPLICATE_MSG, Abort communication, ABORT-COMM 
CM_BAD error cannot be recovered 
from / action not provided 
TIMER-HIGH Minimise timer value by t MINIMISE-t 
msec 
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TIMER-LOW Maximise timer value by t MAXIMISE-t 
msec 
CHECK_BAD Apply another checksum RECALCULATE_CHECK 
calculation procedure 
Depending on the severity of the error, the SL protocol decides upon the action to 
be taken, including the release of the connection in cases where the layer cannot 
recover from the error condition. At the same time, it should also decide whether 
the user of the layer protocol should be notified of the condition or even the 
signalling of the situation to the peer. 
Upon reception of the ERROR_RESP message, the respective FCNS communication 
layer has to check whether it can support the functions required to recover from it. 
If this is not possible, then the NODE_ALERT message is sent again, indicating the 
protocol's inability in conforming to the SL dictations. The node should keep a 
record of the number of error indications sent to the SL and if the number exceeds 
the predetermined threshold for the particular protocol (usually three tries), then 
the connection should be released and the system be notified of the situation 
following the signalling of the condition to the peer. 
If the suggested action can be supported, then the necessary functions should be 
enforced, to correct the error that has occurred and to proceed in supporting the 
particular connection. If, for example, a link has been found to be heavily 
congested resulting in delaying or discarding data packets, then an alternative 
route should be followed, as calculated during the connection establishment 
process. If such an alternative does not exist, then the layer should indicate the 
situation to the SL, which should in turn advise the EE_LAYER in re-calculating the 
route for the forwarding of the data messages. If the re-calculation process yields 
an alternative or such is provided by the network operator, then the routing tables 
of the nodes present in the network topology should be updated accordingly and 
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the peer notified of the alteration occurred. In contrast, in cases where route 
calculation might not take place, then the SL protocol should instruct the peer node 
in providing the suitable capabilities else signal the FCNS layers in releasing the 
parameters and security contexts set for the connection. 
Finally, it may be the case that the SL is unable to provide details about the 
correction and recovery from the fault condition. In such situations, the 
NODE_ALERT message is replied with a NAK message, signalling the notification of 
the system of the condition arisen. Care should be taken in dismissing any error 
indication by the layers for fear of an active attack by an adversary, whereby illicit 
error request messages are inserted to disrupt the connection service or obtain 
information about the operation of the SL protocol. It is therefore imperative that 
all FCNSEP related messages are secured using the parameters exchanged via the 
respective SC during connection establishment phase. 
If the error can be corrected locally, then communication will proceed as required 
without the peer being notified about the condition, a measure used to avoid 
redundant information in the network channels. On the other hand, peer error 
signalling should be enabled if the condition's severity is such that either the fault 
should be corrected at the peer or the connection becomes extremely difficult to 
support. 
6.3.2 Peer Error Signalling 
FCNSEP peer error signalling is a process initiated upon indication from the SL 
protocol that the peer should be notified of the error condition. The indication 
should be included in the ACTION_REC field of the ERROR_RESP message, as well 
as providing the appropriate NEI identifier in the respective field. The process 
involves the transmission of the ERROR_REP message towards the peer entity 
involved in the error condition. The message could be initiated by either the data 
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messages intended destination or an intermediate router responsible for the 
forwarding of the data to their recipient. Typical examples include the indication of 
an ARQ or TX-LAYER flow control failure, the notification of an unreachable host or 
the detection of a congested and/or faulty transmission link. 
Upon reception of the ERROR_REP message, the entity should perform a series of 
tests aiming at identifying any security inconsistencies that might be present in the 
FCNSEP message. Table 6.3 depicts some of the possible errors that could be 
detected on the ERROR_REP message. 
Table 6.3: ERROR REP erroneous reception conditions 
Message header and/or data received corrupted 
Faulty security headers 
Wrong destination address (e. g. node not involved in 
the communication) 
CORRUPTED-MSG 
WRONG-CM 
WRONG-ADDRESS 
These typical error values are used to enable the creation of the NAK REP message 
depicted in Figure 6.4 below, and are contained in its REASON RE] field. 
bits: 8 24 32 16 16 32 
Flag CM 
I 
NEI 
I 
REASON_REI ERROR_REPORT 
NAK II IPATTERNI 
Figure 6.4: NAK REP message structure 
The ERROR_REPORT field contains information enabling the recipient of the 
message to identify the exact ERROR_REP message received on error, whilst the 
NAK PATTERN field holds a unique pattern used to offer an extra degree of 
protection of the message against possible manipulation and replay attacks. 
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If the ERROR_REP message is successfully authenticated and decrypted, then the 
peer notifies the SL protocol of the error condition, with the process involving 
similar steps to the interlayer error signalling procedures. 
If the layer entity can, in conjunction with the SL protocol, identify and correct the 
error, then an acknowledgment is sent back to the peer, to indicate that 
communication should proceed. Any suggested actions related to the receiving 
instance are mapped onto the data messages, reducing the overhead that would be 
produced by a further ERROR_RESP message transmission. In contrast, if further 
negotiation of the necessary parameters needs to take place, then this is signalled 
via the ERROR_RESP message to the appropriate node or the system. 
Upon reception of the ERROR_REP response, the node enters a final checking 
routine phase, wherein the layer attempts to overcome the problem with the action 
proposed by the SL. If the fault cannot be corrected, then the node should initiate 
the connection release phase by sending the appropriate service primitive request. 
The SL notifies the system of the condition that led to the termination of the 
association, so that appropriate actions can be found and uploaded to the node 
instances accordingly. Any parameters and variables set for the specific connection 
are released from the node's memory and the FCNS communication layer is reset to 
the idle state, unless traffic padding functions are afforded to the network topology. 
6.3.3 System Error Signalling 
System error signalling procedures involve the explicit notification of the system 
network elements in cases where error recovery services cannot be offered to a 
particular FCNS instance. It usually follows the unsuccessful attempts of the SL 
protocol to negotiate with the FCNS communication layer and/or the peer entity the 
appropriate mechanisms that could be used for the error correction phase of a 
particular connection. 
ra 
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The error notification procedure is initiated by the SL protocol instance in the form 
of the ERROR_REP message, where an indication of the fault condition is given, 
together with identification of the particular instance that experienced the situation. 
If the network operator can provide the necessary functions for the correction and 
recovery procedures, then these are included in the ERROR_RESP message sent 
back to the SL. If not, the system informs the SL protocol that it is initiating the 
connection release process, signalled to the FCNS communication layers by the 
SET-STATUS message. An entry of the condition that caused the termination of 
the association should be kept in a file, to enable the monitoring of the situation 
and the development of an adequate function that could be used if such situations 
may ever arise. 
Upon reception of the ERROR_RESP message, the SL protocol should be able to 
construct a suitable recommended action for the layer entities and forward this on 
another ERROR_RESP message. It is important that the mechanisms used to 
secure the system signalling messages be independent of those used for the 
interlayer and peer error notification functions to protect the network against 
possible active attacks. 
The principles governing the detection and signalling of error conditions to the 
system entity follow those presented for the peer error notification case, since they 
involve the communication of a particular FCNS instance with an external network 
or peer element. The only difference observed in the two processes concerns the 
uploading of the information obtained to all nodes present on the given topology, 
increasing the network elements awareness of any fault conditions that might affect 
their operation. In contrast, peer error signalling is a locally based solution where 
mechanisms are addressed only to the nodes involved in the data transfer 
communication process. 
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As a final remark, it should be noted that the purpose of the FCNSEP is the 
signalling of error situations to Peers and the negotiation of the proposed schemes 
for their correction. The possibilities and fault conditions that may occur in a 
network vary from software to hardware faults. FCNSEP implementation does not 
dictate the mandatory correction of and recovery from such situations, though it 
provides an adequate and secured method in responding to system calls regarding 
the maintenance of the requested connection QoS. 
6.4 Security Considerations 
Message security is a notion strong(y supported in the FCNSEP architecture, since 
all messages involved in the error signalling procedure should be protected prior to 
their transmission. As described in the previous sections, if an FCNSEP message is 
received unsecured, it is ignored and discarded, irrespective of the error condition 
in the network. 
The mechanisms used to protect the ERROR_REP and ERROR_RESP structures, 
including the independent secret keys previously discussed in the content of the 
other layers, are exchanged and agreed between the FCNS communication layers 
and the peers during the SC exchange process. 
6.4.1 Security Measures 
The SL protocol provides the required services for the FCNSEP signalling messages. 
The service of the FCNSEP can therefore be regarded as connectionless - based, in 
the sense that the messages can be transmitted by an FCNS communication layer 
towards the SL at any time, no matter the connection which the layer might be 
involved with. Similarly, a peer entity might be supporting more than one 
communication processes, yet an FCNSEP request could be launched at any time 
irrespective of those processes and the phase association would reside at that time. 
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Although the appropriate connection parameters are included in the FCNSEP 
messages to facilitate the identification and correction of the fault condition, the 
end-to-end connectivity issues are left to the FCNS communication layers 
responsible for the actual transmission of the error signalling information. The 
connection -oriented functions supporting the association should have been 
negotiated during the connection establishment process between the peer entities. 
Additionally, the security contexts agreed, provide for the peer entity 
authentication, integrity and confidentiality services to be used throughout the 
communication process, securing the data transfer on a connection -oriented rather 
than on a message-based foundation. Consequently, FCNSEP is secured on a 
connectionless service basis, to enable the protection of the error signalling data 
irrespective of the connection in question, since the peers have already been 
afforded the required services during association set up. However, for the FCNSEP 
peer error signalling process, the network operator is able to request peer-based 
security services for the connection, given that the appropriate certification 
authority can provide the necessary parameters for the FCNSEP protection. 
In general situations, it is recommended that since the FCNSEP messages would be 
mapped into the FCNS communication layer connections, that they be afforded 
message-based security services, to eliminate to a great extent the need for an 
external authority providing for the appropriate security parameters. 
One of the first security measures applied for the FCNSEP messages is the 
authentication of the data transferred either between the FCNS layers or the peer 
entities. The mechanisms, other than the secret keys, could be the same for both 
cases. The message digest is included in the data, where an identifier is also 
contained in the message for protection against possible replay attacks. The 
identifier must be specific for a connection or error-signalling request and never be 
used for another FCNSEP initiation. 
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Message authentication services follow the data origin verification principles of the 
security functions offered by the SL protocol. The peer entities confirm the validity 
of only the sender of the FCNSEP message, relying on the peer-entity 
authentication functions to confirm the legitimacy of the peers themselves. The 
source and data recipients verify that the message can indeed traverse the network 
and is not the product of an illicit node attempting to manipulate the connection. 
Since the validity of the message can only ensure the legitimacy of the transmitter, 
FCNSEP messages are afforded the appropriate integrity functions to certify that 
their contents have not been tampered with, either by an adversary or a faulty 
transmission link. Encryption of the message is mandatory even in the interlayer 
signalling cases, to counter an active protocol attack. 
If an attacker were able to alter the information contained in the FCNSEP data, then 
that could cause serious problems possibly leading to disconnection. A typical 
example of such a case is the repeated manipulation of the ERROR_REP and 
ERROR-RESP messages, whereby the adversary alters the contents of the 
ERROR_REPORT field issuing a FATAL error request to the peer entity. If the node 
accepts the request as being a legitimate one, then that would lead to the 
termination of the connection. Therefore, a successful DoS attack could be 
mounted if the messages are not securely sent over the communications channel. 
Furthermore, since the messages are intended for a particular destination, the 
FCNSEP security mechanisms can additionally ensure the confidentiality of the data 
in transit, together with verifying its integrity. Message integrity functions may be 
coupled with a public key scheme, whereby only the legitimate destination is able 
to decipher the message. 
Application of functions such as non-repudiation and access control are not of 
importance for the FCNSEP architecture. The former is rendered redundant by the 
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monitoring and maintenance capabilities FCNS can provide to an already 
established connection. The latter is made unnecessary by the assumption in this 
work that all nodes are peers. 
The security implications of the FCNSEP architecture form one of the essential 
elements of the protocol and any unsecured messages are discarded. The 
information transferred in the error signalling messages is too vital to be sent in 
plaintext format, with any possible manipulation leading to potential DoS attacks 
against the connection. 
6.4.2 FCNSEP and Currently Used Error Signalling Protocols 
Error and control protocols have always been used in computer and 
telecommunication systems as a means of maintaining the required QoS for a 
connection, by providing peers the appropriate information for the communication 
well being and recovery from situations that could affect its lifespan. 
This session provides a comparison of the FCNSEP in relation to the Internet 
Control Message Protocol (ICMP) architecture of the IP family. ICMP is currently in 
its sixth version [170], following the modification of the IP specification and its 
transition to IM, and is forming one of the most commonly used error and control 
signalling mechanisms. Figure 6.5 illustrates the general structure of the ICMPv6 
message header, including a list of the possible errors that could trigger its 
operation. 
bits: aa 16 variable PARAMETERS 
L 
TYPE 
I 
CODE 
ICHECKSUM I 
PARAMETERS 
I- 
Destination unreachable 
Packet too big 
- Time exceeded 
- Parameter problem 
ECHO request 
ECHO reply 
Figure 6.5: ICMPv6 header message structure 
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Depending on the fault situation, the PARAMETERS field is updated accordingly, 
including an amount of the data sent when the problem has been detected, to 
enable the message recipient identify the location of the fault condition in the data 
stream and the upper layer(s) involved in the situation. 
ICMP is used in the TCP/IP protocol stack as the architecture responsible in 
ensuring that the data messages conform to the parameters set during the 
connection establishment phase and also that their routing towards the data"s 
intended destination is successful. The protocol is not responsible for end-to-end 
connectiv ty issues, usually handled by the TCP flow control mechanisms, and 
hence can provide notification for only a limited number of error conditions, as 
depicted in Figure 6.5. 
Consequently, the responsibilities of ICMP are somewhat limited to congestion 
handling, either as a congestion avoidance or congestion recovery mechanism. In 
the first case the purpose of its initiation is the avoidance of a zero throughput 
network appearance. The second case involves issues of congestion recovery even 
when such measures have already been enforced on the particular connection. A 
typical method realising the congestion monitoring and maintenance services is the 
source quench process, whereby the source is instructed to reduce the rate at 
which information is forwarded onto the network topology. Unfortunately, ICMP 
does not inform the end system of the actual reason for which the request has been 
launched, and hence the indication may not always be specific to the particular 
system, in the sense that it may not imply the signalled entity being the cause of 
congestion. 
ICMPv6 also provides a measure of informing the data source of any inconsistencies 
in the network topology that may deny the transmission of its messages towards 
the receiver. The destination unreachable ICMP message includes information as to 
whether a route to the peer actually exists and/or details about the legitimacy and 
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capabilities of the node directly connected to the sending instance. Table 6.4 
indicates the possibilities available for the notification of the sending instance with 
respect to the status of the data recipient, as set by the specification of the 
protocol. 
Table 6.4: Destination unreachable ICMP notification instances 
Destination unreachable 0 No route to destination 
9 Administratively prohibited 
0 Not a neighbour 
0 Address unreachable 
0 Port unreachable 
The ICMP protocol forms an integral part of the IP stack implementation, resulting 
in prohibiting its use to architectures based on another protocol stack rather than 
IP. Until the design of the IP security architecture (IPsec), all ICMP messages were 
sent in cleartext format, leaving the network susceptible to attacks by unauthorised 
parties [171]. Although IPsec provides for the protection of the protocol's 
messages against modification and DoS attacks, the functions of the architecture 
closely bind any security considerations to the IPsec structure for which security is 
not always imperative. This implies that ICMP messages could still be sent in 
plaintext format, if the association was to be initiated without any protection 
mechanisms enabled. 
The provision Of the IPsec services for the ICMPv6 messages should ensure the 
adequate protection of the protocol data against unauthorised modification and 
information disclosure attacks. This notion does not imply any protection of the 
system against attacks aiming at the IPsec architecture itself, by exploiting 
vulnerabilities of the system running the IPv6 protocol [172] and [173]. 
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The overall security of the ICMP system relies on parameters external to the 
protocol and set of communication rules, in contrast to the FCNSEP where security 
services are afforded for the protocol independently of the underlying network 
structure and FCNS implementation. Moreover, FCNSEP addresses a wide variety 
of error conditions that could affect the communication flow, reporting any 
condition to the system and/or the peer entity and not only those specific for the 
link-based data transmission. Finally, FCNSEP is not bound by the functionality of 
the FCNS stack and hence can be used in virtually any packet-switched architecture 
and telecommunication systems such as the UMTS CN. The following subsection 
identifies the areas of applicability of the FCNSEP with respect to the scope and 
notion of a possible FCNS network implementation. 
6.5 Applicability 
FCNSEP defines a framework for use within network architectures, where explicit 
error notification should take place irrespective of the technology supporting the 
connection. A typical example of the applicability of the FCNSEP is a generalised 
network model, where the node initiating the connection may be the subscriber of a 
UMTS network, requesting a data transmission connection with a node residing 
behind a packet-switched network. Figure 6.6 provides such an example, where 
the Internet network present between the UMTS CN and the particular node adds to 
the particularity of the topology, where various erroneous conditions may arise due 
to the diverse nature of its elements. 
The sample network outlines a broad integrated topology, as such could be defined 
for a third generation telecommunication system, merging existing technologies to 
enable the communication between the mobile subscriber and Node B. The FCNS 
protocol stack could be used to securely transfer the required data via the elements 
of the UMTS CN, denoted as NE1 and NE2, and route the messages on the Internet 
network through the routing elements indicated as NE3, NE4 and NE5. 
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FCNS Applicability 
Figure 6.6: Sample integrated communications network 
At any given time, an erroneous situation such as a faulty transmission link or 
excessive congestion could arise in any of the different network systems forming 
the example of Figure 6.6. This mandates the need for an architecture that could 
provide for the signalling of the error parameters throughout the environment 
nodes. FCNSEP can support the notification of the network elements involved in 
the communication process, irrespective of the nature of the network where they 
reside, thus offering a degree of connection monitoring throughout all phases of the 
association. The support of various architectures that could shape the set of 
connections in question renders FCNSEP a suitable mechanism for error signalling 
procedures, offering at the same time a degree of protection against active network 
attacks aiming at exploiting the valuable information exchanged between the peers. 
The use of FCNSEP constitutes a last resort in attempting to notify and recover from 
an error network situation. Parameters such as congestion control could be added 
at the user frames or packets, to reduce the overhead that could be produced by 
the FCNSEP messages. However it is imperative that there exists a means of 
alerting the system administrator of any situation that could endanger the 
communication process, enabling not only the correction of such a situation but the 
initiation of the appropriate mechanisms that could afford its future prevention. 
Router 
Chapter 6- 193 Protocol Security for 3ro Generation Telecommunication Systems 
Chapter 7: Future Core Networks 
System Implementation 
Chapter 7. Future Core Networks System Implementation 
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7.2.2 Environment Parameters and Assumptions 
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In Chapter 7 an analysis of the FCNS design and implementation process is 
provided, which enabled the completion of the FCNS specification. A description is 
given as to the assumptions made for the environment in which FCNS would run, 
including details of the rules followed to realise the protocol. Furthermore, a 
presentation on the FCNS prototype building is provided, encompassing information 
for the validation tool used and its applicability. Finally, the FCNS source code 
implementation is analysed, with details on the simulator and the environments 
created for realising the proposed architecture. 
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7.1 Overview 
Protocol design aims at identifying the necessary parameters used for the 
realisation of a given architecture. Available techniques target the establishment of 
an agreement about the usage of shared resources in a network of peers [6]. 
Current literature on protocol design issues represents the steps that can be taken 
to define the minimum functionality and services required for a protocol to function 
[174 - 1761. 
The definition of the set of communication rules governing a protocol, focuses on 
three main requirements [6]: 
9 The syntax, where definition is given as to the format of the valid protocol 
messages 
9 The grammar, which defines the procedure rules for the data exchange 
* The semantics, forming the vocabulary of valid messages that can be 
exchanged 
These rules encompass most of the details concerning the connection 
establishment, data transfer and termination process issues negotiated between the 
communicating peers. The validity and common understanding of the nodes 
present in the connection is vital for the operation of the protocol and consequently 
the connection realisation. 
Nevertheless, conformance to the above requirements is only the first step in 
properly defining the protocol architecture. Specific elements of the structure must 
be defined to enable these requirements to be set. These elements are as follows 
[6], [174]: 
e Ser-vice element, which represents the services to be offered by the protocol 
* Assumptions taken for the environment protocol will be run 
0 Vocabulary of the messages used to implement the protocol 
o Encoding for the specific messages 
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* Procedure rules, governing the message exchange process 
The respective elements and requirements for the FCNS realisation are given in the 
following sections. Conformance of the proposed architecture to the defined rules 
is provided in the FCNS specification, as described in Chapters 4,5 and 6. 
7.2 FCNS Design Process 
The FCNS design process aimed at creating a functional prototype of the FCNS 
stack to verify the logical consistency of its specification and the conformance of the 
protocol to the rules identified in it. Assumptions and definitions made during the 
design stages are therefore included in this section, bearing information as to the 
possible environments in which FCNS would be executed. 
The ultimate goal of the FCNS design has been the identification and prevention of 
errors that could render FCNS operation impossible. Deadlock and livelock 
avoidance has been of utmost importance for the proposed architecture, since 
these are situations the protocol may not recover from once realised. Emphasis 
has also been given to minimising design errors, such as incomplete or 
contradicting sets of communication rules. 
7.2.1 Service Specification 
FCNS has been designed to provide a reliable and secure end-to-end transfer 
service of user and/or signalling information for PS architectures. This service 
includes the following parameters: 
* Connection establishment 
0 Connection termination 
0 Transmission error detection, recovery and correction 
0 Flow control strategy 
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* Communication channel security 
0 User data and interlayer security services 
0 Data encoding 
* Full duplex transmission 
Depending on the peer requests, this service can either be connection -oriented or 
connectionless. The former implies the confirmation of the request made by the 
sending instance, whereas the latter represents an unconfirmed situation in which 
only an indication is sent to the receiving peer as to the action taken by the 
transmitter. The assumption made in both cases is that peers are willing to accept 
the connection request. In any other case, communication cannot proceed 
resulting in the immediate release of any resources held. FCNS provides 
acknowledged data transmission facilities as the means of protecting both entities 
from possible communication attacks, as detailed in Chapters 3 and 5. 
Further definitions regarding the FCNS architecture include the possibility of 
connection termination and/or abortion by either party and the ability of the system 
to recover from any message losses that may occur. The probability of an 
undetected error has been chosen to be in the order of 10-7 to 10-9 for the protocol 
to maintain an adequate degree of functionality. The implementation of error 
detection and correction techniques ensures the recovery of FCNS from greater 
error probabilities. 
The architecture must also be able to obtain information concerning security 
parameters from nodes in the topology. Specific databases and/or elements set by 
the network operator must be interfaced with the FCNS instance to enable 
information updates and modifications. Therefore, an external interface mechanism 
has been installed in the SL to provide for system management services to be 
offered to the running FCNS instance. 
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Services have not been designed to provide support for circuit-switched 
applications. Compatibility with protocols such as the Mobile Application Part and 
Mobile IP has been preserved only in the sense of carrying the respective messages 
if that is ever needed. The FCNS is not used to set up and maintain calls to provide 
telephony and other voice-based services to its users. 
However, the FCNS architecture could be used for the transmission of multimedia 
services, such as real time video and audio. Since its design provides a general 
secure architectural framework, network operators could use existing protocols to 
serve as the FCNS communication layers, in an attempt to support a complete 
network communication solution. Application layer type messages can be mapped 
into the FCNS messages and be transferred across a packet network topology, 
irrespective of the data contents. Consequently, an increased flexibility is provided 
in supporting various connection parameters and situations. 
7.2.2 Environment Parameters and Assumptions 
FCNS supports full duplex transmission in communication channels, varying from 
copper cables to optical fibres. Depending on the medium technology used to 
support the association, a minimum amount of data bits should be calculated to 
provide a common reference for the FCNS implementations. As an example, the 
following consideration is given for optical environments [13]. 
velocity -2xc=2x 300,000kms-' = 200,000kms-1 33 
For a typical 10km distance it would therefore take 50 jis for a message to be 
transferred. 
Depending on the transmission speed offered by the supporting hardware, the 
number of data bits that can be exchanged for the 50 ps time interval may vary. 
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Hence, for a modem running at 56Kbps, the amount of bits exchanged in the 
calculated time interval is 2.8 bits and for a 2Mbps high-speed modem 100bits. 
The choice of the underlying medium has also been based on security issues, such 
as the ease in tapping the channel to obtain information as to the traffic in transit 
or to cause a DoS attack. Optical fibres do not leak light and, since optical 
transmission does not exhibit electromagnetic emissions, are more difficult to 
attack at a physical level [177]. Despite this fact, attacks can be successful in 
optical networks, although the amount of effort and cost that would be required for 
such a result is significantly greater than that for a shielded coaxial cable. It is 
consequently recommended that all-optical architectures be adopted in PS 
environments to enhance the physical security services provided by the FCNS. 
Further issues surrounding the environment of the FCNS application include 
services supporting the requested QoS by the users. Network routing, congestion 
control and compensation for queuing delays are notions for which respective 
mechanisms have been added to the FCNS design, including flow control and route 
calculation procedures. 
Additional parameters concerning the types of errors that could occur have been 
accounted for. Transmission channels have been assumed to impose several 
effects on the transit data, such as message loss and insertion, message 
duplication, message re-ordering, error insertion, contents modification and 
information misrouting. Depending on the fault condition, FCNS has been afforded 
functions counteracting transmission errors to preserve connection continuation. 
As far as the types of errors that can occur, this work has assumed a bursty nature, 
since it provides an adequate approximation of real-network situations. Single-bit 
and two-bit errors categories are also possible, though the technology in error 
detection and correction mechanisms (CRC-32) ensures the almost certain recovery 
of the system from such faults [145]. 
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As an aside on the transmission channel effects, the FCNS provides traffic padding 
mechanisms and link-based security to account for unauthorised traffic monitoring. 
An attacker has been assumed to hold the necessary hardware and software tools 
for launching passive and active network attacks, seeking knowledge of the 
contents of the data messages or the simple connection disruption. 
Transmission speed and bandwidth (BW) limitations depend on the underlying sub- 
medium and the type of network hardware used to support the topology. Typical 
examples include 20OMbps shielded twisted pair cables or 20OMbps single mode 
optical fibres. The identification of the channels has only been made for simulation 
purposes and hence the observation of the FCNS efficiency in delivering the user 
data under different network parameters (Chapter 8). As far as security is 
concerned, no categorisation has taken place on the communications channel, 
resulting in the same mechanisms used irrespective of the medium. 
7.2.3 Protocol Vocabulary 
Protocol vocabulary services include the identification of the respective messages 
used for establishing, maintaining and terminating a connection. Internal and 
external FCNS messages have been described in a packet format basis, and 
classified according to the functionality they provide to the FCNS architecture. 
Messages internal to the FCNS operation are never exchanged between peers and 
are secured with different secret keys than those used for the user data. Similarly, 
external FCNS messages cannot be exchanged between the FCNS communication 
layers and/or the SL. 
The peer datagrams, packets and frames hold different headers than internal 
messages and are only processed by the intended protocol instance. If another 
layer protocol receives such a message, then it is discarded and an error 
notification is sent to the SL upon persistence of the condition. 
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Table 7.1 provides a representation of the messages exchanged between the peer 
FCNS entities, whilst Table 7.2 illustrates some of the internal messages to the 
FCNS operation. 
Table 7.1: FCNS external messages 
Message name Usage 
NODE-CONNECT Initial connection request to destination (check if 
peer can accept information) 
NODE_REQUEST Information on the data to be exchanged 
connection must have been established 
NODE_REQUEST RESPONSE Response upon the acceptance of the data 
NODE_ESTABLISH Negotiation of presentation/encoding issues 
NODE_QOS QoS parameters request 
NODE_QOS_RESPONSE QoS levels requested 
NODE_SYNC Synchronisation points and parameters 
NODE_IDLE Node instance returns to idle state 
COMM-ABORT Abort the communication 
NODE_END Node has finished all transmissions 
NODE_TRANSFER User data to the UDSES layer and UDPRES peer 
MSG_CREATE User data to the TX-LAYER and UDSES peer 
MSG_AGREE End-to-end QoS support negotiation between 
TX-LAYER entities 
DATAGRAM User Data to EE_LAYER and TXLAYER peer 
DATAGRAM_SAR Segmented user data to EELAYER and TXLAYER 
peer 
PACKET User data to PHYS layer and EELAYER peer 
PACKET_SAR Segmented user data to PHYS layer and EELAYER 
peer 
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FRAME User data to destination via communications channel 
(peer PHYS layer entity) 
EOF No more user data to send - wait for response before 
NODEEND transmission 
EOF_RESPONSE Response to the EOF message bearing its 
acceptance/ rejection 
ACK_FRAME Acknowledgment for the frame or block of frames 
NAK_FRAME Unacknowledgment for the frame or block of frames 
ERROR_REP Error report message of the FCNSEP 
ERROR_RESP Error response message to the ERROR_REP 
NAKREP Unacknowledge reception of the FCNSEP messages 
ROUTE_INFO Route information for the network nodes 
Table 7.2: FCNS internal messages 
Message name Usage 
ACK Acknowledgment of an internal message (if 
necessary) 
NAK Unacknowledgment (negative acknowledgment) of 
an internal message 
NODE_ALERT Alert the SL of an error condition (triggers the 
FCNSEP) 
SERVICE_PRIMITIVE Transmission of the service primitives 
NODENEI Verify communication peers 
NODE_ACCEPT Node acceptance 
NODE_REJECT Node rejection 
ENCRYPT/DECRYPT Security context for the internal messages 
ENCRYPT_ETE/DECRYPT_ETE Security context for end-to-end mechanisms 
ENCRYPT_LE/DECRYPT_LE Security context for link-based mechanisms 
ra 
Chapter 7- 203 Protocol Security for 3 Generation Telecommunication Systems 
PATH-ROUTE Calculated route information list 
ACK_ROUTE Acknowledge chosen route 
NAK_ROUTE Reject chosen route 
ADDY-FORMAT Identify correct address formatting rules - must 
proceed the PATH_ROUTE 
ADDY-ACCEPT Accept formatting options 
ADDY-REJECT Reject formatting options 
MSG_READY Check PHYS capability in accepting the data 
messages (from the EE_LAYER) 
MSG_STATUS Identify whether subnetwork can accept and route 
data (from the TX-LAYER) 
TRANSFER_DI UDSES checks if TX-LAYER can accept data 
COMM_QOS QoS parameters to be supported on an end-to-end 
basis (UDSES to TX-LAYER) 
SET_STATUS Return to idle state 
DECISION Decision from the source leading to the request 
primitive 
DECISION_RESPONSE Response from the destination leading to response 
primitive 
PERMISSION Send permission for sending and/or receiving user 
data 
ACK_DATA Acknowledge connection parameters requested by 
the application instance 
NAK_DATA Unacknowledge connection parameters requested by 
the application instance 
Both tables are representative of the messages used in the FCNS realisation. Their 
identification has been essential in realising the message format and the number of 
bits that is required to explicitly recognize each one of them. 
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7.2.4 Message Formats 
Message format issues concern the representation of the data transmitted via the 
FCNS layers in a form acceptable by all communicating parties. 
Firstly, the packet encoding issues have been identified to preserve consistency in 
the FCNS design. The three main possible formatting options have been as follows 
11611: 
* Bit oriented formatting. The data is sent as a stream of bits, with framing 
flags being used to recognize the adjacent frames. 
9 Character oriented formatting. The data is sent as a stream of frames, with 
delimiters being used for indicating the beginning and end of each individual 
frame. These are the Start of Text (STX), End of Text (ETX) and Data Link 
Escape (DLE) characters (ASCII terminology). 
e Byte-count oriented formatting. A technique similar to character orientation, 
but in this case the sender includes in the message the exact number of 
bytes contained. Since such information is provided, the ETX and DLE 
characters can be omitted. 
Byte-count oriented formatting has been chosen for the FCNS, due to the efficiency 
it presents in relation to the other two mechanisms. 
These procedures aim at finding the minimal message size required to represent 
the information that is to be sent [6]. The respective calculations took place on the 
PHYS layer frame, since that is the ultimate message sent between the peer 
entities. Figure 4.18 of Chapter 4 identifies the frame structure for the FCNS 
architecture. Since there exist 60 messages in total, then 6 bits are sufficient for 
indicating the exact message sent, distinguishing also the internal and external 
messages (2' -< 
60:! ý, 26). This number should be added to the frame header 
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making up the overall frame header size used for calculating the optimum message 
length for a given error-free interval. Therefore, 
* The length of the frame overhead is 17 bytes or 136 bits (Figure 4.18) 
9 The data bits are denoted as 8D to result in a byte-multiple payload, D being 
the payload size in bytes 
* The length of the ACK message is 12 bytes or 96 bits 
9 Let p, and Pddenote the probability of an erroneous ACK and frame 
respectively 
* The total transmitted bits will then be 136 + 96 + 8D = 232 + 8D with the total 
overhead being 232 bits or 29 bytes. 
1. For an error-free transmissionr Pa = Pd =ý 
Protocol Efficiency (E) will be: E= 
8D 
Equation 7.1 
232 + 8D 
Since the FCNS efficiency is independent of the probabilities that any messages will 
be in error, the data payload size can be as large as possible 
2. For an erroneous transmissionr Pa ý Pd : ýý- 
The probability that a message and its acknowledgment are error-free is 
(1 - Pd)(1 - Pa). Hence, the probability that a message is retransmitted becomes 
Pr :: - 1-0- Pd)(1 - PJ - Therefore, the probability that it takes I 'subsequent 
transmissions to get the message across using i-I retransmissions and one 
successful transmission is i-I . Then, the expected number of AQ-P, )Pr 
transmissions per message is 
00 00 00 00 Go 
R=Iixpi =Iix(l-p, )P'-'=(]-P, )Il, xp'-'=(I-P, )I] rr ý-, 
11 Pr 
j-0 i=j 
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1 00 
p, )j 
Pr I]pj - 
0" 1 
J=O - Pr i=O 
I- Pr 
Hence, the relative protocol efficiency will become 
E= 
8D 8D(I - p, ) 0- A2)(I - Pd) *D Equation 7.2 
R(232 + 8D) 232 + 8D 29+D 
For a representative error-free interval of 125msec (a Bit Error Probability (BER) of 
8xl 0-6), then: 
Pa = --- 
96 
--=7.68 X 10-4 Pa = 0.999232 125,000 
136 + 8D 
Pd = 125,000 
The calculated relative FCNS efficiency is depicted in Figure 7.1. As can be 
observed from the graph, FCNS achieves a maximum efficiency of 91.57% for a 
data payload size of 5000 bits or 625 bytes. This means that under erroneous 
situations with a BER of 8x1 0-6 , the probability that a message is successfully 
delivered to its destination is 0.9157. 
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The final step in validating the logical consistency of the FCNS specification has 
been the creation of an abstract high-level prototype. The procedure rules tested in 
the abstraction enabled the identification of any errors in the FCNS layer 
interactions and limitations of the protocol in providing the data transfer services. 
7.3 FCNS Prototype 
Procedure rules are an essential part of the FCNS design, since they encompass the 
policies and parameters governing the message exchange process. The aim is to 
devise a complete set of rules, avoiding duplication and ensuring clear definitions of 
the protocol functions. The approach is to therefore produce a simple design, 
where overall functionality is broken down to individual pieces (layers), each of 
which performs a specific task [174], [176]. At the same time, robustness needs to 
be preserved, to address recovery issues from possible software errors. 
7.3.1 Prototype Building 
The FCNS prototype has been built using the XSpin validation tool [178] on a 
Windows 2000 machine. The interest for this work has been the semantics of the 
protocol and not its precise syntax, creating a high-level abstraction of the FCNS 
stack. The contents of the messages and transmitted files have been of no 
importance to the design, hence, a generic model has only been realised, which is 
depicted in Figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2: FCNS prototype model architecture 
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The connections between the layers of the prototype are channels forwarding 
information from and to a layer, without introducing any delays or bit errors. The 
omission of an application layer from the validation model follows the principles 
described in Chapter 4. The inclusion of models implicit to the validator for the 
sending and receiving instances has only been done for the provision of a 
continuous data generator and sink, in the form of the node functional block. 
Similarly, a physical layer defining transmission characteristics and capabilities falls 
outside the scope of the FCNS prototype. 
The model of Figure 7.2 lacks also the provision of distinctive input and output 
FCNS abstractions. The reason for this approach is that the prototype validation 
has solely focused on the FCNS layer interactions and not the communication 
process between peers. Since every network node should be able to both send and 
receive data, the FCNS blocks of the prototype architecture entail the necessary 
functionality to compensate for both situations. 
The definitions of the prototype parameters have been based on the PROMELA 
language of the XSpin software package [6]. Further information on formal 
description languages used for prototype building is described in [179 - 181]. For 
the creation of the prototype, the following functions have been assigned to the 
FCNS communication layers and the SL: 
0 UDPRES block: Interface to the node process handling re-transmission 
requests. Transfer syntax negotiation is only checked as a message 
exchange process and not in terms of message encoding. It is also the 
block responsible for initiating and terminating a connection depending on 
the user requests. 
0 UDSES block: Controls the data transfer process and provides any necessary 
synchronisation parameters. Maintenance of the data to be transferred is 
also accounted for. 
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9 TX-LAYER block: Implements a flow control mechanism for the end-to-end 
transmission. It handles the sending and receiving of the data as well as its 
acknowledgment depending on the window size. 
9 EE_LAYER block: Verifies with the SL the path in which messages will 
traverse and calculates a checksum value appended in the packet for error 
detection purposes. 
0 PHYS block: Forwards the data to the physical link, implementing a sliding 
window ARQ mechanism for handling re-transmissions. 
SL block: Provision of end-to-end and link-based security mechanisms. It 
checks the integrity of the messages exchanged between the FCNS 
communication layers and supports the implementation of the traffic 
padding mechanism. 
7.3.2 Validation Tool Applicability 
XSpin [178] is a high-level design verification too[, used for models of applications 
and not implementations. The procedures surrounding the operation of XSpin are 
based on abstract models, for which details must be suppressed to create a 
prototype based on only the minimum necessary functionality. 
The tool provides three types of simulation: 
1. Random simulation option used to debug a model. No correctness requirements 
are checked during simulation runs. All non-deterministic decisions are resolved 
randomly. 
2. Interactive simulation can be used to force the execution towards a known 
point. The user is prompted at every point in the execution where a non- 
deterministic choice has to be resolved. 
IA guided simulation is used to follow an error-trail that was produced by the 
verifier for every FCNS functional block. 
ra 
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The advantage of the simulation procedures is the production of time-sequence 
diagrams, where the verifier outlines processes in terms of states created during 
simulation time. States and layer interactions can be checked via these diagrams, 
providing the designer with an indication as to the correctness of the model and its 
compliance to the specification. 
Further advantages include the ability to analyse the properties of the system 
interactions, clearly identifying the internal states of a communication protocol 
[182]. It also enables the location of design errors in the abstract model 
representation, offering an early protection measure in recognizing potential 
implementation pitfalls. 
The limitations of XSpin lay in the usage of excessive CPU and memory loads for 
the verification processes. Representative values obtained by the FCNS prototype 
are depicted in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Memory requirements of the XSpin verification tool for the FCNS model 
FCNS layer Memory requirement (MB) 
UDPRES 35.759 
UDSES 35.759 
TX-LAYER 35.759 
EELAYER 134.623 
PHYS 15.112 
SL 214.223 
The amounts provided in Table 7.3 are quite large compared to the level of 
abstraction the FCNS communication layers have undergone. Further interactions 
and processes have increased the memory requirements of the validation tool, 
limiting its usage for this thesis. 
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Additionally, the provision of verification procedures only for the layer interactions 
meant that the processes and FCNS functionality could only be tested on the 
complete design. Software code flaws and miscalculations have decreased the 
amount of time it took for the FCNS software realisation to take place, and the 
testing of a more complex system than the prototype at the same time as the 
design process was progressing. 
Finally, a weakness this work has identified has been the lack of automated 
implementation procedures, whereby software code could be produced in a high- 
level language such as C/C++. Such a feature would decrease the time it took to 
complete the FCNS implementation, since after the verification of the desired model 
properties the task would focus on only the addition of the functionality left out of 
the prototype. Instead, once the FCNS model had been verified, the work had to 
move into manually realising the FCNS layers into software. 
7.4 Source Code Implementation 
Following the verification of the FCNS specification logical consistency and the 
conformance of the model to the requirements set in the design, the OMNET++ 
simulator [11) has been used to realise the FCNS model. The idea behind the 
implementation of the protocol into a software entity has been the provision of a 
formal test-bed in observing issues related to the FCNS performance and efficiency 
in delivering the requested services. 
7.4.1 FCNS Stack Simulation Environment 
The provision of the FCNS stack simulation environment enabled the identification 
of the performance of the protocol in supporting the services designed in the 
specification. Message forwarding, address verification, security context exchanges 
and route calculations have been the major functions tested. 
Following the 
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validation of the prototype, where layer interactions have been verified, the model 
depicted in Figure 7.3 has been used to test the processes between peer entities. 
Figure 7.3: FCNS stack simulation environment 
The specific model aimed at testing the capabilities of the FCNS in sending and 
receiving information that might be required in a PS environment. The Source and 
Destination module instances represent a data generator and a sink respectively, 
continuously producing and receiving data for the communications channel. The 
Protinp module represents the functions of the UDPRES layer at the sending 
instance, whilst Udsesin the functionality of the UDSES layer. Txin encompasses 
the details of the TX_LAYER, Eein the ones provided by the EE-LAYER, whereas 
Physin and Securein those for the PHYS and the SL layers respectively. Similarly, 
the Protout, Udsesout, Txout, Eeout, Physout and Secureout represent the output 
instance of the FCNS stack. 
The links between the FCNS layer instances did not introduce errors but delays 
representing the amount of time it would be required to process a message. 
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Typical values ranged from hundred microseconds to a few milliseconds depending 
on the message size and the encryption technique applied. 
Additionally, the link between the PHYS instances has been regarded as a 
communications channel, with the characteristics outlined in Section 7.2.2. 
Measurements have consequently been taken with respect to this link, including 
protocol efficiency calculations and throughput measurements for various network 
situations. 
The functions of the OMNET++ simulator enabled the setting of the respective 
parameters in changing delay and BER values, with the results obtained being 
presented in Chapter 8. 
7.4.2 Simulation Tool Applicability 
OMNET++ is a discrete event simulator, enabling protocol procedures to be 
programmed and realised using the functionality of the software tool. Functions 
such as message encapsulation and decapsulation, as well as route calculations 
have been based on those provided by OMNET++, simplifying the FCNS 
implementation process. The tool offers the flexibility of explicitly defining 
parameters and variables for the environment, representing the layers of the 
protocol in individual modules, such as those depicted in Figure 7.3. The designer 
is able to address specification issues irrespective of the platform the protocol will 
run, removing dependencies from existing protocol architectures such as the IP and 
TCP. 
The tool lacks standardised module libraries, enhancing the difficulty of the FCNS 
realisation and the creation of case studies for measuring the protocol efficiency in 
real-network type situations. Software tools such as OPNET [183] provide the 
capabilities of model platforms, including wireless networks and the UMTS CN, but 
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licences are very expensive. Similar functionality had to be programmed in the 
OMNET++ simulator, reducing the flexibility of the design. At the same time, the 
amount of effort that has been required to provide a complete test-bed architecture 
has been increased, at the expense of a controlled environment with parameters 
clearly defined by the designer. 
Furthermore, the work has identified the inability of OMNET++ to handle message 
structures inside queues. The use of pointers has been acknowledged to remove 
the ability of the simulator to distinguish between the messages in a buffer [184]. 
Consequently, whenever there has been the need of simulating a message buffer 
and/or a queue, the message C++ structures have been replaced by the addParo 
simulator function, manually adding the appropriate parameters to the FCNS 
messages. Although this did not have any effect on the continuation of the 
simulation runs, it leveraged the amount of effort and time taken to provide a 
complete solution. 
Moreover, OMNET++ had limitations in interpreting the implicit message structures 
into byte-type buffers. Interfacing the FCNS design with cryptographic libraries 
such as the Cryptlib [185] has therefore become impossible, leading to simulating 
only the effects security had on the FCNS communication. 
The nature of the simulation too[ meant the representation of the FCNS architecture 
using discrete techniques. The implications of this approach were that protocol 
states could only change at particular time intervals and that all variables 
maintained their values throughout these time periods. This meant that processes 
could not occur simultaneously but by following a specific order. In the FCNS 
simulation context this implied the loss of simulation time in processing the data 
messages sent, since the input instance has been unable to send information prior 
to the interpretation of the previous message by the destination. As a result of 
this, continuous data generation entailed either the provision of a message buffer at 
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the input PHYS layer instance to store the respective messages, or the halting of 
the sending process for an amount of time equal to that taken for acknowledging a 
message. 
Table 7.4 depicts a representative case to further address this OMNET++ pitfall. In 
the example presented, the run has assumed a5 msec FCNS message processing 
delay in delivering the data from the source node to the PHYS layer, with a round 
trip propagation delay (RTT) of 60 msec. The overall delay in processing a frame 
block represents the time it takes for that block to reach the receiving entity plus 
the time taken to acknowledge its reception. For consistency, a complete frame 
block has assumed to contain 32 messages (frames). 
Table 7.4: Message sending processing time 
Sending Rate Processing time Overall delay in processing the 
frame block 
32 messages before ACK 160 msec 1320 msec 
1 message before ACK 5 msec 2560 msec 
The amounts illustrated in Table 7.4 have been calculated as follows: 
0 For an acknowledgment after one complete frame block (Go-Back N or 
Selective Repeat ARQ), the processing time for the 32 data messages in one 
FCNS instance is 160 msec. For both the input and output instances this 
becomes 320 msec. The time to transmit each message is half the RTT and 
hence for 32 messages this becomes 960 msec. The acknowledgement 
should take 30 msec (RTT/2) to reach the sending PHYS instance plus 10 
msec for its processing, resulting in an overall 1320 msec time before the 
sender can transmit the next block. 
0 For acknowledging every single frame block segment (Stop and Wait ARQ), 
the processing time for a single message in both FCNS entities is 10 msec 
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plus the 10 msec required for the ACK to reach the sender, making up a 
total of 20 msec. Transmitting and acknowledging the message would also 
take 60 msec entailing a total of 80 msec overall delay in processing a single 
frame and hence 2560 msec for the frame block. 
If the transmission and message reception could occur concurrently, then assuming 
a Go-Back N ARQ scheme, the overall processing delay would be: 
* Total processing time for a frame block in the FCNS instances would be 160 
msec. This is due to the fact that sending and receiving are simultaneous 
processes. Sending the frame block down the communications channel 
would take 960 msec plus 40 msec for its acknowledgment including the 
processing time for the ACK message, making a total propagation delay of 
1000 msec. Therefore, the next block could be transmitted at 1160 msec 
after the previous one assuming that data transfer continuation should be 
based on the ACK reception. If the sender is permitted to send without 
receiving an ACK, then the overall processing delay is further reduced to 
1090 msec (1160 msec minus 40 msec ACK total processing time minus 30 
msec that would take for the last frame to reach the receiving PHYS layer 
entity). 
Finally, the memory consumption of the OMNET++ simulator for each environment 
module has been observed to be quite large. On a Windows 2000 machine with 
256 MB of RAM, the simulation environment that has successfully been built 
encompassed only 6 nodes, as depicted in the generic model of Chapter 8. Further 
node additions resulted in the program to crash due to lack of memory. Table 
7.5 
illustrates typical stack usage memory amounts for the model of Figure 7.4. 
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Table 7.5: FCNS simulation environment memory consumption 
FCNS layer Memory consumption (input/output instances) 
Source / Destination 59032 / 55648 (total of 114,680 bytes) 
UDPRES layer 3670324 / 3950820 (total of 7,621,144 byes) 
UDSES layer 24064 / 24816 (total of 48,880 bytes) 
TX-LAYER 25004 / 25380 (total of 50,384 bytes) 
EE_LAYER 25756 / 23688 (total of 49,444 bytes) 
PHYS layer 124644 / 73508 (total of 198,152 bytes) 
Securitylayer 99640 / 63168 (total of 162,808 bytes) 
For a single simulation run, Table 7.5 depicts the partitioning of a total of 
8,245,492 bytes of memory consumption for just the FCNS simulation environment. 
Additions in FCNS functionality and processes would increase this requirement 
resulting in constraints as to the applicability of the simulator in implementing the 
FCNS into a large-scale network environment. 
Overall, the OMNET++ simulator provided the means of identifying design errors in 
the FCNS specification, refining the protocol and removing any unwanted states and 
functions that could lead to potential pitfalls. As a possible further step, the FCNS 
implementation could be ported to the OPNET environment, further testing the 
protocol under standardised architectures for wireless telecommunication systems. 
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Chapter 8: Case Studies 
Chapter 8. Case Studies 
8.1 Overview 
8.2 FCNS Stack Implementation 
8.2.1 Simulation Environment Description 
8.2.2 Results and Measurements 
8.3 Packet-Switched Architecture 
8.3.1 Simulation Environment Description 
8.3.2 Results and Measurements 
In this chapter, observations and results taken from the FCNS simulation 
environments are presented. The measurements are categorised into two sections. 
In the first, the FCNS architectural simulation environment is given, depicting the 
model used to provide a test-bed for the FCNS stack. Results and observations 
concern the efficiency and throughput of the protocol under situations with bit 
errors, delays and delay variations (jitter). The second section involves 
measurements taken by implementing the protocol into a general packet-switched 
topology to establish the means of measuring the FCNS performance in delivering 
user data across various network elements. Comparisons are also presented, which 
have been made against the TCP/IP suite running on a typical 1OMbps Ethernet 
network. 
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8.1 Overview 
The FCNS specification described in Chapters 4,5 and 6 represents an alternative to 
the OSI security model architecture, to address the security problems given in 
Chapter 3. The software implementation of the FCNS aims to provide a measure of 
the protocol functionality under typical operational conditions. 
The specification of the proposal developed by this work cannot be fully compared 
to existing communication solutions such as the TCP/IP. These have been 
developed over many years and run on diverse operating systems (Chapter 2). 
Measuring the performance of a real-network FCNS instance against the Internet 
suite would require protocol standardisation and operating system implementations 
that have fallen outside the scope of this work. Consequently, the FCNS simulation 
environments have been created to enable verification of the consistency of the 
specification and to give an idea of the FCNS capabilities in comparison to the 
TCP/IP suite. 
In the observations presented in the following sections, comparisons with 
theoretically calculated values are given, to enable the referencing of the simulated 
FCNS model against its specification. 
8.2 FCNS Stack Implementation 
The aim of the FCNS stack simulation environment was the identification and 
recording of the protocol functions and variables necessary to setup and maintain a 
packet data connection. The model has been divided into an input and output 
instance to enable the classification and management of their respective functions. 
Similarities have been preserved whenever needed, since in a real-network 
topology the two instances would compose a single protocol occurrence. Therefore, 
functionality duplication has become inevitable to preserve an adequate level of 
operation for the simulated model. 
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8.2.1 Simulation Environment Description 
The architecture used to provide the measurements is depicted in Figure 8.1, taken 
by the graphical interface of the OMNET++ simulator (GNED tool). 
Figure &I: FCNS OMNET++ simulation topology 
The identification of the individual modules is given in Chapter 7, together with 
information regarding the links present in the model. For the measurements 
illustrated in this chapter, the channels between the individual modules have been 
programmed to introduce small delays to simulate the amount of time it would take 
for a protocol to process a message. 
Table 8.1 illustrates the FCNS communication layer header sizes used throughout 
the simulation measurements, whilst Tables 8.2 and 8.3 depict those used for the 
TCP/IP suite. 
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Table S. 1: FCNS communication layer header sizes 
FCNS layer Header Size (security) Header Size (no security) 
UDPRES 10 bytes 7 bytes 
UDSES 15 bytes 12 bytes 
TX-LAYER 24 bytes 21 bytes 
EELAYER 20 bytes 17 bytes 
PHYS 17 bytes 14 bytes 
Total 86 bytes 71 bytes 
The ACK of the FCNS structure for the data massages had a constant overhead of 
12 bytes or 96 bits when full security measures were applied and 9 bytes or 72 bits 
when no security mechanisms were enforced. 
Table 8.2: TCPIIPv4 protocol suite header sizes 
Internet layer Header Size (bytes) ACK size (bytes) 
Ethernet preamble 8 8 
Ethernet source address 6 6 
Ethernet destination address 6 6 
Ethernet type field 2 2 
Ethernet CRC 4 4 
IPv4 header 20 20 
TCP header 20 20 
Pad (to Ethernet minimum) 0 6 
Inter-packet gap (9.6 psec) 12 12 
Total 78 84 
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Table 8.3: TCPIIPv6 protocol suite header sizes 
Intemet layer Header Size (bytes) ACK size (bytes) 
Ethernet preamble 8 8 
Ethernet source address 6 6 
Ethernet destination address 6 6 
Ethernet type field 2 2 
Ethernet CRC 4 4 
IPv6 header 40 40 
ESP header 14 14 
TCP header 20 20 
Pad (to Ethernet minimum) 0 6 
Inter-packet gap (9.6 psec) 12 12 
Total 112 118 
The choice of an additional security extension header for the Internet suite has 
been made to enable the comparison of the FCNS against a secured Internet 
connection. The ESP was chosen since it provides both authentication and integrity 
features when running in tunnel mode (Chapter 3). 
The values presented in Tables 8.1,8.2 and 8.3 have been used to measure the 
individual protocol stack efficiencies at a theoretical level, using equations 7.1 and 
7.2 of Chapter 7. This enabled the identification of the maximum possible 
throughput and stack efficiency, providing the necessary reference point for the 
simulation results. 
rd 
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8.2.2 Results and Measurements 
This section presents the results of the simulation runs categorised according to the 
variable kept constant,, namely either the Bit Error Rate (BER) or the Round Trip 
Time (RTT) delay. 
All measurements have been taken with respect to the following parameters. 
9 Maximum number of frameslsecond (MFS): Identifies the maximum 
obtainable throughput for an errorless transmission. Defined as the ratio of 
the data rate over the physical frame size. For the FCNS architecture, two 
possibilities have been identified: 
1. FCNS with security measures. With a typical 1460-byte data size 
[14], then the overall FCNS frame will have a size of 1546 bytes or 
12368 bits. This means that for a communications channel of 10 
Mbps BW, the maximum number of frames that can be transferred 
(MFS) will be approximately 808 per second. 
2. FCNS no security. For the same 1460-byte data size, the overall 
FCNS frame size becomes 1531 bytes or 12248 bits. Consequently, 
MFS will be approximately 816 frameslsecond. 
9 EE LAYER Packet Throughput: Represents the number of payload bits that 
can be transferred per simulation time second, given the MFS obtained. 
1. FCNS with security measures. With the MFS as above, the size of the 
frame payload (EE_LAYER packet) is 1529 bytes long. The packet 
throughput (TEk_LA yER) is the product of these, which is approximately 
9.98 Mbps. Therefore the throughput efficiency is 98.9% for the 
1OMbps data rate. 
2. FCNS no security. Similarly, in this case, the frame payload is 1517 
bytes giving an efficiency of 99.08%. 
Time to transmit a single frame. This has been used to test the response of 
the FCNS simulation environment in delivering information according to the 
ra 
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theoretical standards. It may be calculated as the number of bits present in 
the frame over the channel capacity datarate. 
1. FCNS with security measures. The time to transmit a single frame 
(TiF) i s: T --,,: IF 
123 Wits 
IOX106bpS = 1.24m sec. This value has been used as 
half the RTT time for a set of simulation runs to enable identification 
of the FCNS software model in delivering user information at the 
maximum theoretical rate. 
2. FCNS no security. In this case, the time to transmit one frame 
becomes T 12248bits = 1.22m sec IF 10 xI O'bps 
Channel Utifisa6on (CU). The parameter represents how efficiently the 
communications channel is utilised by the data transfer process. It can be 
regarded as the ratio of the maximum achieved throughput over the channel 
capacity. Problems though can arise if all nodes in a network transmit at the 
highest possible rate, resulting in a maximum CU. Cases include congestion 
built up, which has the effect of minimising the throughput of an instance 
and/or lead to potential message losses, as depicted in Figure 8.2 [28]. 
Throughput 
(packets delivered) 
1.0 
Ideal (no congestion) 
overhead 
CoFitrolled 
rvcontrolled 
-+ 
Offered Load 
0.8 1.0 (packets sent) 
line utilisation 
Figure &2: Congestion effects on packet throughput 
For the uncontrolled case illustrated in Figure 8.2, when the line utilisation 
exceeds 80%, the packet throughput drops dramatically, reaching a zero 
value for nodes flooding the lines with the user data. As a consequence, 
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there has to be a measure of the maximum number of messages in transit, 
a notion expressed in terms of the bandwidth-delay product. 
* BW-delay product. Represents the number of bits that can be in transit at 
any given time, to enable the network achieve the highest possible 
throughput before network becomes congested. The product can be used in 
conjunction with the flow control mechanisms offered by the protocol to 
enable the identification of the number of messages that can successfully be 
sent before an acknowledgement is requested, given the respective channel 
capacity. In a sense, this variable determines the receiver window size in 
terms of the network latency (RTT). As a general reference, links should 
never be over-utilised, with the nodes achieving a CU of less than 50% [141. 
* Loss and deliverability Ratio. Loss ratio represents the amount of messages 
that have been lost either due to the presence of bit errors or due to 
discarding by the receiver as duplicates and/or intended for another 
recipient. It is expressed in percentage form as: 
LossRatio = 
Framessent - 
FrameSreceived 
X 100%. 
Framessent 
In a similar manner, the deliverability ratio 
EranieS received can express the 
Framessent 
throughput of the particular simulation run. 
* Packet Throughput. This value is used to depict the efficiency of the FCNS 
in 
transmitting the user data under erroneous conditions. It can be expressed 
in terms of the deliverability ratio or by calculating the overall number of 
bits sent in a simulation run. 
The variables presented above have been used to illustrate the FCNS efficiency 
compared to the theoretically calculated values and those obtained for the Internet 
suite. 
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The throughput response of a general-purpose protocol scheme has also been 
calculated, representing the reference point for the observations made in the FCNS 
simulation runs. The calculations follow the assumption of an error probability 
bearing the characteristics of a Poisson distribution. This hypothesis has been 
made to enable the representation of the BER probability as a random occurrence in 
a specified period of time (the simulation run time), matching the characteristics of 
a real-network environment. The number of bits in the FCNS frame overhead h is 
688 bits when full security measures are applied and 568 bits with no security 
functionality. The data size values x had a range from 1600 to 160,000 bits, and 
the BER from 0 to 0.001. For a Poisson distribution, the probability of incident for a 
given variable is: P(x) = 
AK 
er-ý , where A represents the average number of 10 
occurrences and Kthe number of actual incidences. For an error rate p, then the 
ýL)(I-px), where e-Irepresents the throughput becomes T )e-' - (I - 
xx 
distribution for a single occurrence, that is, the P(O) [6]. Figure 8.3 corresponds to 
the throughput obtained for the case of the FCNS with full security measures. 
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The following sections illustrate the results obtained by the FCNS stack simulation 
environment with respect to the theoretical calculations presented above. 
8.2.2.1 Constant Delay, Variable BERf Reference Measurements 
Varying the BER imposed on the FCNS messages under a particular RTT delay 
resulted in the observations depicted in the following figures. 
8.2.2.1.1 RTT of 2.5 msec - Loss Ratio (no timers) 
This measurement has been used to identify the potential frame loss that could 
occur when the network nodes where transmitting at the highest possible rate 
(TIF: --1.24 msec) resulting in the maximum MFS. The value of 2.5 msec is very 
close to the 3 msec RTT of an Ethernet 10 Mbps LAN [14] and can therefore provide 
a good view of the losses that may incur in such physical network topologies. 
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Figure &4: Reference loss ratio for RTT of 2.5 msec and variable BER 
This RTT value has also been used as a reference point for the proceeding 
observations to enable the identification of the FCNS stack response in delay and 
BER variations. For these particular sets of measurements, all FCNS layer message 
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timers have been disabled, to achieve the maximum possible throughput at a 
theoretical level. 
8.2.2.1.2 RTT of 2.5 msec - EE_LAYER Packet Throughput (no timers) 
The FCNS packet throughput observation of Figure 8.5 represents the amount of 
EE_LAYER packets that have been sent in the reference simulation set, for sending 
rates matching the optimum TlF. The variations indicated in the measurement are 
due to the simulator memory usage resulting in different number of packets being 
sent for the various BER cases. 
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Figure B. S. - Reference FCNS packet throughput for RTT of 2.5 msec and variable 
BER 
The jitter observed falls into the area of 250 kilobits/second or 31,250 bytes, that 
is, 2.5 packets/second. Given the processing load alterations and the applicability 
issues of the OMNET++ simulator described in Chapter 7, the packet variation rate 
observed can be regarded as acceptable. 
The maximum obtainable packet throughput is 1,124,412 bits, which results in a 
CU of 11.24% for the whole of the simulation time period. For a single node 
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transmitting at the highest MFS, flow control issues may be omitted, since the 
communication links may not built up congestion. In contrast, for a large-scale 
network topology, the amount of bits that can be sent by the nodes should be 
limited to the BW-delay product of 25,000, to provide for a delay-free data transfer 
process. 
8.2.2.1.3 RTT of 2.5 msec - Frame Throughput (no timers) 
The final observation made for the ideal FCNS simulation model concerns the 
overall frame throughput variation for the duration of the simulation runs. In the 
FCNS measurements, the work has assumed a constant data size throughout the 
set of the runs. Data length alterations have taken place to provide the means of 
measuring the protocol's performance in delivering different kinds of information 
including network-signalling data. Such results are provided in the following 
sections, where comparisons are made against theoretical calculations. 
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Figure 8.6: Throughput comparison - reference RTT 2.5 msec and theoretical 
calculation 
It may be seen that the simulated frame throughput is greater than the theoretical 
(Calculated response caption) value (Figure 8.3). This is due to the lack of error 
detection and correction mechanisms in the theoretical calculations. The presence 
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of such schemes in the FCNS stack architecture results in erroneous messages 
being corrected and consequently forwarded to the upper communication layers. 
Lack of such techniques increases the loss ratio and therefore minimises the 
deliverability Of the FCNS frames. 
With this provision, it may be concluded that the representation illustrated in Figure 
8.6 can be an acceptable measure of the FCNS performance acting as a reference 
(Reference observation caption) for the remainder of the observations. 
8.2.2.2 Constant Delay, Variable BER 
For these sets of simulation runs, the respective timers at the source and 
destination FCNS instances have been enabled, to create a more realistic view of 
the FCNS stack topology. The most important timers concern the 
acknowledgement and message reception values, which may vary depending on the 
network FCNS runs on. Typical values range from 50 msec to 260 msec to support 
a wide range of observations to take place. 
8.2.2.2.1 RT7r of 2.5 msec - Loss Ratio 
In the results presented in Figure 8.7, a comparison is provided with the reference 
observations of Section 8.2-2.1.1. 
The response of the FCNS protocol stack to message losses is almost identical, as 
presented in Figure 8.7. This comes as a result of the timers' rates for the FCNS 
instances, which have a minimum value of 50 msec to preserve a level of 
consistency for the simulation runs. Any period below the 50 msec threshold is 
possible (25 msec is the minimum acceptable), but its exclusion has been 
necessary to simulate a realistic model able to adapt in topologies with a large 
number of intermediate nodes between the peer entities. 
Chapter 8- 232 Protocol Security for 3' Generation Telecommunication Systems 
Loss Ratio 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
Co 
so% 
40% 
cu 
CL 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% iýýý, ý, a. a,...... 
kd3 e"db ' -Z-- mo j31 mo z ok mk 
d' fi '131 m, 
- ob ob mb ob mý Z, > %3,5 -- 
ý-1-5 't, 3 pt ý! 3v -, zt 'bp 'ýJ) 3p Ibp 1p Zý) p lp 13 
Bit Error Rate (BER) 
Figure 8.7. - Loss ratio - RTT 2.5 msec and variable BER 
In case the transmission rate needs to be changed and therefore the protocol timer 
values, the FCNSEP should be employed, following the identification of the condition 
and its signalling to the SL. Possible implementations of the FCNSEP should add up 
to the overall data transfer latency, due to the processing times required for the 
error protocol messages. 
To adequately observe the effects of timer changes in the FCNS throughput 
response, the following categorisation has taken place, given a frame block 
consisting of 32 individual frames and a Go Back N implicit flow control mechanism. 
Congestion has been assumed to be the reason for the FCNSEP realisation running 
on an interlayer signalling scheme. The effects of the Peer error signalling case are 
discussed in Section 8.3.2. 
1, PHYS layer accepts 32 packets in its buffers before proceeding in creating the 
FCNS frames. Application instance issues the NODE ALERT. Assuming a 
processing delay of 2 msec for every interlayer message, the FCNSEP 
implementation would result in a6 msec delay for the FCNS instance to be notified 
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for the recommended action (2 msec is also the time that SL would take to reach a 
decision). If 2 msec is the time that it would take the particular FCNS 
communication layer to process the request, then the overall time it will take for 
the user data messages to be sent under the new timer scheme will be 8 msec. 
Given that a single FCNS frame can be transmitted in 1.24 msec, then the 
alteration will result in a loss of 6 messages. Due to the particularity of the FCNS 
frame creation, a whole block will have to be retransmitted towards the PHYS layer 
leading to a message loss of 32 frames (39.68 msec) and 32 additional ones from 
the previous frame block that will be lost in transit due to congestion or rejection by 
the receiver (if transmission is continuous). Therefore, the theoretical overall delay 
will become 79.36 msec. 
2. PHYS layer accepts a single packet, creates the frame and proceeds to the next 
message. Acknowledgment is requested for every frame block. Application 
instance issues the NODE ALERT. For a2 msec processing delay, 8 msec will be 
required for the instance to adjust its message timers. Due to the fact that the 
source is not required to transmit 32 messages before the frame block is created, 
the message loss incurred will only be the 6 messages that could be transmitted in 
the 8 msec time. This is because the PHS layer will reject the messages under the 
previous sending rate and complete the block with the refreshed ones. The 
receiver will not understand the alteration, since its timer is greater than the delay 
of 8 msec and it acknowledges the completed frame block due to the Go Back N 
scheme. 
To provide for a clearer view in the effect the FCNSEP implementation would have 
on the loss and deliverability ratios, an example is further given for the case of RTT 
of 60 msec (Section 8.2.2.2.4). 
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8.2.2.2.2 RTT of 2.5 msec - EE_LAYER Packet Throughput 
Figure 8.8 depicts the effects of the timers' introduction in the FCNS model for the 
EE_LAYER packet sending and receiving rates. 
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Figure &8: EEý_LA YER packet throughput - RTT 2.5 msec and variable BER Qr - 
The reference observation caption represents the FCNS reference packet 
throughput of Figure 8.5, entailing the ideal values the model could achieve. It is 
clear from the response of the FCNS that even with the same RTT and BER values, 
there is a significant decrease as to the amount of packets sent towards the output 
FCNS instance. This is due to the fact that the measurement is extracted with 
respect to the simulation time observed throughout the various runs equalling the 
BER points. 
With the introduction of a receiving timer of 50 msec, it becomes apparent that a 
message loss would expire the timer, resulting in an additional delay of 50 msec 
plus the time that it would take for the NAK message to reach back to the sender 
(RTT/2). If the processing time for the NAK is 5 msec for each FCNS instance, then 
with a 1.25 propagation delay, the latency that would incur will be 61.25 msec 
before it reaches the sending peer node entity. This implies that if transmission 
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occurs for the highest T1F, then the loss is translated to 49 frames, that is, almost 
one and a half frame blocks. 
In Figure 8.8 such variations can be observed for the various BER values. As an 
example, for a BER probability of 10-7, the loss imposed on the model is of the 
order of 14 frames, whilst for a representative error-free interval of 2 msec, the 
packet throughput is further minimised by 39 frames. Given the fact that 
messages received on unrecoverable errors are discarded, the response of the 
FCNS system depicted in Figure 8.8 conforms to the protocol specification. 
8.2.2.2.3 RTT of 2.5 msec - Frame Throughput 
Figure 8.9 depicts the overall frame throughput of the FCNS architecture, which 
closely matches the one obtained from the reference measurements. Since this 
observation is solely based on the amount of frames sent and received by the 
destination, irrespective of the amount of time it took for the messages to reach 
their recipient, the response of the FCNS follows the design expectations 
represented by the reference model. 
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Figure &9: Frame throughput - RTT 2.5 msec and variable BER 
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Following the loss ratio response of Figure 8.7 it can be concluded that the slight 
variations between the reference and measured FCNS performances are due to the 
memory consumption deviations of the OMNET++ tool. The application of the 
protocol timers altered the overall amount of frames in transit, but not the 
response of the system in detecting and correcting bit errors for the similar delay 
value of 2.5 msec, resulting in an almost identical deliverability response. 
8.2.2.2.4 RTT of 60 msec - Loss Ratio 
For these sets of measurements the overall RTT has been increased to 60 msec, 
keeping as constants the 2 msec message protocol processing delay and the 5 
msec FCNS instance processing time for any message sent or received. The 
introduction of additional latency in the FCNS model has been used to model the 
response of the protocol in an environment based on a slower communication 
channel and node instance, increasing the time it would take for the system to 
apply the FCNS security functions to the user data. 
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Figure & 10: Loss ratio -R TT of 60 msec and variable BER 
The effects of the additional delay are clear in the loss ratio FCNS response of 
Figure 8.10. The protocol was unable to maintain a level of frames acceptability 
tion Systems 
close to the reference observations as the BER was increased. The overall 
performance of the FCNS stack is acceptable, given the message losses that could 
occur due to the additional latency and the frames that could ideally be transmitted 
at that time. 
An example erroneous case has been considered for this environment, to enable 
the identification of the system's response in the application of the FCNSEP. For 
the interlayer signalling procedure, an initial 25 msec timer had to be changed to 
adapt to the network environment used for these measurements for the 
propagation delay of 30 msec. The PHYS layer constructs the FCNS frames as they 
arrive by the upper layer and does not store them first into a buffer before creating 
the message block. Figure 8.11 illustrates the effects of the FCNSEP 
implementation throughout all simulation runs. 
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Figure 8.11: Loss Ratio - RTT 60 msec, comparison with FCNSEP realisation 
In Figure 8.11 the caption FCNSEP application represents the loss incurred in the 
FCNS system by the introduction of the FCNSEP interlayer signalling messages, 
whilst RTT 60 msec identifies the simulated loss ratio of Figure 8.10. 
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On a theoretical level, without taking into account the address verification and SC 
procedures, then the minimum effect of the FCNSEP realisation will be as follows. 
For the receiving instance to adjust its timer, the NODE-ALERT message is sent 
after three frames have been discarded, or the receiving timer has expired three 
times. The time it will take for the SL to issue the appropriate action and the 
receiver to adjust the new value is 8 msec and hence an overall 13 msec for the 
PHYS protocol to be notified of the alteration. For the optimum T1F this should 
imply a loss of 10 frames, due to rejection by the receiving protocol instance. 
Overall, the discarded messages should have been 13 from just the alteration 
process, plus 7 additional frames due to the timer expiration at the PHYS layer 
before its adjustment (32messagesxl. 24msec=39.68msec, 9.68nisec->7. frames). 
However, due to the discrete-event nature of the simulator, the loss induced on the 
system has only been 5 frames (3 that were lost before the FCNSEP application, 1 
after the ERROR_RESP reception and 1 after the adjustment of the timer). This is 
due to the fact that throughout the FCNSEP signalling procedures, the sender has 
sent no messages as would have been expected in a real-network situation. 
8.2.2.2.5 RTT of 60 msec - EE_LAYER Packet Throughput 
The effects of the RTT increase with respect to the reference model can be 
observed in the response of Figure 8.12, which shows the throughput observations 
for RTT of 60 msec and 2.5 msec compared to the ideal case. The throughput is 
much reduced by the increased RTT, which results in message losses with respect 
to the highest MFS. 
The introduction of the additional 28.75 msec propagation time, entails a message 
loss of 23 messages in relation to the optimum TIF. The losses induced 
in the 
simulated model appear greater and of the order of 
27 packets for a representative 
BER of 5x 10-7 and 35 packets for an error-free interval of 100 msec with respect 
to 
the RTT of 2.5 msec measurement (timers enabled). 
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Figure & 12: EE LAYER packet throughput response comparisons 
The additional loss is due to the FCNSEP application, which as mentioned results in 
a cost of 5 messages. Given this fact, it can be concluded that Figure 8.12 is 
acceptable to represent the packet throughput response of the FCNS for the RTT of 
60 msec. 
8.2.2.2.6 RTT of 60 msec - Frame Throughput 
Figure 8.13 depicts the observed frame deliverability ratio in comparison to the 
reference value. 
Due to the added network latency, it is normal for the system to reach 
lower 
throughput values than the theoretical measured ones. 
Overall the system 
behaved as expected, even in cases where FCNSEP had to 
be realised to adjust 
timer settings at the receiving FCNS instance. 
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Figure 8.13: Frame throughput - RTT 60 msec and variable BER 
8.2.2.3 Variable Delay, Variable BER 
For this set of measurements, both the delay and BER have been varied, to enable 
the identification of the throughput response of the FCNS system. Table 8.4 depicts 
the jitter imposed on the system with respect to the simulation time. 
Table 8.4: Delay variations (jitter) with respect to OMNET++ timing 
The excessive RTT of 260 and 400 milliseconds have been used to model a network 
with very slow communication channels, simulating the effects that congestion 
might have on the frames in transit. 
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Figure & 14: Loss ratio - Variable RTT and BER, FCNS realisation comparison 
FCNS secuilty caption of Figure 8.14 represents the FCNS system in an 
environment with full security functionality enabled, whilst FCNS no security 
corresponds to the FCNS system when no security services are required. The latter 
implies the lack of encryption/decryption techniques and SC exchanges, though the 
address verification procedures of the UDSES layer have been preserved since they 
are independent of the security mechanisms of the SL. Comparison is also given in 
relation to the reference measurement for the RTT of 2.5 msec. The effects of the 
excessive delays are clearly observed in Figure 8.14, which illustrates the 
performance FCNS exhibited in heavy faulty transmission conditions. 
Additionally, it can be seen that the loss ratio of both settings is very similar, as 
was expected because of the design considerations of the FCNS stack. The security 
procedures affect the overall delay of the system in producing and transmitting the 
FCNS frames and not the way the messages are communicated between the peers. 
Therefore the throughput of the system is not influenced in the sense of the loss 
and deliverability ratio, given in Figure 
8.15. 
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The support offered by the protocol stack is the same, irrespective of the security 
functionality requested for a particular connection. The differences between the 
two environments are identified in terms of the data bits in transit and more 
specifically the relative FCNS efficiency. 
8.2.2.4 Relative FCNS Efficiency Measurements 
Protocol efficiency measurements have been used to enable the recognition of the 
differences between a secured FCNS solution and the realisation of the protocol 
stack with no security mechanisms. 
8.2.2.4.1 FCNS Efficiency - Variable Data Size., Constant BER and RTT 
Figure 8.16 represents the efficiency of the FCNS architecture for both cases of its 
implementation. It can be seen that the response of the protocol with full security 
measures is very close to the one with no security functionality, for a 
representative error-free interval of 125 msec and an 
RTT of 20 msec. 
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Figure 8.16: Relative FCNS efficiency, FCNS realisation comparison for variable data 
size 
This implies that the system can indeed provide the required security services 
without loss of data transfer functionality or a significant decrease in its 
performance. To further enable the measurement of the FCNS efficiency, the 
simulation environment settings have been altered to provide packet data services 
for a constant frame size with varying BER. 
8.2.2.4.2 FCNS Efficiency - Constant Data Size and RTIr, Variable BER 
The data size has been kept constant and equal to 1546 bytes or 12368 bits for the 
case of FCNS implementation with full security measures, and 1531 bytes or 12248 
bits for the FCNS system with no security functionality. 
Even for a constant data size and variable bit error probability, the performance of 
the FCNS for both cases has been almost identical. This notion strengthens the 
application of full security measures for the FCNS stack, since their employment 
has a minimal effect on the operation of the protocol. 
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Figure 8.17. - Relative FCNS Efficiency, FCNS realisation comparison for variable BER 
It can therefore be concluded that the application of the security mechanisms in the 
FCNS architecture should be prioritised, given the flexibility of the FCNS in 
adequately adapting to the effects security functions may impose. 
8.2.2.5 Constant BER, Variable Delay 
These particular sets of measurements explored the behaviour of FCNS when the 
BER was kept constant, with varying RTT delay. Depending on the value of the 
error free interval, the following observations have been made to identify the FCNS 
performance when running on links building up congestion. These results differ 
from those in section 8.2.2.3 as delay variations did not occur during the simulation 
ru n. Additionally, a constant BER has been assumed throughout the delay 
variations. 
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8.2.2-5.1 BER greater than 10-6 - Loss Ratio 
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Figure &18: Loss Ratio - Variable delay, BER greater than . 
10-6 
Figure 8.18 represents the amount of frames lost during the observations, for 
communication links becoming congested and with an increased BER imposed on 
the FCNS frames. For error free intervals greater than 200 msec, the loss ratio of 
the FCNS maintains a value of less than 5%, that is a loss of 1-3 frames, even with 
an RTT of the order of 250 msec. As the BER arises, more frames are discarded at 
the receiver, which also delays the reception process by attempting to correct the 
bit errors. While the error correction process takes place, further time is lost that 
could be used to transmit more frames. Additionally, for the PHYS flow control 
algorithm, message loss implies the retransmission of the messages on error, 
imposing increased latency on the system that will have to appropriately place the 
retransmitted frames into the frame block for its recreation at the receiver. This 
process adds up to the lost frames with respect to the reference measurements for 
the RTT of 2.5 msec, eventually leading to losses of up to 80% for error free 
intervals less than 3 msec. 
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8.2.2.5.2 BER greater than 10-6 - EE_LAYER Packet Throughput 
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Figure & 19: EE LAYER packet throughput - Variable delay, BER greater than 10-6 
Figure 8.19 depicts the packet throughput response observed for the duration of 
the simulation runs. The amount of packets in transit follows the design 
expectations of the FCNS architecture measured per simulation time second. As 
the RTT increases, the packet transmission rates fall due to the loss incurred by the 
added network latency in relation to the highest MFS. 
The dependence of the FCNS response to the BER variations is also clearly visible, 
since small error-free intervals result in more erroneous frames arriving at the 
receiver. Overall, message losses fall into the order of 29,793 to 94,250 bits, that 
is, approximately 3 to 8 frames for delay variations of 30 msec and 100 msec 
respectively. Given that the propagation time is 15 msec (RTT/2), then for the 
optimum MFS that would imply a loss of maximum 12 frames. For the 100 msec 
variation the overall loss that could occur is 40 frames for the highest T1F- 
Therefore, the response of the FCNS outperforms the theoretical expectations, 
strengthening the flexibility notion of the FCNS in adapting to RTT variations and 
congestion built up. 
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8.2.2.5.3 BER less than ILO-4 - Frame Throughput 
Figure 8.20 illustrates the overall frame throughput of the FCNS stack environment 
for varying RTT values. For bit error probabilities below 10-7 , the FCNS achieves 
virtually 100% deliverability, implying an unaffected from bit errors system. This 
conforms to the design expectations set in Chapter 7, for which the protocol should 
provide for an errorless data transmission for small BER values. As the error 
probability increases, the system has to adapt in network situations, whereby FCNS 
messages may be discarded due to the modifications occurred in their bit patterns. 
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Figure 8.20: Frame throughput - Variable delay, BER less than 10-4 
The throughput response provides an adequate measure of the applicability of the 
FCNS for time and delay sensitive data. It can be concluded that the FCNS can 
efficiently be used for packet data transmission under erroneous communication 
conditions. Migration of the FCNS stack into the OPNET environment may provide 
for a more thorough testing of the protocol procedures, provided that module 
memory utilisation is far less than that of the OMNET++ tool. 
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The FCNS protocol stack has been tested against the specification and design 
considerations presented in Chapters 4 to 7. The protocol simulation environment 
has been realised to identify the way protocol procedures would adapt to various 
real network conditions and to test the performance of the protocol in relation to 
the specified parameters and expectations set in the design process. 
The measurements presented in the preceding sections strengthen the applicability 
of the proposal developed in this work, to serve as the means of an advanced 
reference architecture for use within packet-switched environments. The 
implementation of the protocol architecture into a software entity enabled the 
provision of a test bed for reference secure architectures, which to our knowledge 
did not previously exist. Therefore, the work has proven the superiority of the 
FCNS design to standardised models, such as the OSI security architecture 
presented in Chapter 3. 
The following section provides comparisons of the FCNS protocol efficiency and 
throughput in relation to the Internet suite. The general packet-switched 
simulation environment enabled the identification of the impact of the security 
measures application to the FCNS model and its overall performance against 
currently used protocol structures. 
8.3 Packet - Switched Architecture 
The packet-switched model network architecture was created to enable the 
identification of the FCNS response in handling procedures such as message routing 
and message security in cases where the communicating peers were not directly 
adjacent. The response of the protocol was tested against delays varying from 100 
to 260 msec, in an attempt to simulate the latency such a network may present. 
Comparisons are given with the TCP/IP Internet suite to provide the means of 
verifying the efficiency of the FCNS against currently used architectures. 
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8.3.1 Simulation Environment Description 
To realise the execution of the FCNS in a packet-switched network, the simulation 
model of Figure 8.21 was created via the OMNET++ tool. To preserve consistency 
with the FCNS stack simulation model of Figure 8.1, the virtual links between the 
FCNS communication layers and the SL remained intact, imposing the same 
amount of processing delay on the communication procedure. 
Figure &21: Packet-switched network OMNET++ simulation topology 
Subnet 1 and Subnet 2 functional blocks represent intermediate routers running the 
FCNS subnetwork instances. These include the SL, EE_LAYER and PHYS FCNS 
layers, to enable the routing and security of the frames exchanged on a realistic 
network basis. In contrast, Subnet 3 has been programmed to act as a simple 
switch, whereby the FCNS frames were simply recognised and forwarded to their 
destination, without performing any check as to the message protection 
mechanisms and routing procedures. This subnet has been employed to enable the 
creation of a secondary communications link, providing alternative routes in case 
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subnet3 
congestion was ever to arise. For the simulation runs, the primary route has been 
chosen to be the one following the input FCNS instance through to the subnetl, 
subnet 2 and the output instance of the stack. 
The identification of the particular module blocks was made to enable the abstract 
representation of the UMTS CN packet-switched domain and address the 
performance issues of the FCNS in handling services such as the Packet Data 
Protocol (PDP) exchange procedures and the transmission of signalling data 
between the CN elements. Chapter 9 identifies the elements of the UMTS CN PS 
domain and the applicability of the FCNS in delivering the required services. 
The parameters used to depict the performance of the FCNS are the ones identified 
in Section 8.2.2, including the loss and deliverability ratios and packet and frame 
FCNS throughput measurements. 
8.3.2 Results and Measurements 
The reference set of simulation measurements was realised for a propagation delay 
of 50 msec, distributed as 10 msec between the input FCNS and subnet 1 blocks, 
20 msec between subnet 1 and subnet 2, and 10 msec between subnet 2 and 
output FCNS instance resulting in an RTT of 100 msec. 
8.3.2.1 Constant Delay, Variable BER,, Reference PS measurements 
The effects of the varying BER observed for the PS network topology are depicted 
in 
the proceeding sections. 
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8.3.2.1.1 RTT 100 msec - Loss Ratio (reference measurement) 
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Figure 8.22: Reference loss ratio - RTT of 100 msec and variable BER 
In Figure 8.22, comparison is provided with the reference measurement for the RTT 
of 2.5 msec of the FCNS stack environment. The increased loss ratio is due to the 
added latency in the network and the presence of the intermediate nodes, which 
have delayed some of the FCNS frames in their routing towards the clestination. 
This has also been due to the discrete-event nature of the OMNET++ tool, where 
the destination timers have been expired due to messages not being continuously 
forwarded to their peer. If the network is further flooded by messages resulting 
from a sending rate close to the optimum T1F, then the problem becomes more 
severe, since the simulator is unable to handle the amount of data in transit and at 
the same time acknowledge the frame blocks on time. However, the response of 
the system matches the design expectations set for such a topology. Its use has 
therefore been acceptable as a reference for the PS network environment. 
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8.3.2.1.2 RTT 100 msec - EE_LAYER Packet Throughput (reference 
measurement) 
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Figure 8.23: Reference EE LAYER packet throughput - RTT of 100 msec and 
variable BER 
The EE_LAYER packet throughput of Figure 8.23 represents the response of the 
system in delivering the FCNS frame payload for the given simulation time. The 
illustrated measurement corresponds to the performance expected by the FCNS, 
given the RTT of 100 msec. The throughput response relates to a model for which 
transfer syntax and QoS parameters negotiation completed in two attempts to 
provide the means of simulating a real network situation. The variations observed 
in the packet throughput response are of the order of approximately 3 messages, 
resulted for the additional ones required for the connection establishment 
parameters negotiation. 
8.3.2.1.3 RTT 100 msec - Frame Throughput (reference measurement) 
To enable the comparison of the actual deliverability of the FCNS system with 
respect to the RTT 2.5 msec, Figure 8.24 is used to illustrate the frame throughput 
for the RTT of 100 msec. 
rd 
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Figure 8.24: Reference frame throughput - RTT of 100 msec and variable BER 
Following the observation of the loss ratio of Figure 8.22, it can be seen that the 
presence of additional network latency has decreased the throughput of the FCNS 
frames for the PS simulation environment. The response illustrated follows the 
design expectations, given the increased delay present in the model in relation to 
the reference measurement for the RTT of 2.5 msec. 
For the PS environment, the reference measurements were based on the 
assumption that the transmission delay was a combination of the message 
processing delay presented by the FCNS layers and the propagation delay imposed 
by the communications link. To model a more realistic network topology, the 
observations given in the following section encompass two additional latency 
parameters, being the queuing and the insertion delay presented by the 
intermediate network nodes. The introduction of increased RTT values was also 
made to enable the simulation of the effects of the SL functionality to the 
communication process. Functions such as authentication, encryption and 
decryption introduce additional processing delay for the FCNS protocol instances. 
Consequently, the parameters used in the proceeding section represent the overall 
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delay it would be imposed on a message transmitted towards the output FCNS 
instance. 
8.3.2.2 Constant Delay, Variable BER,, PS measurements 
The results presented in the following sections concern measurements taken for 
RTT of 200msec and 260 msec. In the former case, 30 msec propagation delay has 
been imposed to the input FCNS instance - subnetl and subnet 2- output FCNS 
instance links, whilst 40 msec have been allocated to the subnetl - subnet 2 
connection. In the latter case, 40 msec transmission delay has been imposed to 
the input FCNS instance - subnetl and subnet 2- output FCNS instance links, with 
the remaining 50 msec induced in the subnetl - subnet 2 one. All links to and 
from subnet 3 have been assigned a propagation delay of 20 msec for the RTT 200 
msec case and 50 msec for the RTT 260 msec case. 
8.3.2.2.1 RTT 200 msec - Loss Ratio 
Figure 8.25 depicts the behaviour of the FCNS system in delivering the user data in 
terms of the loss ratio, compared to the reference measurement of the RTT 100 
msec. The performance of the system follows the design expectations, bearing 
small deviations compared to the reference response. The presence of added 
network latency has increased the amount of lost frames transmitted for bit error 
probabilities of 10--5 and above, due to the error correction mechanisms applied on 
the received frames and message discarding for BER greater than 10-4 
In such cases, excessive delays and BER may render the data transmission process 
defective due to the effects communication conditions might have on the 
information in transit. Furthermore, BER greater than 10-5 imply not only the 
heavy distortion On the FCNS frames, but the probability that more frames may 
arrive on error compared to error-free intervals of greater than 10 msec. 
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Figure 8.25: Loss Ratio - RTT of 200 msec and variable BER 
8.3.2.2.2 RTT 200 msec - EE_LAYER Packet Throughput 
Figure 8.26 represents the packet throughput response of the FCNS compared to 
the RTT 100 msec observation. As is expected, the packet throughput response for 
the RTT 200 msec is less than the reference measurement due to the doubled 
propagation delay in transmitting the user data. 
For a representative BER of 10-61 the amount of bits in transit was 1,011,537 
resulting in a CU of 10.11% for the clatarate of 10 Mbps. Given the topology 
created for the PS environment, it can be concluded that the transmission rates 
imposed on the system resulted in a congestion-free communication process. 
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Figure &26: EE LAYER packet throughput - RTT of 200 msec and variable BER 
8.3.2.2.3 RTT 200 msec - Frame Throughput 
The graph of Figure 8.27 represents the performance of FCNS in detecting and 
correcting frames arrived on error, for the particular timer instances set for these 
measurements. The deliverability ratio of the FCNS protocol system for the RTT of 
200 msec conforms to the theoretical expectations, given its independence from the 
simulation time run periods. The behaviour of the FCNS stack follows the principles 
identified in the preceding sections, provided that the theoretical frame loss for the 
highest MFS could have been in the range of 40 frames and above (compared to 
the RTT 100 msec reference measurement). The applicability of such results is 
described in Chapter 9, where the settings presented in this section have been used 
to address service requirements for the UMTS CN packet-switched domain. 
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Figure 8.27. - Frame throughput - RTT of 200 msec and variable BER 
8.3.2.2.4 RTT 260 msec - Loss Ratio 
To enable the identification of the FCNS response for higher propagation delays, the 
work has constructed a set of measurements bearing an RTT of 260 msec. The 
individual processing times induced to the simulation environment links have been 
programmed to simulate a long-distance network topology, whereby latency is 
increased with respect to the distance between the adjacent nodes. 
The destination instance message timers have been set to 260 msec (by the 
FCNSEP peer-error signalling procedures), to observe the response of the protocol 
in adapting to network environments bearing high transmission delays and BER. 
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Figure 8.28: Loss ratio - RTT of 260 msec and variable BER 
Figure 8.28 depicts the effects of the increased network latency in relation to the 
destination timers matching the RTT time. Even for very small bit error 
probabilities the protocol system exhibited losses of 40% with respect to the 
reference observation of RTT 100 msec. Given that the difference between the 
propagation times is 110 msec, the losses induced in the packet-switched system 
match the theoretical expectations and even present greater performance than the 
ones calculated for the optimum T1F (89 messages). 
The percentage loss observed in these measurements can also be explained due to 
the application of various FCNS functions for the establishment of the data transfer 
process. As the BER increases, the probability that any message is received on 
error in maximised, irrespective of the phase communication may reside. 
Additionally, if the primary route fails, then the transmission of the FCNS messages 
via an alternative path will result in further losses, due to the path and route 
verification procedures that must take place between the EE_LAYER and 
the SL at 
all network nodes. Furthermore, SC exchanges may need more than 
two attempts 
to complete, since BER may affect the contents of the respective primitives at any 
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node of the simulation environment. Moreover, due to the discrete-event nature of 
OMNET++,, acknowledging service primitives exchange may also delay the 
transmission of the FCNS frames, due to the amount of simulation time lost. Given 
that the destination timers should expire virtually after the frame block 
acknowledgement reaches the input FCNS instance, the response presented in 
Figure 8.28 represents how efficient FCNS is in providing data transmission services 
in heavily congested network environments. 
It should be noted, that for this particular environment, FCNSEP peer error 
signalling has been enabled, to increase the destination timers due to the added 
network latency that may lead to messages losses. Its application has decreased 
the number of frames sent, due to the discrete-event nature of the simulator. 
8.3.2.2.5 RTT 260 msec - EE_LAYER Packet Throughput 
EE_LAYER Packet Throughput 
1080 
0ý% 
V 1060 
c 
0 
1040 
1020 
id 
%-, 1000 
CL 
= 980 
Im 
960 
F- 
4w 940 (D 
M 920 
IL 
900 
Simulated observation 
Reference observation 
gp Ob Ob jobýbSj '09 01 . 01 
01 101 
. 90S 
xis 
Bit Error Rate (BER) 
Figure &29: EE LAYER packet throughput - RTT of 260 msec and variable BER 
The packet throughput response of the RTT 260 msec topology conforms to the 
theoretical expectations, exhibiting a reduced performance due to the additional 
propagation delay imposed in relation to the reference measurement. The 
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throughput difference in the observations falls into the area of 64,133 bits or 5 
packets for small error probabilities, rising to some 103,807 bits or 8 packets for 
larger BER. Due to the applicability notions of the OMNET++ and the adaptability 
of the FCNS in various network conditions, the response observed in Figure 8.29 
can be accepted as the representation of the FCNS performance in delivering the 
user data packets for RTT of 260 msec. 
8.3.2.2.6 RTT 260 msec - Frame Throughput 
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Figure &30: Frame throughput - RTT of 260 msec and variable BER 
The deliverability ratio of Figure 8.30 is an illustration of the effects of the increased 
RTT delay in the PS network environment. Although the FCNS has proven to be 
adaptable in erroneous and delay-sensitive network conditions, high latency may 
lead to message losses, depending on the destination message timers. For this 
particular setting, timer expiration periods have been programmed to match the 
RTT to observe the response of the FCNS in such situation. Although these values 
are quite large compared to the specification settings of the FCNS (25-100 msec 
timers), the work has addressed the need of simulating cases where the FCNSEP 
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peer error signalling has been imperative. This has implied the loss of user data 
frames due to the FCNSEP message- processing overhead imposed in the network. 
Even if the frame ACKs are piggybacked onto the ERROR_REP and ERROR_RESP 
messages, the receiving FCNS instance will have to process the FCNSEP message, 
consult the SL and/or the system management for the appropriate solution and 
transmit the response back the sender. Therefore, the overall loss induced to the 
system, even for an errorless transmission is not negligible, as is indicated in Figure 
8.30. The work has therefore accepted the observation as valid for the RTT of 260 
msec simulation setting. 
The provision of both simulation environments has enabled the verification of the 
FCNS specification and the monitoring of the FCNS procedures and functions. The 
results presented are representative of the initial development of the FCNS and the 
refinement of the protocol services to provide a reference architecture for PS 
networks. To address the need of comparing the proposal presented in this thesis 
with currently used network protocols, the following section is provided, illustrating 
the performance of the FCNS in relation to the TCP/IP suite. 
8.3.2.3 FCNS and the Internet Protocol Suite 
In this section, comparisons between the FCNS architecture and the Internet suite 
are given, in relation to the protocol efficiency and throughput performances. For 
these measurements, two settings have been taken into consideration for the 
TCP/IP suite. In the first case, IPv4 has been assumed, without the use of 
additional security mechanisms to ensure the protection of the transmitted 
messages. In contrast, for the second case, IPv6 with ESP tunnel mode protection 
has been considered, to enable the evaluation of the FCNS against a secured 
network protocol architecture. Tables 8.1 to 8.3 depict the message header sizes 
for the respective protocol environments. 
ation Systems 
8.3.2.3.1 Relative Protocol Efficiency Comparisons - Variable Delay 
Figures 8.31 and 8.32 represent the relative stack efficiency of the two protocol 
architectures for a constant data size of 1460 bytes and variable BER. The graphs 
include comparisons with the IPv4 and IM protocols respectively in relation to the 
FCNS when either full security measures are applied and with lack of security 
functionality. 
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Figure 8.31: FCNS vs. TCPIZPv4 - Constant data size 1460 bytes and variable BER 
The efficiency of the FCNS in delivering user data information is superior to that of 
the TCP/IP suite by a factor of 3.7% for the FCNS when full security measures are 
applied and of 4.61% when no security services are provided. Given that the 1460 
data bytes constitute the optimum amount of data that can be transferred before 
fragmentation is required [14], it can be concluded that the FCNS can provide for a 
more efficient data transmission service according to the standards currently 
governing network operation. Even when full security measures are applied, the 
FCNS appears to exhibit greater performance than the TCP/IP suite, which for the 
particular measurements has been assumed to lack any security functionality. This 
fact strengthens the arguments presented in this thesis concerning the usage of 
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this proposal and the migration from currently used packet-switched protocol 
architectures to the FCNS. 
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Figure &32: FCNS vs. TCPIIPv6 - Constant data size 1460 bytes and variable BER 
Implementing into these calculations the newly adopted IPv6 standard, the work 
has assumed a level of security for the Internet packets, based on the application of 
the ESP in tunnel mode. The particular setting has been chosen, since ESP should 
provide for both packet authentication and integrity, in contrast to the AH that 
supports only the message authentication process. Therefore, the particular setting 
can be regarded as a possible real network backbone, enabling the comparison of 
the FCNS with a future network implementation. 
As can be observed from Figure 8.32, FCNS achieves greater performance than the 
Internet suite, in the range of 7.32% for full security services and 8.23% with the 
FCNS lacking security functionality. Further advantages of FCNS include the 
support of security services choice by network operators at any 
layer of the 
protocol architecture, in contrast to the TCP/IPv6 suite, which supports only packet- 
level based protection mechanisms. The FCNS therefore outperforms the protocol 
rd 
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structure chosen to support the new generation of packet-switched networks, such 
as the UMTS CN. 
8.3.2.3.2 Relative Protocol Efficiency Comparisons - Variable Data Size 
Figures 8.33 and 8.34 illustrate the FCNS relative protocol efficiency with respect to 
the Internet suite for variable data sizes. Figure 8.33 depicts the results obtained 
for a representative error-free interval of 125 msec, whilst Figure 8.34 for a BER of 
10-5. 
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Figure 8.33: FCNS vs. TCP1IP - Constant BER (SxlO-6) and variable data size 
The measurements presented in Figure 8.33 illustrate attempts made to identify the 
performance of the FCNS in relation to the Internet suite for various data sizes. As 
can be seen from the depicted response, FCNS has a 12% superior performance to 
the TCP/IPv4 suite and an increased efficiency over a secured Internet topology in 
the area of 21%. In case no security measures are applied, then the FCNS 
outperforms the Internet suite by 16.2% for the IPv4 case and by 25% when IPv6 
is used. The increased FCNS efficiency in relation to TCP/IP can be observed for 
small data sizes, typical of the signalling data that may be transferred in a 
telecommunications network. 
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To further enable the comparison between the two protocol suites, the following 
results depict the FCNS superior efficiency for an error free interval of 100 msec. 
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Figure &34: FCNS vs. TCP1IP - Constant BER (10-, 5) and variable data size 
For small data sizes, FCNS with full security measures presents greater 
performance of 12% in relation to the TCP/IPv4 suite and 15.5% from the 
TCP/IPv6. Lacking security functionality, the FCNS is superior by 16.2% and 20% 
respectively. 
For both error-free interval cases, as the data size increases, FCNS still exhibits 
greater performance than the Internet suite, supporting the arguments that it can 
be better suited for packet data transmission in PS environments. The application 
of the security measures does not affect the efficiency of the protocol stack to a 
great extend. Consequently, network operators can choose to realise the full 
protection mechanisms for the FCNS architecture without loosing functionality due 
to the increased message sizes and functionality supporting the security functions 
of the stack. 
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The following subsections depict the throughput performance of both suites, in an 
attempt to provide the reader the means of identifying the performance of the 
FCNS to deliver the requested data, in relation to the TCP/IP protocol suite. 
8.3.2.3.3 Throughput Comparisons - Acknowledging all messages 
For these sets of measurements, the work has assumed that for the FCNS 
architecture all messages should be acknowledged prior to the transmission of the 
next frame. For the TCP/IP suite, ACK has been requested for every 2 messages, 
to enable the support for the lowest possible receiver window size of TCP/IP [14]. 
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Figure 8.35. - FCNS vs. TCPIIPv4 - Variable data size throughput responses 
The observations depicted in Figure 8.35 represent an errorless transmission, to 
enable the provision of the highest theoretical throughput that both suites can 
achieve. The datarate taken into consideration has been chosen to be 10 Mbps, to 
support consistency with the rest of the measurements given in this chapter. 
FCNS has a superior performance over the TCP/IPv4 architecture in the order of 
111,607 bytes and 52,676 bytes depending on whether no security functionality 
has been enabled or when full security measures are applied. In terms of the 
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additional amount of the user data that can be transferred, then for a 
representative data size of 1460 bytes, FCNS can support the transmission of 20 
more packets when no security measures are applied and 1-9 more packets with full 
security functionality. In the context of a data transfer process where every 
message should be acknowledged, the advantages and superior efficiency of the 
FCNS stack become apparent. 
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Figure 8.36: FCNS vs. TCPIIPv6 - Variable data size throughput responses 
FCNS exhibits greater throughput efficiency in relation to the TCP/IPv6 suite as is 
presented in Figure 8.36. Due to the increased header sizes compared to the 
TCP/IPv4, the Internet suite displays an inferior to the FCNS performance in 
delivering user and/or signalling data between the network elements. Given that 
FCNS can transfer more messages for the same data size, it can be concluded that 
the communication channels will be better utilised, resulting in a more efficient data 
transmission. 
8.3.2.3.4 Throughput Comparisons - Acknowledging message blocks 
The superiority of the FCNS can also be illustrated for the maximum receiver 
window sizes set for the two architectures. For the FCNS stack, an 
Chapter 8- 268 Protocol Security for 3d Generation Telecommunication Systems 
acknowledgement is requested every 32 messages, whilst for the TCP/IP an ACK is 
required every 22 frames. The latter is due to the 65535 - window size of the TCP 
receiver (64kbytes of application data for the 16-bit window size of the TCP 
header), which for 1460 bytes of user data results in 44 messages being 
transmitted. Since messages have to be acknowledged, receiver sends an ACK 
every 22 messages to support the continuation of the data transmission process 
and the avoidance of retransmitting a whole block in case of bit errors. It should be 
noted that window sizes greater than 64 kilobytes can be supported [186], yet, this 
still remains on a theoretical level. 
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acknowledging frame blocks 
The performance of the FCNS appears to be greater than that of TCP/IPv4, in the 
range of 32,925 to 48,572 bytes for small data sizes, that is, 21 to 32 messages. 
This implies that an additional message block can be transmitted with the FCNS 
resulting in a more efficient and quicker data transfer process. 
FCNS also outperforms the TCP/IPv6 suite for the case of an errorless transmission 
with varying types of user and signalling data. The amount of additional frames 
that could be sent using the FCNS at similar transmission times varies from 15 to 
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55 when full security measures are applied and from 23 to 87 for the FCNS with no 
security functionality. 
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Figure 8.38. - FCNS vs. TCPIIPv6 - Variable data size throughput responses 
acknowledging frame blocks 
Finally, Figure 8.39 depicts the throughput efficiency of FCNS in relation to the 
TCP/IPv6 suite for variable BER and clatarate of 1.5 MbPs. The throughput of the 
FCNS and TCP/IP stacks has been considered, for a 125 msec constant error-free 
interval and data size of 1460 bytes. Even with the application of the maximum 
possible security measures for the FCNS communication layers, FCNS achieves 
much greater throughput than the TCP/IPv6 suite, particularly in adverse BER 
channels. In all cases, FCNS is 10% superior to TCP/IP, rising to some 30% at high 
BERs. 
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Figure 8.39: FCNS vs. TCPIIPv6 - throughput efficiency comparison 
From the measurements presented in the preceding section, there can be the 
conclusion that FCNS is more suited to serve as the means of transporting user and 
signalling information in telecommunication systems. Chapter 9 details the 
applicability issues of the FCNS for the UMTS CN. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Work 
9.1 Overview 
9.2 FCNS Applicability 
9.3 Further Work 
In Chapter 9 the conclusions drawn from the research work are presented. The 
major arguments and points made for the FCNS stack are given followed by an 
insight on the applicability of the proposed protocol for telecommunication systems. 
Finally, further work is proposed to enhance the FCNS capabilities and usage in 
future telecommunication networks. 
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9.1 Overview 
The focus of this thesis has been the design and development of a secure protocol 
architectural framework for use within packet-switched network environments. The 
provision of a stack that is independent from currently used structures enabled the 
design of a reference model addressing the issues of message protection for both 
the internal and external protocol data units. 
The research work has presented a novel protocol architecture, realising security 
services to all level of the communication between the stack layers. Protection of 
the layer service primitives and PDUs exchanged between the layer interfaces are 
issues that to our knowledge have never arisen in previous protocol designs. The 
increased probability of attacks launched against messages in transit, leveraged the 
design of communication protocols in which security architectures have been added 
to support the required functionality. 
The idea behind the design of the FCNS has been the need of a scheme that would 
firstly protect the internal messages of a set of communication rules, before 
proceeding in providing services for the actual information to be transferred. The 
reasons for this approach lay on the technology supporting network connectivity 
and the integration of communication systems into the UMTS. The demystification 
of telecommunication networks implied the usage of protocols widely used and 
exploited in Computer systems. The technological advances in cryptographic 
applications meant the provision of more secure algorithms, minimising the 
possibilities of successful attacks. It has therefore been identified that attempts at 
manipulating a connection would target the operation of the protocols supporting 
the communication, since no mechanisms have been used to account 
for their 
protec ion. 
The FCNS structure has been viewed with respect to the individuality each 
layer 
exhibited, allowing the security of the protocol modules 
irrespective of the status of 
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the whole stack. The Security Layer has been designed to provide each FCNS layer 
with the necessary functionality to ensure the protection of the communication 
process at all possible levels. All messages concerning the operation of the FCNS 
have been secured, to counter possible attacks aiming at connection discontinuity, 
information disclosure, session replay and hijacking, as well as illicit connection 
requests. 
The security functionality of the FCNS has been encompassed into a single layer, to 
reduce problems identified with reference architectures, such as the OSI model. 
The lack of implicit mechanisms in the FCNS communication layers signified the 
avoidance of functionality duplication and, at the same time, the ease in managing 
and updating functions in relation to network security advances. The SL has 
consequently been able to support a wide range of security services to all levels of 
communication, reducing the processing load and network resources that would be 
required for each individual layer. 
The advantage of the FCNS architecture is the simplicity of the design of the stack, 
offering network operators the possibility of enforcing security mechanisms on- 
demand and at any required level. The application of the SL protection 
mechanisms is not imperative, enhancing the flexibility of the FCNS in transmitting 
various types of data. 
The FCNS conforms to the design principles of the OSI model, adopting a layered 
structure to maintain compatibility with currently used protocol architectures. The 
most distinctive features of the research work proposal are 
the lack of clearly 
defined application and physical layers, as well as the placement of the 
SL in 
relation to the rest of the stack. 
The exclusion of the layered functionality for the 
mentioned protocols is explained 
in Chapter 4, where an indication is given as to 
the steps taken to provide similar 
instances for the FCNS simulation environments. 
The layers analysis has proven that the FCNS communication 
layers can adapt to 
Chapter 9- 275 
PrOrOC01 ZWCU"Ey I-Uf -') L7VflVFdElUfl I VlCf-UfflfffUfll(-dLlUfl ZýYbEVM! 
many network environments, offering network operators the choice of either using 
the FCNS stack as is, or replacing its layers with other protocols. 
The work has also analysed the design and applicability of the FCNS keystrearn 
generator, serving as the provider of the secret keys used for the security contexts 
(SCs) of the internal messages. The FCNS external messages can be protected by 
using either the FCNS keystream generator or parameters provided by the network, 
such as the HLR/AuC of the UMTS CN. The generator has been subjected to tests 
regarding its applicability in security applications, referencing standardised 
procedures to provide a system that could be used in current topologies. Further 
statistical and cryptographic tests have also been used, to identify the generator 
correctness and relevance with respect to the current status of cryptographic 
applications. The FCNS keystrearn generator has successfully passed the tests in 
question, making it suitable for the provision of the necessary secret keys for the 
FCNS SCs. 
Furthermore, the FCNSEP has been presented, providing details on the operation of 
the protocol and the application of security functions for its messages. FCNSEP can 
be used for either interlayer or peer-error signalling, to indicate a wide range of 
faulty conditions and obtain the appropriate actions by the SL or the system 
management. The protection of the FCNSEP messages depends on the level of its 
application and signalling procedures. For this reason, the SL has to exchange the 
respective SCs with the FCNS communication layers, to enable identification of the 
signalling case and the provision of the required security services. The FCNSEP has 
been compared to currently used signalling techniques, such as the ICMP of the 
TCP/IP suite. The analysis of the ICMP has proven that FCNSEP provides a more 
complete and efficient solution in notifying the protocol layers and the peer 
communicating entities of transmission errors and fault conditions that might occur. 
In particular, the independence of the FCNSEP from specific communication 
protocols implies that any layer can signal a condition to the SL or the network 
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system. By this method, errors regarding the negotiation of the transfer syntax, 
QoS parameters and SCs can be indicated, in conjunction to the cases arisen from 
congestion built up and unreachable hosts. 
The FCNS prototype has also been developed, which addressed the issues of 
verifying the communication between the FCNS layers and the detection of 
potential design pitfalls. The abstraction of the FCNS specification enabled also the 
comparison of the FCNS stack to the design expectations and its conformance to 
the procedure rules set for the services it offers to network elements. The logical 
consistency of the specification itself has also been tested, to detect any 
functionality duplication and the definition of functions and services outside the 
scope of the protocol. 
Following the validation of the FCNS prototype, the design has been realised into 
software code. This approach has been followed to create the FCNS simulation 
topologies, for the testing of the FCNS functions and procedures in relation to 
connection requests and data transfer processes. In particular, the software model 
enabled the observation of the effects of the security functions to the overall 
communication process, both at the internal and external levels. Since emphasis 
has been given on the security of the internal FCNS messages, the layers of the 
protocol structure have been viewed as independent modules, connected to each 
other via links. These links actually represented the interfaces of a layered protocol 
to those directly adjacent to it, accepting and forwarding information to the access 
points specific for a service. Their use provided the advantage of programming the 
delay it would take for a layer to process a message, simulating the effects of the 
FCNS functions application. 
The model enabled the comparison with currently used protocol architectures and, 
more specifically, the TCP/IP. These measurements targeted the applicability of the 
architectures in supporting the communication between the UMTS CN elements. Of 
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importance, observations related to the efficiency and throughput of the suites in 
delivering signalling type data, for cases where security functionality was not 
needed and when full security measures needed to be applied, have been taken. 
FCNS outperformed the Internet suite for the cases included in the observations, 
varying from the application of variable data sizes to BER alterations. 
For the protocol efficiency calculations, the FCNS exhibited 3.7% greater 
performance than the TCP/IP suite running with IPv4 and 7.32% for the IPv6 with 
ESP in tunnel mode, for a representative 1460 byte long data size and variable 
BER. Varying the data size to reflect several cases and types of information 
exchange, then for an error-free interval of 125 msec, FCNS had a superior 
performance of 12% in relation to TCP/IPv4 and 21% to TCP/IPv6. Increasing the 
BER to 10-5, FCNS achieved 12% greater performance with respect to TCP/lPv4 and 
15.5% to TCP/IPv6. The values indicated, reflected observations made for the 
FCNS when full security measures were applied, to model a reference FCNS 
instance. 
For the throughput calculations, FCNS has exhibited superior functioning compared 
to the Internet suite. For both cases of a minimum and maximum receiver size 
window, FCNS achieved greater throughput performance than TCP/IP, varying from 
an overall transmission of 19 to 55 additional frames respectively. 
Finally, comparisons have been made to observe the protocol throughput efficiency 
under BER variations and constant data size. FCNS has indicated superior 
performance to the Internet protocol architecture, of the order of 10% to 30%, 
even for relatively small error-free intervals. 
There has therefore been the conclusion that the FCNS exhibits superior 
performance to the TCP/IP suite under real network conditions, involving the 
transmission of various sized data in erroneous communication channels. 
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9.2 FCNS Applicability 
In this section an insight on the UMTS CN services is given, to enabie the 
identification of the FCNS applicability in telecommunication systems. The 
architecture chosen to attempt and analyse the FCNS capabilities is the Release 99 
of the UMTS CN and more specifically the PS domain. Figure A. 1 of Appendix A 
illustrates the view of the R99 network as developed in the 3GPP specifications [3]. 
The PS domain forms the set of the CN entities offering a PS type of connection for 
both the user traffic and network signalling [187]. User information is transferred 
via data packets each of which can be routed independently of the previous one. In 
a sense, the PS domain exhibits the characteristics of a general packet-based 
network, such as the Internet in the way messages are exchanged between the 
network nodes. 
The elements of interest to the PS domain are the Equipment Identity Register 
(EIR), the Home Location Register (HLR) encompassing the Authentication Centre 
(AuQ, the 3G Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) and the Gateway GPRS Support 
Node (GGSN). The UMTS registers are actually independent of the domain CN 
refers to, although their inclusion is imperative due to the information they provide 
to the PS network elements. 
The EIR contains information regarding the user identity and mainly the equipment 
numbers that will be used throughout the connection. The HLR/AuC contains a 
collection of information to which a subscriber is assigned for record purposes. The 
AuC stores data for each user to enable its authentication whenever a connection 
needs to be established. The SGSN is a register used to support subscription 
information for PS services and the communication of the CN towards the access 
network. It is responsible for mobility management issues such as routing area and 
location updates, as well as controlling the security mechanisms relevant to the 
packet connections. Finally, the GGSN maintains the connections towards external 
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packet-switched networks, such as the Internet, and has the session management 
responsibilities of the UMTS CN. It is also used to store subscriber data received 
from the HLR and/or SGSN. 
The four basic QoS classes that must be supported in the UMTS CN are as follows 
[65]: 
9 Conversational class: minimum fixed delay, no buffering, symmetric trafficjr 
guaranteed bit rate. This class is usually applied for time sensitive data 
such as real-time audio and video. 
e Streaming class: minimum variable delay, buffering allowed, asymmetric 
traffic, guaranteed bit rate. Applied mainly for streaming applications such 
as music downloading. 
9 Interactive class: moderate variable delay, buffering allowed, asymmetric 
traffic, no guaranteed bit rate. An example of such service is the Wireless 
Application Protocol (WAP). 
0 Background class: big variable delay, buffering allowed, asymmetric traffic, 
no guaranteed bit rate. Support for general packet-based transmissions. 
The guaranteed bit rate parameter is the rate that the bearer service must carry 
between the service end points, given the maximum permissible rate that may be 
used. The identification of the service classes enable the designer in identifying the 
applicability of the set of communication rules that can be used to support the 
required services. 
FCNS supports many levels of QoS for a packet-based data transmission. 
Depending on the data that has to be exchanged, the various classes can be 
supported by the UDSES and TX-LAYER, giving priority to time and delay sensitive 
data. At the same time, the full - duplex communication support and FCNS flow 
control mechanisms enable the provision of either symmetric or asymmetric traffic. 
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The FCNS ability to adapt to erroneous conditions, such as the presence of 
excessive network latency and bit errors, makes the protocol stack an attractive 
solution for supporting the four service classes of the UMTS CN and consequently 
the transmission of virtually any type of traffic. 
For the PDP context exchanges, the observations for the propagation delay of 100 
msec have provided the means of extracting information as to the efficiency of the 
FCNS in handling signalling-type information data requests. The characteristics and 
particularities of this kind of data have been modelled by setting the data size in 
200 bytes or 1600 bits and by setting the priority of the data to the highest 
possible. From the results obtained, the work has concluded that FCNS can 
efficiently Support the basic UMTS services, due to the protocol's high adaptability 
and flexibility in transmitting signalling type data. 
For the UMTS CN, security is also a very important QoS factor as analysed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. For the R99, there exists no network domain security defined for 
the PS domain. Because R99 will be the first commercial UMTS release, it is very 
important for the operators to be able to support an adequate level of protection for 
the sensitive data that may be transferred between the network elements. 
FCNS addresses the issues of message security irrespective of the underlying 
submedium and the user data. This transparency enables the protection of the 
user and/or signalling data at the highest possible level, assuming that there exists 
an adequate mechanism supporting the creation and exchange of public keys used 
between the peer elements. 
The provision of the FCNS traffic padding mechanism ensures that the possibilities 
of a successful passive monitoring attack (sniffing) are minimised, avoiding traffic- 
pattern attacks. By this method, sensitive data such as secret keys used for the 
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user authentication procedures cannot be distinguished from random data, 
disabling an attacker from manipulating the information in transit. 
Furthermore, the FCNS keystream generator provides for the unique keys used to 
secure the FCNS messages. The SC exchange process ensures the session 
integrity, making session hijacking attacks very difficult to succeed. This implies 
that valuable user information that may exchanged between the SGSN and GGSN 
will not be disclosed to an unauthorised party and, at the same time, the adversary 
will not be able to repeat part or the whole of the session to gain information about 
the network and/or its subscribers. 
The provision of the unique FCNS keys, the address verification procedures and the 
SL functionality also support the protection of the system against illicit connection 
requests that may lead to DoS attacks [65]. Also, protection is provided against 
spoofing attacks aiming at forging service requests. It should be very difficult for 
an adversary to masquerade a legitimate node and request the transmission or 
manipulation of user and/or signalling data. 
The implementation of the FCNS can therefore provide for a more flexible and 
efficient solution for use in telecommunication environments than currently defined 
protocol architectures. The simplicity of the proposed architecture enables the 
portability of the FCNS in many packet-switched environments, and also the update 
of the protocol mechanisms depending on network and communication advances. 
The superior performance of the FCNS in relation to the TCP/IP suite, as observed 
in Chapter 8, enhances the arguments presented in this thesis, for which FCNS 
should be the preferred solution for supporting packet-based communication. For 
the UMTS CN, there is also the advantage of preserving compatibility between the 
various architectural releases. Updates on the UMTS should reflect possible 
amendments to the FCNS functionality and not the choice of additional or different 
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protocols serving as the network backbone. Cost is therefore minimised by 
maintaining this level of consistency and at the same time provide for an easy to 
manage solution portable for any service users might request. 
9.3 Further Work 
The research work has presented a secure architectural framework for use within 
PS network topologies. The FCNS can be used in environments such as computer 
and telecommunication systems, addressing protocol and data security issues. The 
comparisons with the TCP/IP suite have indicated the superiority of the proposed 
work in providing a more efficient transmission for a wide range of data types. Its 
applicability has been analysed with respect to the UMTS CN, affording a sufficient 
and flexible solution for the security of the R99 architecture. 
The FCNS specification represents the initial attempts made to define an up-to-date 
reference model. The simulation environments enabled the testing of the protocol 
functions and procedures, identifying effects such as security functions application 
and the FCNSEP. To further address the applicability of the FCNS in 
telecommunication networks, the model can be transferred into the OPNET modeller 
environment, which makes use of implicit libraries providing a more complete 
solution. Cases include the UMTS CN architectures, wireless networks, LANs and 
mobile access systems. The usage of such a commercial tool would enable a more 
pragmatic FCNS evaluation, since libraries are pre-programmed, offering greater 
flexibility in addressing design and development issues of the stack. 
Furthermore, the FCNS can be extended to support variable bit rate applications 
such as multimedia. The measurements presented in Chapter 8 indicate a rate of 
adaptability of the protocol in BER and delay variations, which is of particular 
importance when transferring time and delay-sensitive data. Due to the nature of 
the proposal, multimedia support has not been investigated in depth and issues 
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such as the establishment and monitoring of video-conferencing connections would 
merit further study. Support for such services has only been viewed with respect to 
the implications security functionality might have, where the SL may not be needed 
for specific layers of the communication. 
An additional feature that can be exploited is the transmission of voice data for the 
UMTS CS domain. Messages originating from the Mobile Application Part (MAP) 
protocol can be mapped onto the FCNS frames and be exchanged between the 
UMTS network elements. As the architectural releases of the UMTS progress, 
commercial deployment of the network will imply the support of a single domain, 
where voice and packet data will be transferred by a single protocol (e. g. voice over 
IP). To preserve compatibility with R99, given that the FCNS is used as the 
transport mechanism for the UMTS signalling data, voice-based services can be 
developed to adapt to the technological advances and nature of the integrated 
system. 
Finally, the FCNS PHYS layer functionality can be enhanced to support network 
environments such as local area networks. The particularity of such topologies 
entails the classification of the network nodes into servers and clients, in which 
elements are not peers. The UDSES protocol already includes services such as the 
provision of communication tokens and their management. The PHYS layer though 
has not been designed to address communication procedures for LANs. The 
provision of a Medium Access Control (MAC) scheme and token technology can 
therefore be researched, to enable the use of the FCNS in such topologies. Due to 
the simplicity and architecture of the protocol stack, updates will only be necessary 
for the PHYS layer. The SL will be able to provide the appropriate SCs no matter 
the level of network support PHYS layer affords and the environment on which 
FCNS runs. 
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The FCNS has been designed to be simple and flexible in adapting to network and 
security technological advances, increasing its applicability in network 
environments. The development of the protocol stack should therefore be 
continuous, to preserve its efficiency and compatibility with standardised network 
models and transmission techniques. Its increased performance in relation to 
currently used protocol suites and the advantages it exhibits over standardised 
reference models, make the FCNS an attractive solution for use in current and 
future telecommunication networks. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. FCNS Protocol Specification Diagrams 
Appendix A includes the abstracted representations of the FCNS layers processes, 
given in SDL diagrams. Information is also provided as to the UMTS CN R99 
architecture. 
Figure A. 1 - UMTS CN R99 
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Figure A. 2.2 - Node Receiving Instance 
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Figure A. 3.1 - UDPRES Sending Instance 
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Figure A. 3.2 - UDPRES Receiving Instance 
Process Type receiving 
IDLE 
1 
NO 
ý2 
I 
identify the keys 
-sent, 11\ 
YES 
receive SC and c hock w hether protocol ca n 
node status ýupport connection for thk; 
instance 
V 
N, i--I 
2 
syntax -ý, _ 
No 
obtain source syntax and I 
analýse msg check agreement, construct check header: syntax remov e 
respective msg and ency header 
T- 
ication YES agree on syntax -9 efforts>2 
to 
break communication and signal node 
to SL 
analyse Z. 7 
Discard decision if already 
received for same connection or 
due to the expectance of a 
previous printive for the same 
connection ID - check the SC as 
w ell, signal to the SL if error is 
persistent 
indication J1) NO 
syn x/ 
Yý 
Itax I /a, 
decision 
I 
response 
discard rnsg 
I more than 3 erroneous 
msgs arrive initiate the 
FCNSEP 
response 
mirnitive 
1 
1 
strip 
header 
Appendix A- 291 PrOtOCOI Security for 3ro Generation Telecommunication Systems 
Figure A. 4.1 - UDSES Sending Instance 
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Figure A. 4.2 - UDSES Receiving Instance 
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Figure A. 5.1 - TX-LAYER Sending Instance 
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Figure A. 5.2 - TX_LAYER Receiving Instance 
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Figure A. 6.1 - EE_LAYER Sending Instance 
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Figure A. 6.2 - EE_LAYER Receiving Instance 
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Figure A. 7.1 - PHYS Sending Instance 
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Figure A. 7.2 - PHYS Receiving Instance 
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Figure A. 8.2 - SL Receiving Instance 
1 (1) 
H 
I wakfor 11 lhandshakell 
completely successfully instrL 
K_LAY ER to send a bogus AC 
rovide, layers then w th extern 
messages SCs 
M 
M 
rmnftor II 
activ ity 
II 
identify msgs and provide 
appropriate actions. For 
xample assist UDSES in the 
address verification 
procedures 
ELSE 
end 
3ET STATUS to layers. If traff ic 
padding applies wad for bogus 
msgs reception 
DLE 
Appendix A- 301 Protocol Security for 3r" Generation Telecommunication Systems 
Process Type receiving 
Figure A. 9.1 - FCNSEP Sending Instance 
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Figure A. 9.2 - FCNSEP Receiving Instance 
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Appendix B. FCNS Keystream Generator Statistical Test 
Results 
Appendix B provides details of the results obtained by measuring the performance 
of the generator using the DIEHARD statistical tests battery. The generator has 
been made to produce more than 3,000,000 numbers, all placed on a binary file. 
The latter constitutes a prerequisite for the DIEHARD operation, which requires 
large files to enable the generation of a large sample of the output sequence. 
Information is provided as to the measurements obtained for the following set of 
tests: 
0 Frequency (count-the-1s) tests - total of 2 tests by DIEHARD 
0 Poker (overlapping 5-permutation) test - total of 1 test 
0 Runs and long runs tests - total of 1 test 
0 Birthday test - total of 1 test 
0 Bitstream test - total of 1 test 
For every test, the normal probability density function from the results obtained is 
depicted, together with the respective uniform cumulative density function (cdf). 
The normal distribution has been used since it models the central limit theorem 
[1681. This states that the sum of independent samples from any distribution with 
finite mean and variance converges to the normal distribution, as the sample size 
goes to infinity. The graphs are given to provide a measure identifying the 
response of the FCNS keystream generator to the tests completed, given the p 
values obtained. Figure B. 1.1 illustrates the standard normal distribution reference 
graph whilst Figure B. 1.2 the standard cdf of the (0,1) interval. 
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Figure B. 1.1: Standard normal pdf 
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